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By what means, then, is poverty to be contended against? How is the evil of low 
wages to be remedied? If the expedients usually recommended for the purpose 
are not adapted to it, can no others be thought of? Is the problem incapable of 
solution? Can political economy do nothing, but only object to everything and 
demonstrate that nothing can be done?  
 
     ---J. S. Mill, The Principles of Political Economy 
 
 
“Man,” said the Ghost, “if man you are in heart, not adamant, forbear that 
wicked cant until you have discovered What surplus is, and Where it is. Will you 
decide what men shall live, what men shall die? It may be, that in the sight of 
Heaven, you are more worthless and less fit to live than millions like this poor 
man’s child. Oh God! to hear the Insect on the leaf pronouncing on the too much 
life among his hungry brothers in the dust!” 
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This dissertation critically examines why mid-Victorian fiction often 
dismisses or complicates monetary transactions and monetary charity, even as it 
negatively portrays differences in social status and wealth. I argue that the novel 
uses representations of failed charity to reconstruct, however briefly, a non-
monetary and non-economic source of value. Further, I examine how the novel 
uses techniques of both genre and style to predict, form, and critique alternate, 
non-economic, social models. While tension surrounding the practice of charity 
arises in the late eighteenth century, the increasing dominance of political 
economy in public discourse forced Victorian literature to take a strong stance, 
for reasons of both ethics and genre. This stance is complicated by the 
eighteenth-century legacy that portrays charity as a kind of luxury. If giving to 
the poor makes us feel good, this logic suggests, surely it isn’t moral. Thus, while 
much eighteenth- and nineteenth-century literature remains dedicated to the 
ethics of charity, the practice becomes immensely complex. By discussing the 
works of Tobias Smollett, Charles Dickens, Elizabeth Barrett Browning, and 
George Eliot, this project exposes a wide variety of responses to this deep 
 
vii 
cultural anxiety. These authors are, ultimately, strongly invested in redefining 
the meaning of benevolence as a valid form of social action by moving that 
benevolence away from monetary gifts and toward abstractly correct moral 
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The Luxury Debates, the Poor Laws, and the Crisis of Victorian Fiction 
 
 
 When Henry Mayhew describes the chaos of London markets in the 1840s, 
he deliberately blurs the line between acts of buying and selling and acts of 
begging and charity. Children selling vegetables “creep between people, 
wriggling their way through every interstice, and asking for custom in whining 
tones, as if seeking charity.”1 Descending further into the market, he notes the 
“clean family, begging; the father with his head down as if in shame, and a box 
of lucifers held forth in his hand—the boys in newly-washed pinafores, and the 
tidily got-up mother with a child at her breast” (1.10). The father isn’t begging, 
though, despite Mayhew’s description—he is selling matches. Of course, selling 
matches was an occupation hardly sufficient to feed young girls, let alone the 
entire “clean family” of at least three children. Mayhew later goes on to explain 
that match-selling itself is an almost entirely liminal occupation. A match-seller 
he interviews much later in the volume complains, as he tries to calculate the 
number of match-sellers in London, that “I don't reckon them as begs, or whines, 
or sticks to a house for an hour, but them as sells; in my opinion, they're 200, and 
no more. All the others dodges, in one way or other, on pity and charity” (1.433). 
So, this family’s participation in an act of commerce is, in and of itself, a non-
                                                
1 Henry Mayhew, London Labour and the London Poor, ed. John D. Rosenberg 
(1849; New York: Dover Publications, 1968) 1.9. Subsequent references in text, 
with volume number indicated. 
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commercial activity. Moreover, charity, in this case, is the same as any other of 
the “street dodges” that Mayhew will eventually illuminate. At the same time, 
Mayhew’s description undercuts common stereotypes of begging. The family is 
neither dirty nor loud, neither proud nor drunken. Unlike the earlier children, 
who participate in a more legitimate act of sale, there is no “whining tone” here.  
 For Mayhew, sellers beg and beggars sell, and the topsy-turvy nature of 
London markets is just another part of their interest. But the markets weren’t the 
only thing turning upside-down in the middle of the nineteenth century. The 
very nature of economic writing was shifting. Earlier writers were, like Mayhew 
himself, quick to discuss poverty and vice; indeed, poverty and scarcity were the 
driving economic force for Malthusian economists. By the end of the century, this 
theoretical position would be radically reversed. After the “marginalist 
revolution” in the 1870s, economics became almost exclusively focused on 
purchasing and consumer choice, rather than on labor, production, and scarcity. 
According to Mary Poovey: 
economics’ embrace of mathematical modeling, which was inextricably 
linked to the theory of marginal utility, helped widen the gap between a 
mode of explanation that was obviously (if not perfectly) related to the 
phenomena it sought to describe and another mode whose referential 
capacity was arguably less important than its formal coherence.2  
In other words, after the work of economists such as William Stanley Jevons and 
Alfred Marshall, economics no longer had a need to account for social realities 
                                                
2 Mary Poovey, Genres of the Credit Economy (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2008) 277.  
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such as poverty.  
 Modern scholars criticize the resulting school, now often called 
“neoclassical economics,” for focusing exclusively on individual preference, as 
opposed to large-scale social action; in neoclassical economics “self-interested 
agents must use their reason—they must make choices between alternative 
uses—about the disposition of their resources in order to realize their ends.”3 
Rather than studying large group phenomena—most relevantly here, poverty—
“all social institutions can be reduced to the individual preferences of the agents 
who comprise such institutions and groups.”4 Focusing on this kind of 
individual economic choice inevitably pulls economics away from politics. While 
somewhat disingenuous about his own involvements, Jevons set the tone when 
he quipped that “about politics, I confess myself in a fog.”5 Rather than being 
genuinely apolitical, though, this type of economic thought expends “much 
energy . . . to efface and ignore the political constitution of such thought.”6  
 Mayhew’s mid-century ambivalence, poised just before this drastic 
economic turn, is echoed in the more exclusively economic writings of his 
decade. Economists like John Stuart Mill were forced to actively decide what role 
charity and poverty would have in their own economic writings, at a time when 
both were still vitally important to Britain but becoming less and less so in 
                                                
3 Jack Amariglio, Stephen Resnick, and Richard D. Wolff, “Division and 
Difference in the ‘Discipline’ of Economics,” Knowledges: Historical and Critical 
Studies in Disciplinarity, ed. Ellen Messer-Davidow, David R. Shumway, and 
David J. Sylvan (Charlottesville: U of Virginia P, 1993) 168. 
4 Armaglio, Resnick, and Wolff 169.  
5 Qtd in Robert Heilbronner, The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times, and Ideas of 
the Great Economic Thinkers, 7th ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999) 182. 
6 Armaglio, Resnick, and Wolff 154. 
 4 
economics as a discipline. In this first section of my chapter, I will examine this 
ideological crisis of charity as it appears in Mill and Mayhew, two writers whose 
ostensibly quite different goals become surprisingly similar over the course of 
their texts. Discussing these two writers will reveal a deep and important 
Victorian social anxiety about philanthropy, which the remainder of my project 
hopes to illuminate and the remainder of this chapter will historicize. 
In his Principles of Political Economy (1848, revised 1865), Mill subscribes to a 
Malthusian position regarding surplus population. Because of the nature of 
supply and demand, he argues, the only way to permanently increase the 
standard of living among the working class is for there to be fewer workers. The 
only way to decrease the numbers of the working class is for working-class 
families to have fewer children. But, like many Victorians, Mill believes that the 
poor tend to automatically convert higher wages into more children, rather than 
into a higher standard of living: “the use they commonly choose to make of any 
advantageous change in their circumstances, is to take it out in the form which, 
by augmenting the population, deprives the succeeding generation of the 
benefit.”7 The desire of the middle classes to move up the social ladder 
encourages them to have relatively few children, but if the poor can “bring up a 
family as they themselves were brought up, even the prudent among them are 
easily satisfied” (174). Even worse, the poor are tempted to “rely on fortune, or 
the resources to be found in legal or voluntary charity” to help them raise these 
                                                
7 John Stuart Mill, The Principles of Political Economy (1848 & 1865, Amherst: 
Prometheus Books, 2004) 175. The version used is based on Mill’s revised edition 
of 1865. Passages cited here have been checked against the 1848 first edition; 
significant changes are noted. Subsequent citations in text.  
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children (174). Poverty is rendered here as not only choice—one could be more 
upwardly mobile with fewer children—but as a deliberate abuse of public 
resources.  
For all his pessimism about the state of population, though, Mill is 
considerably less acerbic than many Malthusians. He notes, for instance, that as 
society progresses “population is restrained by fear of want, rather than want 
itself. Even where there is no question of starvation, many are similarly acted 
upon by the apprehension of losing what have come to be regarded as the 
decencies of their situation in life” (173). To the extent that even the working 
class can come to expect a higher standard of living, they will have fewer 
children. This causation, however, is enormously delayed because the poor lack 
adequate foresight: “Improvement in the habits and requirements of the mass of 
unskilled day laborers” can only be the result of “raising the entire body to a 
state of tolerable comfort and maintaining them in it until a new generation 
grows up” (367). Only children raised in this “tolerable comfort” will see that 
lifestyle as a requirement rather than a luxury and moderate their behavior 
accordingly. In this way Mill attempts to moderate what he sees as the self-
sabotage of the poor. If they are content merely to stay in the same situation, 
generation after generation, the only way for them to move forward as a class is 
for that situation to be substantially altered by those in another economic 
position. By this logic, only a serious, forward-thinking, middle-class altruism 
can reduce class inequality.   
While Mill could use this quandary as an excuse to abandon the poor to 
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their own devices, a gesture that many philanthropists criticized in economics at 
large, he instead proposes specific solutions. First, Mill believes that the poor 
need a guaranteed level of practical education. More importantly than any set 
curriculum, they should be taught to recognize “the tendencies of their actions” 
with the desired effect of creating “a public opinion by which intemperance and 
improvidence of every kind would be held discreditable, and the improvidence 
which overstocks the labor market would be severely condemned” (366). In their 
current state, the poor are “careless of the consequences of their actions” exactly 
because they have no expectations of social advancement (366). The second stage 
of Mill’s project, then, after teaching the poor the social realities of cause and 
effect is to provide hope of social advancement through colonization and land 
reform. Once able to understand the consequences of their actions, the poor will 
be able to make better use of new opportunities. More critically, we might say, 
once the poor are educated to have an appropriately middle-class ideology of 
social advancement, they can be “trusted” not to abuse such social opportunity.  
As someone who proposes what he saw as non-charitable methods of 
reform, Mill has an understandably complex attitude toward philanthropy. In 
several instances, he mocks philanthropic efforts as an insufficient and often 
ridiculous way of bandaging social problems. He remarks scathingly that 
agricultural laborers “with large families, and eight or perhaps nine shillings for 
their weekly wages when in full employment, have for some time been one of the 
stock objects of popular compassion: it is time that they had the benefit also of 
some application of common sense” (346). Mill applauds “sensitiveness to the 
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hardships of the poor” at the same time that he is frustrated by “an 
unwillingness to face the real difficulty of their position” (346). Like many 
philanthropists, then, Mill feels the injustice of the middle class’s general 
ignorance of both the causes and the effects of poverty. Indeed, he claims that 
this ignorance often causes middle class charity to do more harm than good. In 
the 1848 edition of his text, he criticizes those who see “improvidence” as a key 
recommendation to charity: !  
While a man who is intemperate in drink, is discountenanced and despised 
by all who profess to be moral people, is it not to this hour the favorite 
recommendation for any parochial office bestowed by popular election, to 
have a large family and be unable to maintain them? Do not the candidates 
placard their intemperance on walls, and publish it through the town in 
circulars?8 
Giving charity, or in this case remunerated public office, to people whose only 
recommendation is having too many children is, in Mill’s analogy, the equivalent 
of buying drinks for alcoholics. 
                                                
8 Thomas Carlyle uses this opportunity to make a Dickensian joke. His 
marginalia to this passage exclaims “Bumble for Beadle! He has ten children!” 
(See Carlyle: Books & Margins, UCSC Bibliographical Series Number Three 
[University of California, 1980]). Bumble is the Beadle of Oliver Twist, and 
Sketches By Boz mocks the same voting phenomenon. In 1865 Mill modified the 
ending of the above quoted paragraph to read: “While a man who is intemperate 
in drink, is discountenanced and despised by all who profess to be moral people, 
it is one of the chief grounds made use of in appeals to the benevolent that the 
applicant has a large family and is unable to maintain them.” Mill further softens 
the message by adding, in a footnote, “Little improvement can be expected in 
morality until the producing of large families is regarded with the same feelings 
as drunkenness or any other physical excess. But while the aristocracy and clergy 
are foremost to set the example of this kind of incontinence what can be expected 
from the poor?” (361). 
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Despite what could thus be easily constructed as an anti-charitable attitude, 
Mill does strongly support the operations of public charity. He is especially 
sensitive to the plight of poor children, arguing that “since no one is responsible 
for having been born, no pecuniary sacrifice is too great to be made by those who 
have more than enough, for the purpose of securing enough to all persons 
already in existence” (350). The idea of personal responsibility resonates strongly 
through all of Mill’s writings about poverty, and here he uses it to dilute the 
most objectionable effects of Malthusianism. We must do what we can to limit 
future population growth, but we cannot in good conscience allow existing 
children to die merely to, in the words of Ebenezer Scrooge, “reduce the surplus 
population.” Mill does believe strongly, though, in doing all that can be done to 
prevent this generation’s surplus from perpetuating itself: “it is another thing 
altogether, when those who have produced and accumulated are called upon to 
abstain from consuming until they have given food and clothing, not only to all 
who now exist, but to all whom these or their descendants may think fit to call 
into existence” (351).  If this excess charity comes to be expected, “there would be 
nothing to hinder population from starting forward at its rapidest rate” (351). 
Charity must be given with great care, in Mill’s view, lest it remove any hope of 
its own efficacy. When population does advance “at its rapidest rate,” no amount 
of charity will be sufficient to prevent starvation and disease.  
So, what does successful charity look like? First, Mill warns that any charity 
that guarantees subsistence must be part of a larger social system. He claims in 
several places in his text that the state should consider restricting marriage to 
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those who can prove their ability to provide for potential offspring. Otherwise, 
we “lavish the means of benefiting mankind, without attaining the object” (352). 
Perhaps unexpectedly for those who envision Mill as a defender of personal 
liberty, the same sentiments lead him to strongly embrace the New Poor Law 
and the principle of less eligibility. One way to keep charity from only increasing 
the population is to provide “relief, though ample in respect to necessaries” that 
is “accompanied by conditions which [the recipients] disliked, consisting of some 
restraints upon their freedom, and the privation of some indulgences” (353). 
Nowhere in his lengthy work does Mill choose to address how seldom the 
“necessaries” dispensed by workhouses were at all sufficient, and his choice of 
the word “indulgences” suggests a deep suspicion of the working class.9 It is, 
furthermore, quite possible that the “indulgence” Mill has in mind is sex, given 
that workhouses often separated husbands and wives. In this case, the 
workhouse and the poor laws are celebrated precisely because they can forcibly 
enact the restriction on childbirth that Mill so desperately desires from other 
social strictures, like a mandated minimum age for marriage. Readers should 
remember, though, that Mill desires the same restraint from the middle and 
upper classes but leaves their own greed and desire for upward mobility to 
compel them to have fewer children.  
Mill sees this efficient, practical, forward-looking model of state charity as a 
                                                
9 Mill’s inclusion in the Association for Improving Workhouse Infirmaries, 
founded in 1866, just one year after the revised edition of the Principles, suggests 
that he was indeed aware of workhouse shortcomings. Workhouse scandals were 
also popular newspaper material throughout the 1840s. (See Anthony Brundage, 
The English Poor Laws 1700-1930 [Houndsmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002] 99, 87.) 
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direct contrast to older paternalistic models. His feelings toward the upper class, 
indeed, are quite bitter, dwelling on what he sees as the great gap between 
aristocratic theories of paternalism and their practice. He defines the paternalist 
model as a view in which “the relation between rich and poor . . . should be only 
partially authoritative: it should be amiable, moral, and sentimental: affectionate 
tutelage on the one side, respectful and grateful deference on the other” (694). 
Mill keenly points out that this “is the ideal of the Future, in the minds of those 
whose dissatisfaction with the Present assumes the form of affection and regret 
toward the Past” (694). Mill contends that this lovely vision, like much nostalgia, 
is only and forever a lovely vision. He does recognize, however, some value in 
this particular variety of sentimentality. “Self-devotion” and “strong personal 
attachments” are particularly attractive in a society that could easily base its 
actions entirely on “feelings arising out of pecuniary interest” (695). “A generous 
giving of protection, and a grateful receiving of it” are undeniably strong threads 
to connect disparate elements of society. We must recognize, however, that 
“these virtues and sentiments” are no longer a necessary part of the modern 
world (695). Pragmatically, in Mill’s view, paternalism can no longer function 
because the poor are too quick to realize the gap between the interests of the 
upper classes and themselves. More importantly, the gap between the classes is 
now too great—the “necessity of enforcing a stringent Poor Law” to meet with 
modern demands would soon crush any attempts to actualize paternalistic 
ideals. Both sentimentally and practically, paternalistic ideals have no place in 
Mill’s England.  
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Despite popular criticism resenting economics as anti-charitable, however, 
Mill’s final stance is remarkably favorable toward charity. In the final section of 
his work, he devotes time to examining the implications of his economic system 
for philanthropy. Mill generally agrees that poorly considered charity does more 
harm than good, but he never chooses to use this as a strategy to explicitly 
disavow the power or place of charity. Instead, he insists that the state has an 
ethical obligation to keep its citizens alive and relatively comfortable. Mill insists 
that “though individuals should, in general, be left to do for themselves 
whatever it can be reasonably expected they should be capable of doing,” charity 
still has an important role. We must be careful, however, to consider the effects 
of our charity by attending to both “the consequences of the assistance itself, and 
the consequences of relying on that assistance” (880). Like many economists, Mill 
believes that relying on public charity can render the poor unable or unwilling to 
return to more “productive” employment. This understanding leads Mill to an 
enthusiastic embrace of the principle of less eligibility, which makes public 
charity more uncomfortable than almost any employment, however meager. The 
crucial criteria for any large scale philanthropy must consider “that if assistance 
is given in such a manner that the condition of the person helped is as desirable 
as that of the person who succeeds in doing the same thing without help, the 
assistance . . . is mischievous” (881). Thus far Mill aligns himself completely with 
the standards of the 1834 New Poor Laws.  
Nonetheless, Mill remains optimistic about the power of charity. He 
articulates, for example, reasons that public charity can be beneficial, noting that 
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assistance for the “hopeless” can be “a tonic, not a sedative” (881). Charity is as 
capable of helping people to begin again as it is of rendering them unwilling to 
work. More substantially, Mill also insists on the power of individual charity, 
when given on a case-by-case basis. While Mill sees that private charity is too 
fickle to provide the funds for large-scale aid, he acknowledges that in many 
cases it can be more effective. In Mill’s strict division of public and private 
charity, the one thing the state absolutely cannot do is to distinguish the 
“deserving” from the “undeserving” poor. State-funded aid to the destitute is a 
human right, and the state thus cannot leave its dispensation to be contingent 
upon a possibly faulty set of moral criteria. This exact niche is the province of 
private charity. Precisely because private benefactors are not obligated to give 
help to everyone, they can both give more than mere subsistence and choose to 
give only to certain people. While Mill is not explicit, his division of public and 
private leaves to private charity the task of helping those who are not starving. 
Anyone who needs something other than the workhouse is the proper object of 
the individual benefactor. In this model, Mill is left with a single purpose for 
private charity—it must seek out the deserving person who is most likely to 
benefit. This is, according to Mill, the “particular and appropriate province” of 
private charity, and “it is commendable or the contrary, as it exercises the 
function with more or less discernment” (882). The only successful private 
charity is thoughtful charity, where the emotions of the giver are not allowed to 
overrun judgment about charity’s effects.  
Henry Mayhew precisely demonstrates the problem with Mill’s tidy model, 
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as will many of the other texts this project will examine. Most crucially, how, 
exactly, is one to know the line between deserving and undeserving? Mill shows 
that the state, with its large powers of surveillance, cannot possibly make the 
distinction, but he offers no way for individuals to know it, either. London Labour 
and the London Poor complicates this situation far more than it illuminates it. 
Mayhew, as mentioned above, first demonstrates a variety of ways in which 
there is no clear line between legitimate street occupations and begging. The 
boys and girls who sweep the streets provide a valuable service in the dirty 
metropolis, but they earn no wages except from begging. Even those wages are 
forfeited when police are present. At the other extreme, little girls sell flowers to 
ladies and gentlemen who buy them, out of charity, for more than their market 
price. Which of these is charity, and which bad business?  
Mayhew believes, and demonstrates, that charity can be effective. For 
example, he narrates the story of an elderly couple, the husband very ill and the 
wife working diligently to earn only enough money to care for him. Mayhew 
describes the woman’s distaste for parish relief: “What shocked him the most 
was that I was obliged in his old age to go and ask for relief at the parish . . . . the 
only parish money that ever we had was this, and it does hurt him every day to 
think that he must be buried by the parish after all” (1.386). This situation, as 
Mayhew explicitly states, is a perfect case for individual charity, and, in a rare 
moment of reflection on his project, he reminds both the couple and his readers 
that newspaper readers of his accounts have in fact donated money for him to 
dispense charitably. The husband, Mayhew dryly notes, “was buried out of 
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funds sent to the ‘Morning Chronicle’” (1.386). The charity of Mayhew’s readers 
keeps an elderly man from the shame of a pauper funeral. 
Mayhew also distributes money in other ways. In a fascinating enactment 
of Mill’s discussion of interest, he takes a role as a moneylender to the poor. After 
explaining the usurious interest extracted from the poor, Mayhew goes on to 
describe his own intervention in the loan market. As one who has “exhibited an 
interest in the sufferings and privations” of costermongers, Mayhew has “striven 
to extricate the street-sellers from the grasp of the usurer” by various small loans 
(1.31). Mayhew is quite clear that this intercession is not charitable. Like many 
Victorian writers, Mayhew transparently claims that “gifts only degrade 
struggling honest men into the apathy of beggars” (1.31). Despite this strictly 
businesslike stance, it soon appears, as it does over and over in this text, that 
practical experience can support no such absolute division. As an outsider, 
Mayhew is forced to confess that he has no legal power to “seek or enforce a 
return of a loan” because he is completely “ignorant of where to find” his 
borrowers (1.32). The exchange Mayhew desperately envisions as a loan is only 
so if the costermonger himself chooses to see it as such. He is thus compelled to 
end his section with a description of how trustworthy the street-sellers are as 
borrowers—an image he reinforces by an example in which only one of two 
borrowers repays his part of a joint loan. The example further breaks down 
through its own language. The two men, as Mayhew recounts, “beg” him for the 
loan. While Mayhew wants to imagine himself as a benevolent moneylender, the 
inherent tension in such an idea renders the exact morality of Mayhew’s passage 
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much more ambivalent than he might like.  
Mayhew’s fourth volume, “Those Who Will Not Work,” does more to 
damage his potentially charitable message than to further it. As critics have 
pointed out, this volume is from the very beginning more exciting reading than 
the earlier ones, containing Mayhew’s examination of prostitutes, thieves, and 
other “interesting” members of the London Poor. This volume, and other works 
like it, served to convince many Londoners that the local poor were 
“undisciplined, amoral, and parasitic.”10 Moreover, Mayhew’s collaborator, 
Andrew Halliday, ends the volume with a detailed account of the ways in which 
the poor cheat the charitable impulses of the British public by artfully feigning 
distress that they do not genuinely feel. For example, Halliday reminds those 
readers sympathetic to the plight of begging industrial workers that: 
Improvements in mechanics, and consequent cheapness to the many, are 
usually the causes of loss to the few. The sufferings of this minority is 
immediately turned to account by veteran cadgers, who rush to their 
wardrobes of well-chosen rags, attire themselves in appropriate costume, 
and ply their calling with the last grievance out. (4.447)  
Halliday here adopts first the rhetoric of economics, arguing that the general 
social benefit of machinery is infinitely larger than the inconvenience it might 
cause to a very small number of workers, and then plays upon his readers’ fear 
of being taken in. The “veteran cadger” in his “well-chosen rags” is a stock anti-
charitable type, soothing the consciences of the well-off by promising them that 
                                                
10 Brundage, English Poor Laws, 106. 
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the distress they see is either entirely or largely sham.  
An alternate reading of this ending suggests that Mayhew and Halliday are 
attempting to give readers the facts they need to make an appropriate charitable 
decision. Halliday tells his readers, factually, that the very structure of poverty, 
in the guise of “occasional relief afforded by the parish,” keeps industrial 
workers in their own places of origin, making any such who appear in the capital 
less likely to be legitimate (4.447). The general tone of the final section, however, 
suggests that something less straightforward is at work. The repeated insistence 
that his message is only to “step between the open hand of true charity and the 
itching palm of the professional beggar” (4.447) indicates his awareness that the 
very facts he is providing are damaging to charitable sentiment. But Mayhew 
stands in the center of a real dilemma, in much the same way as John Stuart Mill. 
If, as Mayhew’s experiences obviously suggest, a certain portion of begging is 
legitimate and a certain portion is “professional,” charity does need to discern in 
order to be effective. Emotionally, though, the knowledge that even a small 
portion of beggars is not truly distressed is enough to make potential donors 
hesitate before opening their pockets. Just as it did to their predecessors in the 
eighteenth century, this knowledge forces Mayhew and Halliday to redefine 
what true charity is:  
Whoever thinks that charity consists in mere giving, and that he has only to 
put his hand in his pocket, or draw a check in favour of somebody who is 
very much in want of money, and looks very grateful for favours to be 
received, will find himself taught better, if not in the school of adversity, at 
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least by many a hard lesson of kindness thrown away, or perhaps very 
brutishly repaid. (4.448)  
The mere suggestion that kindness can be thrown away aligns London Labour and 
the London Poor with a less purely emotional model of charitable giving. Its final 
exhortation is, much like Mill’s, that “it is the office of reason—reason improved 
by experience—to teach us not to waste our own interest and our resources on 
beings that will be content to live on our bounty, and will never return a moral 
profit to our charitable industry” (4.448). Charity becomes, even for Mayhew, a 
calculus of cause and effect, profit and loss. Pure, emotionally driven 
benevolence, divorced from motive and forethought, is no longer even a 
rhetorical possibility.  
I give this extended picture of the crossing of charity and rationality in the 
mid-nineteenth century for two reasons. First, much of this project will hinge on 
more literary treatments of this same cultural phenomenon, and these two 
interconnected examples provide an important chronological snapshot of mid-
Victorian anxieties about charity and its emotional implications. Second, the rest 
of this chapter will argue that this moral calculation is the inevitable result of 
over a century of debate about the relationships between charity, poverty, self-
interest, and social upheaval. While many scholars are hesitant to link 
nineteenth-century social and economic anxieties to the, in many ways quite 
different, eighteenth-century debates surrounding luxury and sentimentality, I 
will show that the two sets of arguments go, certainly and inextricably, hand in 
hand. In the interest of precision, I try to use the historical terms as carefully as 
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possible. I carry through the eighteenth-century sense of benevolence as the 
exclusively emotional aspect of charity. Benevolence, as an emotion, can be either 
the cause or the result of charity, but it can also be separated from those acts, 
especially in sentimental literature. I have reserved the term “philanthropy” to 
denote large, often public, acts of charity, intended to benefit groups of people 
rather than individuals. “Charity” refers to all other acts intended for the benefit 
of the less fortunate, although I do not exclusively define charity as monetary. 
The link between benevolence and charity is, in fact, one of this project’s 
touchstones. One effect of the eighteenth-century luxury debates, to be discussed 
more fully below, is the coupling of benevolence with what the Victorians came 
to see as undesirable social traits. The characters of sentimental literature both 
eroticized charity, by, for example, lingering over giving money to attractive 
women, and made it ridiculous through sheer excess. As shifting social attitudes 
made eighteenth-century models of masculinity seem practically obscene, 
charity, inextricably caught up in the same discourses, had to be renegotiated. 
Thus, only by considering the link between charity and the socially deviant 
“luxury,” so closely associated with benevolence in the eighteenth century, can 
we fully understand the positions of Mill, Mayhew, and their contemporaries. 
 
II. As British citizens in the eighteenth century became the consumers of an 
increasingly elaborate world of goods, the framework of public morality 
struggled to admit such “excess.” Coffee, tea, silks, and fashions became as much 
the subject of sermons as of gossip. Critics of luxury considered it to be “a 
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debilitating and corrosive social evil” at worst and wasteful of resources at best.11 
Such debates only intensified and expanded as the century progressed. John 
Sekora calls the luxury debates “climactically fierce,” due to a growing fear that 
luxury was “losing by degrees the religious and political sanction it had 
possessed since antiquity.”12 For many eighteenth-century thinkers, luxury was 
“as potent an enemy as England faces.”13 But, while many historians of luxury 
contend that these debates ended with the eighteenth-century, 14 the legacy of this 
controversty lingers in nineteenth-century discussions of both economics and 
charity. Before they “ended,” the luxury debates coupled charity with the same 
excessive feelings that translated into other forms of conspicuous consumption.15 
The luxury debates of the eighteenth century “required new engagements with 
the links between material and intellectual culture,” 16 links which both made 
many spectators deeply uncomfortable and set the stage for long-term 
ideological shifts.  
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The luxury of spending money on personal goods was much easier to 
rationalize than the emotional connection between luxury and charity. The first 
position was given its most compelling description by Bernard Mandeville. 
Mandeville adopts a pro-consumption model of morality, arguing that luxury 
and “useless” spending by the rich in fact help the poor by giving them 
employment. For Mandeville, owning a superfluous number of silk dresses is the 
means to keeping silk workers and tailors in business and away from charity. 
Spending money keeps it in circulation, and thus in the hands of workers, while 
saving money deprives others of their natural rights. No one, in Mandeville’s 
model, is more unnatural than a miser.17 At the same time, Mandeville is strongly 
opposed to traditional types of charity, including charity schools for poor 
children. He feels that true charity is incommensurable with human nature, 
largely because he insists on a much narrower definition of charity than many of 
his contemporaries. Charity, according to Mandeville, is “that virtue by which 
part of that sincere love we have for our selves is transferr’d pure and unmix’d to 
others, not tied to us by the bonds of friendship or consanguinity” (285). This 
definition leads Mandeville to declare that true charity involves two distinct 
conditions. First, it requires a degree of mental benevolence. In order to be truly 
charitable, we must “put the best construction on all that others do or say” (287). 
The extremity of his examples, such as assuming that a neighbor with his eyes 
closed in church is being particularly attentive to the sermon, presents this state 
of mind as a near impossibility. Secondly, we absolutely cannot stand to gain, 
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even emotionally, from any true act of charity. Personal gain, including being 
satisfied that we have helped someone in need, clouds the possibility that our 
actions are morally pure.18  
When Mandeville argues in favor of luxury, he thus enters as a 
compelling voice in a complex moral and ethical debate about not just luxury but 
also the value and place of human selfishness. Like Mill, Mandeville positions 
himself against the kind of paternalist charity that serves only to bolster the 
emotions of the wealthy. For Mandeville, luxury was associated not just with 
material objects, but also with a particular, and hotly contested, set of feelings. 
He constructs human self-interest as a negative emotion in the strictest moral 
sense, but one with great power to promote social happiness at large. Because 
Mandeville sees humans as powered entirely by this self-interest, charity is no 
longer a good Christian virtue, but rather an expression of our own joy at 
receiving thanks or at removing a condition that distresses us. Charitable 
organizations give not only these pleasures, but also the “satisfaction there is in 
Ordering and Directing” (318) to those who establish them. While Mandeville 
appears to allow a small possibility of beneficial charity, his ultimate belief is that 
a general economic well-being, spurred by the selfish spending habits of the 
upper and middle classes, is the best way to truly aid the poor. Mandeville’s 
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somewhat nasty system argues that commerce and virtue are mutually exclusive, 
and, of the two, commerce is more important. Instead of disguising our self-
interest and giving money to “beggars who don’t deserve it,” we should instead 
indulge it by spending our money in such a way as to “employ vast numbers of 
laborers” (366).   
Like Mandeville’s valuing of self-interest, the discourse of sentimentality 
further disrupted the sense of “good Christian charity” by rendering the 
interaction of benefactor and recipient in an intensely emotional language. In his 
Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith reminds us, as Mandeville does, that 
sympathy itself is not just a moral good, it is inherently pleasant. Human nature, 
he argues, enjoys both the giving and receiving of sympathy, as sympathy is the 
emotion that most directly proves our humanity. As Smith points out, no matter 
which emotions we experience, “nothing pleases us more than to observe in 
other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast.”19 Indeed, 
Smith’s entire social structure is based on an idea of sympathy. We learn to be 
appropriately social beings inasmuch as the “man within the breast,” Smith’s 
term for our social conscience, internalizes social norms:   
We either approve or disapprove of our own conduct, according as we 
feel that, when we place ourselves in the situation of another man, and 
view it, as it were, with his eyes and from his station, we either can or 
cannot entirely enter into and sympathize with the sentiments and 
motives which influenced it. (163)  
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Books, 2000) 10. Further citations in text.  
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Sympathy thus moves beyond a merely external phenomenon and instead 
becomes the most fundamental component of human psychology. We neither can 
nor want to avoid feeling it. Accepting that sympathy is pleasure, however, 
makes charity itself suspect to critics. If we enjoy our feelings of sympathy, and 
thus enjoy giving charity, who really benefits? And is it truly ethical to give 
charity that benefits the giver?  
Although explicitly anti-Mandevillian in that he denies the inherent 
corruption of self-interest, Smith arrives at a similar place: we give charity 
because we enjoy the feelings it occasions. When Smith’s sympathetic transaction 
becomes financial, however, it becomes intensely difficult to translate into 
consistently ethical behavior. Smith, typical of his position in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, believes that part of our pleasure in such moments is in accurately 
gauging the correct needs of our recipient and in the recipient’s expression of a 
gratitude both natural and appropriate to the situation. To such an extent, 
sympathy is exactly like a commercial transaction in which the value to the seller 
and to the buyer must be the same. We find it very difficult, says Smith, to 
sympathize with gratitude for charity, “if in the conduct of the benefactor there 
appears to have been no propriety of conduct, how beneficial soever its effects” 
(103). Instead, what we desire from a benefactor is something far more abstract 
than a valuable gift; we desire the perfect expression of sympathy. We feel the 
most natural affection toward a giver who demonstrates “the concord between 
his sentiments and our own, with regard to what interests us so nearly as the 
worth of our own character, and the esteem that is due to us” (138). Only when 
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the actions of a giver and a charitable recipient are thus perfectly in line can we 
feel the charity to be praiseworthy. And, as E. J. Hundert highlights, this move to 
value “praiseworthiness” rather than mere “praise” is one of Smith’s most 
important ethical breaks with Mandeville: “Smith sought to show that unlike the 
social actor of Mandevillian provenance who merely seeks applause, the man of 
genuine self-command could be governed not by the desire for praise but by the 
standard of praiseworthiness itself.”20 By making this distinction Smith attempts 
to move away from Mandeville’s claim that all men are motivated exclusively by 
public acclamation. His model of praiseworthy charity, however, projects a 
world in which charity is only done by those who know their recipient 
personally. It is difficult to imagine this level of “proper gratitude” as the natural 
outcome of, for example, casual almsgiving. Smith posits a charitable position, 
much like that espoused by Mill and Mayhew, in which one of the most 
important factors is knowledge, the more the better, of the intended recipient. 
Charity feels good, but it feels best when we exercise it wisely. Smith’s position 
contains an inherent caution: there is no proper reward for charity given 
casually, blindly, or without attention to possible consequences.  
While Smith thus manages to check the effects of the link between charity 
and emotion, for other writers it becomes a Pandora’s box—the power of 
emotion, once unleashed, is very difficult the keep within socially accepted 
boundaries. The link between emotional display and moral worth in charitable 
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exchanges became, as the eighteenth century progressed, both increasingly 
common and increasingly vexed. As Steven Ahern points out, sentimentalism 
was originally seen as “a reaffirmation of the virtue innate in human nature as 
demonstrated through an individual’s aesthetically pleasing experience of 
sympathetic response to suffering.”21 “One’s degree of sensibility” came to be 
seen as “the sole index of moral virtue and aesthetic judgment.”22 This 
construction, however, became historically unstable, in part for the reasons I 
have outlined above. Sentimental fiction quickly came to be a great object of 
parody and humor, sometimes in the very same works that seemed to represent 
themselves seriously. As Ahern argues, “the unstable complex of assumptions” 
that allows sentimentalism to exist at all also make it a difficult subject to treat 
openly. Indeed, “when put into practice in novels sentimentalism falls prey to 
the internal contradictions that materialize in the very acts of benevolence 
needed to convert the theory into practice.”23 Robert Markley sees this internal 
contradiction as a problem of class privilege, arguing that sentimental narratives 
are “devoted paradoxically to demonstrating the sensitivity of a culture that 
shies away from acknowledging its responsibilities for inflicting upon its victims 
the very injuries that it mourns.”24 To acknowledge that infliction would be to 
move “from passive sympathy to the spectres of outright repression and 
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revolution,”25 guaranteeing that the sentimental hero, unwilling to become a 
revolutionary, can only give charity that does “more to ennoble him than to 
assist those who receive his money.”26 To touch briefly on an example I will 
return to in my next chapter, Laurence Sterne flounders in this emotional nexus, 
representing in A Sentimental Journey (1768) a model of charity that is essentially, 
inescapably, sexualized. For Sterne the logical outcome of the contradictions 
Ahern and Markley highlight is that the feelings that drive us toward giving 
money are one and the same with the desire to give other kinds of pleasure. 
While Sterne is perfectly comfortable with that link, the morality attached to 
those other pleasures is often much more ambiguous. 
This kind of ethical ambiguity echoes much more seriously through more 
apparently straightforward sentimental literature. In Henry Mackenzie’s Man of 
Feeling (1771), for instance, the expected reader response is decidedly vague. 
Harley, the eponymous man of feeling, appears to feel all the appropriate and 
pleasurable emotions of sympathy, but by the end of the novel he can scarcely be 
taken seriously as a model of behavior. While, as Gillian Skinner reminds us, the 
novel is filled with many conventionally sentimental tableaux,27 it becomes 
increasing difficult to recognize Harley as an appropriate lens for these scenes. 
His over-emotionality leads him into situation after situation in which his 
generosity is exploited. Furthermore, Harley continues to revel in the sentimental 
excess of giving, even as his money goes to criminals, madwomen, and 
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dubiously reformed prostitutes. While many critics debated whether the novel is 
meant to be serious or satirical, Ahern claims that the most important message to 
be drawn from the ambiguity is that “the scene of sympathy as spectacle 
threatens to deteriorate into a hall of mirrors as much as it promises to stabilize 
the excesses of passion through the operation of pity.”28 Extreme emotion, when 
“disconnected from rational reflection, social integration, and ethical 
responsibility will produce,” in Mackenzie’s eyes, “nothing but decay and 
disease.”29 Sentimentality is beneficial in that it insists on recognizing and 
foregrounding social inequality, but pernicious to the extent that it requires only 
feeling, not concrete actions. Enjoying the sentimental feelings of a tour of 
Bedlam, to give a popular eighteenth-century example, does nothing to 
genuinely help the inmates, and indeed encourages such performances of 
suffering. Thus, at their worst, these sympathetic exchanges only encourage the 
very divisions of class and gender that they would apparently desire to undo.  
If charity, in the literature of sentimentality, is coupled with both sexuality 
and monetary and emotional excess, it is subject to the same scrutiny and 
criticism as the buying of china and the drinking of coffee. More to the point, if 
we perform charitable actions because we enjoy reveling in our own capacity for 
sympathy and generosity, an action that should be outwardly focused becomes 
only another way of being selfish. Another part of the resulting backlash against 
this complex of sentimental ideas came from economics. The rise of political 
economy, while occuring largely after the luxury debates and the cult of 
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eighteenth-century sentimentality itself began to wane, made this point painfully 
clear by emphasizing the ways that charity is harmful to its recipients, rendering 
them unable or unwilling to work and making them overly dependent on others. 
Charity was thus attacked from both sides. The gratuitous emotions that result 
from casual charity not only morally corrupt the giver, but such charity also 
exploits and financially damages the recipient.  
While we might expect political economy to rationalize the self-interest 
and individual monetary freedom that eighteenth-century critics claimed as the 
core of charity, it instead distances itself from notions of personal philanthropy. 
Early economics focused on production and distribution, not consumption. By 
the time the marginalist economists shifted their focus to consumption, 
economics presented itself as too “scientific” to discuss the emotional 
components of spending. While luxuries like furniture and clothes are implicitly 
praised as the fruits of industry and gradually normalized as essential, the 
reasons for consumption remained outside the province of economics. The 
Victorian public, anxious to distance themselves from the messy emotional 
legacy of the “libertine” eighteenth century, is thus left on their own to redefine 
the ethical source of their emotional engagements with the poor. The recognition 
of the pleasurability of charity was gradually replaced by the ostensibly more 
objective question of the worthiness of the recipient. If, as the latitudinarian logic 
of the eighteenth century goes, we give charity for either the good of our own 
souls or for pure emotional indulgence, it matters very little which particular 
person receives it. If, however, charity is intended to remove itself from mere 
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emotional luxury and serve the larger interests of society, it can only be given to 
those who are genuinely deserving. But for Victorians, taught by the church to be 
charitable and surrounded by brutal poverty, charity and emotion, as Mayhew 
demonstrates, were in practice incredibly difficult to separate. This tension 
ripples beneath almost every nineteenth-century discussion of charity, but it 
surfaces most transparently in the early nineteenth-century debates about the 
new poor laws. For the first time, there is a large and public argument, with real 
implications for social policy, about who deserves aid and what kind of aid can 
most help them. 
 
III. The economic upheaval caused by rapid industrialization, the completion of 
most agricultural enclosure, and the ending of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 
shifted charity debates in several important ways. The concurrent leap to 
popularity of political economy, in the hands of writers such as David Ricardo, 
Thomas Malthus, and Thomas Chalmers radically increased anti-charitable 
rhetoric by “proving” that poverty was either an inevitable part of economic 
progress or a state that the poor themselves could rectify if they so chose. Of 
course, as the argument of Sandra Sherman so articulately proves, most choices 
these economists presented to the poor were “simulacra, conflating discretion 
with the penny-pinching aims of science,” given that in the rhetoric of poverty, 
any poor person “would choose scientific improvement over their own habits” if 
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only they knew the truth.30 Such rhetoric allowed members of the middle and 
upper classes to “see the poor without unique desires and complex subjectivity, 
so that experts wielding new, quantifying protocols could manage the poor en 
masse, cheaply, without regard to traditional folkways.”31 Economics as a 
discipline thus combined with legitimate economic crisis to prepare the way for 
radical changes in the fundamental ideology of charity.  
One early symptom of this change, Donna Andrew notes, is the shift in 
patterns of voluntary charity. By the 1820s, charity: !  
rested on the assumption that the material transfer of aid and goods from 
the rich to the poor was but the most insubstantial element of charity’s true 
purpose. Material aid was useful only to the degree that it helped and 
brought about moral and spiritual reform, reform that bound classes 
together in a more harmonious fashion . . . . true charity involved the 
improvement of the nation’s morals and manners, as this came to be seen as 
not only the nation’s prime need, but the only sphere in which charity had 
not been replaced by the operations of the market.32 
Such sentimental language, in practice, meant the shift from subsistence charities 
to reform charities. Organizations like the Foundling Hospital, which had 
thrived on voluntary, subscription-based, charity through the eighteenth 
century, began to struggle to meet necessary minimum donations. It was no 
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longer so clear to donors that merely saving the lives of “surplus population” 
was the best use of limited charitable dollars.33 Instead, donors began to seek out 
ways to “educate” or “moralize” the poor.34 No longer was individual 
benevolence enough to change England for the better; philanthropists “hoped to 
reform the minds and morals of the laboring poor” and to use charity as “an 
instrument of national regeneration.”35 As Mary Peace observes, the shift from 
benevolent to regenerative charity often cast suspicion on recipients. In her work 
on the Magdalen Hospital, Peace argues that even as early as 1790 the hospital 
was “no longer confident either about the innate virtue of its inmates or the 
possibility of their recuperation for society.”36 The intended recipients of charity, 
generally, disapproved of both this new suspicion and the new protocols it 
demanded.  
Of more sweeping historical importance is the pressure these shifting 
ideologies placed on the Poor Laws. The new focus of philanthropy on moral 
correction and education couldn’t help but shift public policy toward the poor. 
While some modern historians, such as Martin Daunton, have begun to argue 
that developments of the Old Poor Laws, such as the Speenhamland system or 
roundsman work systems, were adequate ways to accommodate the changing  
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rural labor market,37 administrators in the early nineteenth century opposed 
these developments both financially and ethically. In their eyes, the Old Poor 
Laws allowed and even encouraged the poor to be both lazy (by giving too much 
relief to the “able bodied”) and licentious (by giving larger charitable allowances 
to larger families). In the hands of the most vehement critics, the only solution 
was total abolition of any compulsory public relief. These claims for abolition 
were often, although not always, based on Malthusian doctrines of surplus 
population. A certain portion of the religious community followed the lead of 
Thomas Chalmers in reconciling the existence of the poor with God’s divine plan 
for human progress. Poverty was intended, in the view of these thinkers, to 
“stimulate human adaptability and exertion,” and any attempt to lessen its 
effects “led to more, rather than less, human misery” and “frustrated God’s 
plans” for humanity.38 The extremity of this view was moderated in the hands of 
later thinkers, like Samuel Smiles, who came to believe that human life was 
intended as a trial of character.39 While such dark views were never held 
unquestioned by a majority, their presence helped to fuel the aims of those 
stringent reformers who argued that only by rendering relief as unpleasant as 
possible could the state do its duty to the poor.   
The eventual policy resulting from this situation, the New Poor Law of 
1834, solved, in the eyes of Poor Law administrators, the problem of over-
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generous relief by instituting the principle of less eligibility. Charity would only 
be given to those who were willing to enter the workhouse, where their 
conditions would be, because of hard work, the separation of families, and 
scanty provisions, even less pleasant than what could be achieved through the 
most wretched non-charitable employment. More importantly, though, the New 
Poor Laws tried desperately to cast poor relief as both shameful and disciplinary. 
E.P. Thompson writes that “the doctrine of discipline and restraint was, from the 
start, more important than that of material ‘less eligibility’; the most inventive 
State would have been hard put to it to create institutions which simulated 
conditions worse than those of garret-masters, Dorset laborers, framework 
knitters and nailers.”40 In order to lower rates and reduce the numbers receiving 
relief, the Poor Law Board needed to overcome the earlier attitude that “the 
ratepayers, churchwardens, and overseers of the poor were not providing a 
system of relief for a distinct and despised class; they were themselves likely to 
turn to the parish at some stage in their life-cycle, and generosity and self-interest 
were one and the same.”41 The recipients of public charity needed to be, in effect, 
alienated from their own community and cast as “other” to the ratepayers in 
order to lower the cost of public relief. The workhouse, so often likened to a 
Bastille, was the inevitable emblem of this process. 
The only problem was that this “perfect” economic and moral solution 
didn’t work. Workhouse scandals, like that at Andover, appalled early Victorian 
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newspaper readers throughout the 1830s and 1840s.42 In other districts, 
workhouses either couldn’t, or wouldn’t, be built immediately. Northern 
manufacturers, strongly aware of the boom-and-bust cycle of urban trade, 
resented a system more attuned to the problems of rural unemployment.43 
Disregarding pleas from the Poor Law Board to grant only indoor relief (the 
workhouse) manufacturers used outdoor poor relief (gifts of money or food) as a 
palliative for cyclical unemployment well into the 1860s.44 The poor also resisted, 
either actively through riots, or by simply preferring to beg or starve rather than 
be admitted to the workhouse. Moralists and philanthropists, including some 
local poor law guardians, argued vociferously against the brutality of the 
workhouse system, making many of the arguments that Dickens would 
eventually make in Oliver Twist (1837-39). Furthermore, many local boards were 
determined to cling to their autonomy, resisting the dictates of the central Poor 
Law Board in any way possible.45 By mid-to-late century, the campaign to 
eliminate all outdoor relief, never entirely successful, was almost completely 
defeated when many local boards of guardians began to insist that giving money 
was much cheaper than giving room and board, even in exchange for work.46 
Indeed, this very continuity of outdoor relief, seen as the survival of older 
models of paternalistic charity, was one of factors that reconciled opponents to 
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the New Poor Law.47 Only by failing to meet its original strict ideals in ways that 
the strictest interpreters saw as giving in to useless and harmful charitable 
emotions could the New Poor Law continue.  
Resistance to the New Poor Law, coupled with social problems like trade 
depressions, created a powerful public rhetoric of charity. As we’ve already seen 
with Mill and Mayhew, it was very difficult for most citizens to either reconcile 
themselves to purely state-administered relief or to accept that private charity 
could navigate the large-scale poverty that plagued the nineteenth century. 
Many members of the middle class knew that the Poor Laws were inadequate, 
but struggled with the best way to intervene. Social worries about consumerism 
and “Mammonism” paired with a growing awareness of poverty to produce 
extreme social anxiety. Many middle-class Victorians, with their Christian if not 
evangelical background, grew increasingly uncomfortable with their own 
prosperity even as their standard of living continued to improve. G.R. Searle 
writes that “the central predicament for such people was how to reconcile their 
economic convictions with their ethical principles, the new world-view which 
had emerged to explain modern society with the social values they inherited 
from their ancestors.”48 Both Christianity and old-fashioned paternalism dictated 
compassion toward the poor, but economics and fear of the unknown 
recommended severity. Furthermore, with so many competing messages, real 
reform of the Poor Laws seemed both impossible and fraught with social 
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danger.49 Instead, the Victorians turned, in ever-increasing numbers, to private 
charity.50  
Private charity, however, had serious problems of its own. From all sides 
came the insistence that philanthropy needed to discriminate, but such 
discrimination proved unachievable. Mayhew pointed out to his mid-Victorian 
readership hundreds of ways that the poor “cheated” charity, while the Poor 
Law Board and many philanthropists deplored the danger and ineffectiveness of 
charity handed out willy-nilly. The famous Goschen minute, issued by Poor Law 
Board President George J. Goschen in 1869, railed against the “double 
distribution” of compulsory and voluntary relief to some paupers, arguing that 
such charitable plenitude would never teach the poor the self-denial that they 
needed to learn.51 The Charity Organization Society, founded earlier the same 
year, attempted to bridge the gap between indiscriminate private charity and 
more “rational” public works by a social work system based on home visits to 
determine eligibility, but the very scientific basis of its charity drew criticism. 
“Scientific philanthropy” only managed, in the eyes of the tender-hearted, “to 
turn its agents into bureaucratic administrators, a transformation which made a 
mockery of the claim that ‘charity’ was somehow superior to the cold and 
impersonal state.”52 The very “science” of such charity set it in opposition to the 
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emotional connection that many donors saw as charity’s most important benefit. 
The COS in particular drew criticism from both local charities and the clergy, and 
many of the poor they visited would have preferred formal poor law relief.53 
While the eighteenth-century model of purely emotional benevolence never 
resurfaced as a dominant belief, very few people were willing to go to the other 
extreme.   
Mid-Victorians wanted to be charitable: Stephan Collini goes so far as to 
call them “The Culture of Altruism.”54 With so many conflicting voices about the 
“right” kind of charity, though, complete belief in the benefits of charity was 
difficult. Popular writers of fiction and journalism represented the poor laws as 
negative and emotion-driven personal charity as positive, at the same time that 
economists, politicians, and even some religious leaders depicted exactly the 
opposite. The increasing visibility of urban poverty, thanks to exploratory social 
works by writers like Henry Mayhew, Charles Booth, and Seebohm Rowntree 
and the fiction of Charles Dickens, Charles Kingsley, and others legitimately 
troubled audiences and convinced them that poverty was a problem beyond any 
quick charitable fix. This complex social anxiety forms the nexus of my project. I 
will be examining the ways that fiction chooses to interact with a variety of 
responses to charity. More particularly, I hope to examine the ways and possible 
reasons that mid-Victorian fiction often engages with the public discourse of 
charity by representing the ways in which individual philanthropy fails, at the 
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same time that it also undermines, large-scale public charity.  
 
IV. Eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century literature generally responded to 
harsh social ideas regarding poverty with an outraged attempt to revive 
sentimental charity. Oliver Twist (1837-39), and other novels like it, looks back to 
the legacy of Tom Jones (1749), embracing the redeeming qualities of the 
individual act of charity by emphasizing the connections between people of all 
classes. The person one aids without reason may turn out to be the very person 
one would have most wished to save. Money, properly applied, can and will 
save some worthy person from a terrible fate and restore the flow of benevolent 
feelings. Mid nineteenth-century “Social Problem” novels, though, often 
complicate the clear opposition between charity and economics. In a grim 
industrial situation like that of Mary Barton (1848), for instance, private charity 
may temporarily alleviate the most distressing cases, but it is portrayed, even 
within the novel, as no long-term solution. The message instead shifts toward a 
plea for widespread political and social reform. Personal benevolence and 
philanthropy, literary works insisted, could not remove the structural poverty of 
the industrial revolution. Many authors, however, were unwilling to give up on 
the moral and social benefits of benevolence. The resulting works struggle to 
negotiate the increasingly commonplace idea that individual charity is useless 
and the residual feeling that it is literature’s moral obligation to resist the anti-
charitable dictates of political economy.  
The central concern of this project, as noted, is why Victorian literature (in 
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both its “social problem” variant and in others) is so quick to dismiss or 
complicate monetary transactions and monetary charity, even as it negatively 
portrays differences in social status and wealth. Why does literature often appear 
to agree with the political economists that “handouts” are not the answer, even 
though it criticizes poverty and would thus seem to value at least minor 
economic redistribution? Novel after novel features scenes in which poor 
characters either refuse charitable gifts or in which monetary charity damages 
the giver and/or the recipient. Further, I am interested in examining how 
literature uses techniques of both genre and style to predict, form, and examine 
alternative, non-economic, social models. Once literature dismisses financial 
rules as an inadequate substitute for social experience, what other framework 
does it provide for social interaction? And, finally, I will theorize a reason why 
literature often depicts competing economic genres with different moral values, 
like Esther’s fortune and Felix’s charity in Felix Holt: The Radical (1866), or the 
coexistence of “The Golden Dustman” and the Veneerings in Our Mutual Friend 
(1864-65). What do we stand to gain from so much economic plurality? And, 
more importantly, is that plurality of economic experience the very reason that 
the novel, whatever its intentions, struggles to break away from the discourse of 
political economy? My brief answer to these questions, to be explored in more 
depth in the upcoming chapters, is that the novel uses representations of failed 
charity as a way to provide the space to reconstruct, however briefly, a non-
monetary and non-economic source of value. The authors I discuss in this project 
are deeply invested in redefining the meaning of benevolence as a valid form of 
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social action by moving that benevolence away from monetary gifts and toward 
abstractly correct moral feelings. In order to do so, however, novelists must 
reckon with both economics and the legacy of eighteenth century sentimentality.  
My work in this project engages with three somewhat overlapping threads 
of criticism. After Marc Shell’s pivotal The Economy of Literature,55 closely 
followed by Kurt Heinzelman’s Economics of the Imagination,56 a long line of critics 
has chosen to examine the way that economics functions as a metaphor of 
exchange that can structure literary analysis and in fact language itself. For these 
critics, language and economics exist in a complex, homologous, relationship. 
Heinzelman argues that speaking is “a metaphor of economic transaction,”57 to 
the extent that both speaking and spending are actions of supply, demand, and 
exchange. In effect, “the economic complexity of literature is integrally connected 
to the discursive complexity of economics.”58 Recent scholars in this vein have 
examined such issues as authorial anxiety over the connection between paper 
(their livelihood) and paper money (at best, volatile, and at worst, worthless). 
James Thompson sees this recognition as a source of a “crisis of value” at its most 
apparent in eighteenth-century literature: “where is value or worth to be 
located—in silver or in paper, thing or name, or in a different genre, the 
courtship novel, in name or face, body or self?”59  Heinzelman and Thompson, 
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along with critics such as Gordon Bigelow60 and David Trotter,61 become 
intensely interested in the way novels metaphorically and literally present 
images of circulation, which they discuss either in terms of the crisis of literary 
value (Thompson and Heinzelman) or in terms of empire and citizenship 
(Bigelow and Trotter). 
An often, but not necessarily, related discussion arises around the 
economics of literary production. In the hands of Norman Feltes, this field began 
as a Marxist theorization of the ways that the means of production influence 
works of literature.62  Feltes defines his project as determining “the importance of 
such details as format as being the concrete mediations of the historical in the 
production of novels, determining in complex ways the actual production of a 
particular novel and tracing themselves in its text and its own production of 
ideology.” Every text, in this model, “encodes within itself ‘how, by whom, and 
for whom it was produced.’”63 Later critics tend to see the play between the 
commodity-producing author and the commodity-purchasing reader as 
happening more directly. Paul Delany argues that any discussion of money in 
the novel “brings together both sides of the literary transaction: what authors 
hope to get by writing books, and what they hope to show about the market 
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society in which they live.”64  Daniel Hack would largely agree, hoping to 
explore in his book “the meaning and mutual relevance of the physicality of the 
written or printed word, the exchange of texts for money, the working and 
slippages of signification, and the corporealities of character, writer, and 
reader.”65 To these critics, any discussion of money within a text is a reflection of 
the economic status of the author. The analysis of authorial anxiety over being a 
worker has thus become one of the foremost of these branches of study.  
The final group of criticism on these topics, and that most applicable to this 
project, is of a generally social, historical nature. These works look not only at 
how depictions of social interactions between rich and poor attempt to influence 
or control readers (Audrey Jaffe) but also how economic doctrine itself was 
founded on a series of “imaginative” acts (Sandra Sherman). Audrey Jaffe’s work 
illustrates the way that “sympathy in Victorian fiction is inseparable from issues 
of visuality and representation because it is inextricable from the middle-class 
subject’s status as spectator and from the social figures to whose visible presence 
the Victorian middle classes felt it necessary to formulate a response.”66 “Visual 
representation,” with all of its implicit problems, becomes “necessary for the 
production of individual sympathy” both between characters in the novel and 
between reader and character.67 Jaffe’s argument is complicated by Sandra 
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Sherman’s work on representations of poverty in non-fictional works.  Sherman 
aptly notes that late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century works of 
economics and sociology encouraged simplistic representations of poverty. By 
the time “social problem” fiction becomes a popular genre, readers are more 
accustomed to “texts which claim to study and prescribe for the poor” but really 
serve to erase identity and “justify modes of poor relief that cost less by 
discounting personal desires.”68 Sherman’s argument renders the desire-based 
sympathetic relationships that Jaffe sees as fundamentally troubling to in fact be 
a much-needed piece of social restoration.  Some authors, like Catharine 
Gallagher, do extend their studies to examine specific economic predecessors for 
literary claims, but it is more rare for those texts to consider charity.69 Gallagher 
instead chooses to examine some of the underlying reasons for the inherent 
connections between literature and economics seen by my first group of critics. 
In Gallagher’s argument: 
Political economists and their Romantic and early Victorian critics jointly 
relocated the idea of ultimate value from a realm of transcendent spiritual 
meanings to organic ‘Life’ itself and made human sensations–especially 
pleasure and pain–the sources and signs of that value . . . . Each [economic 
and anti-economic discourse] tended to blame the other for its internal 
paradoxes.70 
This debate over the sources of value results, in Gallagher’s argument, in the 
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inextricable co-dependence of literature on economics—no matter how much 
literature wants to get away, the basic terms of literary discourse have already 
been linked to economic ideologies. This group of critics, of which there will be 
additional examples throughout this work, provides the most important 
intellectual context for my work.  
My examinations will, I hope, fill a gap in the discussion of literature and 
economics. The critical literature tends to either assume that both genres are 
playing the same game (an exchange of money is merely a metaphor for the 
kinds of exchange that happen in language, so uses of monetary plots are all self-
referential), or that monetary plots are a reflection of the author’s own status as 
“worker” rather than “artist.” On the other hand, studies of the social agendas of 
novels generally fixate on the success or failure of realism in the solutions those 
novels pose, rather than recognizing the rhetorical space that failure helps to fill. 
By looking at scenes of explicit and deliberate failure, I hope to illuminate such 
concerns. Chapter One will examine closely Tobias Smollett’s Expedition of 
Humphry Clinker (1771), an important eighteenth-century precursor to the 
Victorian anxieties explored in this project. Chapter Two turns to the works of 
Charles Dickens, which trace an increasing ambivalence about, but simultaneous 
dedication to, the idea of personal charity. The chapter will be most centrally 
concerned with Our Mutual Friend’s (1864-65) searching look at the effect of 
philanthropy on its objects. My third chapter examines Elizabeth Barrett 
Browning’s novel-poem Aurora Leigh (1856) and its powerful condemnation of 
paternalistic philanthropy. Finally, I will examine George Eliot’s attempts to 
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move entirely beyond economics in Felix Holt: The Radical (1866) and Middlemarch 
(1871). Each of these texts centers around a notorious economic failure. The 
“unrealistic” economic ventures that focus these texts  (Humphry Clinker’s 
hidden parentage, the “Golden Dustman” of Our Mutual Friend, Marian Erle’s 
refusal to marry Romney Leigh, Esther’s and Dorothea’s abdication of their 
fortunes) correspond exactly with the novels’ attempts to break both fiction, and 
ultimately their readers, away from the language and control of economics. By 
positing an often-abstract morality in place of any particular monetary 
transaction, literature participates in a more general social retaliation against the 
narrow strictures of what nineteenth-century economics deemed appropriate 
interpersonal behavior.   
For all of the research that has been done on the class and gender problems 
of “social problem” and other realist fiction, few works take seriously the 
legitimate projects that these novels undertake. By understanding and 
articulating the way that these literary works, and others, are responding to their 
social context and making important alterations to the social discourse, we can 
recognize the way that literature allows authors to redefine and rearticulate 
public feelings about poverty, charity, and sympathy. 
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Chapter One 
Smollett’s Men of Feeling and Late Eighteenth-Century Charity 
 
 
Tobias Smollett’s intention to thumb his nose at charity and benevolence 
makes itself known from the first pages of The Adventures of Ferdinand Count 
Fathom (1753), where he soundly mocks the venerable tradition of literary 
patronage. The novel, Smollett’s third, was little read and even less appreciated, 
perhaps in part for the initial affront offered by Smollett’s cheeky treatment of 
that staple of the eighteenth-century novel, the dedicatory preface. In writing his 
preface, believed by many critics to be addressed to himself,1 Smollett exposes 
the inherent problem of gratitude: if one expresses “the transports of gratitude or 
affection which is always apt to exaggerate, and produce[s] no more than the 
genuine effusions of his heart, the world will make no allowance for the warmth 
of his passion, but ascribe the praise he bestows, to interested views and sordid 
adulation.”2 A too liberal thanks makes the recipient of patronage a toady, 
insincerely lavishing praise only in the hope of additional gain. Alternatively, too 
much honesty, as expressed in Smollett’s mocking enumeration of his patron’s 
(really his own) vices and virtues, is easily constructed as ingratitude. While 
Smollett can jokingly contend that “you may, thus stimulated [by criticism] 
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watch over your own intemperance and infirmity, with redoubled vigilance and 
consideration, and for the future profit by the severity of my reproof”(4), literary 
patrons are unlikely to desire such harsh advice. Gratitude as constructed here 
always and inevitably undoes itself. Its tendency to exaggerate the goodness of a 
benefactor will be read as false, at the same time that “true,” and thus naturally 
extreme, gratitude leads to the expectation that all thanks will be profuse. Due to 
these expectations, moderate thanks can only be read as ingratitude, while our 
cynicism means that extreme praise can only be read as insincere. Like Cordelia 
in King Lear, the truly appreciative recipient of charity cannot possibly respond in 
the right way. Genuine emotion has no room in the equation, because there is no 
way to control the perceptions of others, who are likely to imagine our actions in 
the worst possible light.3  
Smollett’s cutting satire of the inability to express genuine feelings derives 
from the paradox of sentimentality outlined in my previous chapter. If, as the 
sentimental model established, feeling is the mark of enlightenment, it becomes 
worthwhile to perform sensibility. Appearing to be affected by a scene, if 
performed believably, will convince bystanders that one has true moral worth. 
At the same time, then, that the sentimental model places tremendous value on 
emotion, it also gives a motive for exaggerating or falsifying that emotion.4 The 
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sentimental novel and its surrounding discourse became mired in a rhetoric of 
truthfulness. How can we know, really, that anyone feels the way they appear 
to? For Stephen Ahern, this is the primary anxiety of sentimentality: “Affectation 
is thematized within the fictive world of the narratives themselves, which are 
haunted by the always present threat that someone can fake the signs of 
sensibility in order to deceive others for selfish ends.”5 Furthermore, this focus 
on feelings exposes the fact that human emotions rarely have a single source. 
Even our best impulses, such as charity, can rarely be separated from other 
psychological factors, such as desire. Human emotions are suspect, then, for a 
whole host of reasons. One response to this idea, espoused by Bernard 
Mandeville and later by many economists, is cynicism. Such cynics suggest that 
humans are fallen creatures, motivated by their worst impulses. Luckily for 
humankind, those worst impulses work in socially beneficial ways. For writers 
less interested in this negative view, the problem is more complex.  
Laurence Sterne and Tobias Smollett set out, in very different ways, to 
explore this problem of human psychology. Both of them eventually argue that 
the complexity and apparent contrariness of human nature doesn’t exclude the 
possibility of human goodness. Conflicting and complicated motives for 
benevolent actions do not mean that we are always and inevitably corrupt. 
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Instead, our messy feelings allow for a complex and amusing variety of reactions 
to the world. For both writers, this human multiplicity can be misleading and 
frustrating, but the proper outlook on the world can allow us to navigate it 
successfully and live a life of basic virtue and happiness. The two writers, 
however, take a very different stance on what this outlook entails. Sterne, as I 
will demonstrate briefly, is content to enjoy and even elevate life’s ambiguities. 
Smollett, on the other hand, is driven to articulate an entirely revised ethical 
code. By the end of his final novel, The Expedition of Humphry Clinker (1771), 
Smollett has turned to an alternative discourse for a potential solution to the 
problems of charity and affect. The conclusion of his novel shifts charity away 
from luxury and closer to a more modern understanding of economics as a way 
to remove it from the less concrete and more vexed realm of feelings. That is, 
Smollett comes to accept the belief that charity needs to be calculated. Like 
Sterne, he never questions that we should help others in need, but he does 
question our level of emotional involvement in that intervention. In doing so, 
however, Smollett both raises and explores a host of new problems with charity, 
including the complex navigations necessary between charity and fiscal 
responsibility. While Smollett’s ending functions fairly smoothly in the ethical 
context of his own novel, future writers will struggle to escape Smollett’s very 
solution and reunite charity with emotion.  
 Sterne seeks no such complex ideological solution. Instead, A Sentimental 
Journey (1768) suggests that happiness arises from our ability to revel in the 
vagaries of emotions for their humorous effect. Sterne sees the emotional 
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untidiness of human nature as providing a comic core to our actions. This desire 
to enjoy the potential humor of social interaction surfaces in a number of scenes 
of comic misinterpretation in the novel, many of which center on the connection 
of benevolence and sexuality. While Stephen Ahern accuses sentimental writers, 
especially Henry Mackenzie, of being “uneasy about the effect that 
representations of extreme emotion might have on particularly susceptible 
readers,” especially because sensibility narratives “carry a sexual charge,”6 Sterne 
embraces such emotional tension. Gardner Stout long ago pointed out that 
Yorick’s “sentimental travels consistently exhibit the comic incongruities 
between his exalted impulses and the situations which occasion them, expose 
their instability and radical impurity, and reveal his susceptibility to all the 
venial imperfections of human nature, including pruriency, concupiscence, 
selfishness, and vanity”7 In many of Yorick’s scenes, seduction and charity go 
hand in hand. Unlike the later writers in this study, Yorick, and by extension 
Sterne, suggests that readers should embrace the emotional side of charity—that 
is to say, benevolence—as a positive feeling. While Smollett is anxious to move 
from benevolence to a more calculated and emotionally distant form of charity, 
Yorick sees those emotions as fundamentally worthwhile, despite, or even 
because, of their extra implications.  
Yorick’s encounter with a young Parisian fille de chambre emphasizes both 
the sexualization of benevolence and its inherent emotional pleasure. In their 
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first meeting, Yorick gives her a crown, ostensibly as a “tribute . . . to virtue.”8 
Their meeting, however, is described in elaborately romantic language. Yorick 
pauses midway through their encounter to note, “‘Tis sweet to feel by what fine-
spun threads our affections are drawn together,” and he imagines ending their 
meeting with “a kiss of charity” (65). Their second encounter continues the 
ambiguity by strongly resembling a seduction. The contrived vagueness of what 
does happen emphasizes the psychological turmoil that Yorick experiences. 
Yorick observes that he “felt something at first within me which was not in strict 
unison with the lesson of virtue I had given her the night before . . . . The devil 
was in me” (88). The devil also appears to be in the fille de chambre, who 
seamlessly mingles her gratitude to Yorick with an expression of her sexuality:  
I’ll just shew you, said the fair fille de chambre, the little purse I have been 
making today to hold your crown. So she put her hand into her right 
pocket, which was next to me, and felt for it for some time—then into the 
left—“She had lost it.”—I never bore expectation more quietly—it was in 
her right pocket at last—she pulled it out; it was of green taffeta, lined with 
a little bit of white quilted sattin [sic], and was just big enough to hold the 
crown—she put it into my hand—it was pretty; and I held it ten minutes 
with the back of my hand resting upon her lap—looking sometimes at the 
purse, and sometimes on one side of it. (89) 
The punctuation here, unusually breathless even for Sterne, combines with the 
obvious sexual word play on purse and crown to emphasize the erotic charge of 
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the scene. At its core, however, this is a scene of gratitude. The fille de chambre is 
literally proving to Yorick that she values and appreciates his gift because she 
has taken the time to sew a special receptacle for it. Sterne also suggests, 
however, that she is showing Yorick that she values his attention and would 
consider furthering their relationship. The ruse of looking in her pocket, which 
Yorick can construct as an excuse to “innocently” put her hand against his leg, is, 
at least in his mind, intended to be seductive. Yorick’s appreciation for her 
gratitude takes on the same sexual overtone, as he examines her purse for far 
longer than necessary as a pretext for keeping his hand in her lap. The movement 
between gratitude and sexuality is seamless, but the scene still appears 
emotionally satisfying for both parties. Unlike other sentimental scenes, in which 
female recipients of charity are unwillingly eroticized, here the fille de chambre 
appears to enjoy her charitable flirtation with Yorick.  
 Rather than ending the scene with either a conventional seduction or a 
conventional denial, Sterne ends it with an “accidental” tumble onto the bed and 
an apostrophe to divine providence regarding human feelings:  
If nature has so wove her web of kindness, that some threads of love and 
desire are entangled with the piece—must the whole web be rent in 
drawing them out?—Whip me such stoics, great governor of nature! Said I 
to myself—Wherever thy providence shall place me for the trials of my 
virtue—whatever is my danger—whatever is my situation—let me feel the 
movements which rise out of it, and which belong to me as a man—and if I 
govern them as a good one—I will trust the issues to thy justice. (90) 
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Our heaven-sent duty is both to experience our feelings fully and to govern them 
accordingly. Not only is it impossible to separate one human emotion from 
another, but we also shouldn’t waste time trying to do so. To deny any particular 
category of feelings is to experience less of the world than we should, and thus to 
do less of our duty toward it. The emotional messiness of benevolence—always 
the angle emphasized by the financially strapped Yorick—is in fact its very most 
important part.  
Moreover, Sterne’s very act of embracing the sentimental journey signals 
his approval of emotional indulgence. Yorick deliberately seeks to experience not 
the world, but the feelings that the world can occasion. Again and again in the 
narrative, we see Yorick both deliberately encourage his feelings (as in the scene 
with the caged starling) and pause mid-way through a scene to analyze what and 
how he is feeling. His intense scrutiny of the motives, causes, and effects of his 
emotions serves not only to emphasize that he feels, but also to emphasize that 
human emotions are worthwhile. Yorick, for all his faults, is never worse than a 
little selfish and somewhat silly. If, Yorick suggests, indulging in emotional 
excess is self-interested, it’s a kind of interest that does very little harm to the 
world. The comedy of the story, as Stout reminds us, only emphasizes its 
benevolent message: “In attuning his sensibility to Yorick’s, a ‘man of feeling’ 
should have found himself participating in a comic proof of the incongruities 
between his faith in his benevolent impulses—and the realities of acting on 
imperfect motives in an imperfect, though beneficent, world.”9 This comedy isn’t 
                                                
9 Stout 407.  
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intended to produce despair that we can ever act correctly. Instead, Sterne 
desires his readers to develop “a benignly comic sense of life, including a 
benevolent sense of humor about themselves.”10 Part of this “benevolent sense of 
humor” is accepting, and learning to enjoy, the limitations of human nature, 
including our obsession with our own emotional state. The humorously positive 
attitude of the text encourages the reader to experience by proxy Yorick’s 
heightened emotional sensitivity.11  
Indeed, by conventional novelistic standards the narrative offers little else 
besides this sympathetic identification to recommend itself. Sterne adopts a 
fragmentary form that routinely denies intellectual or emotional closure. Like 
Yorick, the reader goes on a sentimental journey that, because the novel has no 
“end,” spills over into everyday life. While critics can and have attempted to 
trace a moral/intellectual arc in the novel, their attempts are generally thwarted 
by both the inconclusiveness and the comedy of Sterne’s project.12 The novel’s 
non-ending suggests that we should continue to imagine ourselves in the 
intensely emotional world that Yorick has created. By metaphorical extension, 
                                                
10 Stout 407. 
11 Robert Markley expresses the most cynical construction of this fact when he 
claims that “our appreciation of the author’s goodness makes us his 
collaborators: if we respond as he does, then we can appreciate not only his 
goodness but our own.” See “Sentimentality as Performance: Shaftesbury, Sterne, 
and the Theatrics of Virtue,” The New Eighteenth Century: Theory, Politics, English 
Literature, ed. Felicity Nussbaum and Laura Brown (New York: Methuen, 1987) 
221. 
12 For Markley the narrative structure is an ineffective way for Sterne to reiterate 
a message that lacks strength on its own, “litanies of the hero’s sentimental acts” 
that are designed to “mystify the contradictory impulses of sentimentality” (223). 
Stephen Ahern acknowledges that Sterne’s structure “underscores the 
fragmentary nature of human experience,” but his work by and large insists on a 
moral/ideological progression within the novel (113). 
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life itself is the sentimental journey. Sterne’s parody of the more serious Smollett 
as “the learned Smelfungus” (28) emphasizes what he sees as the fundamental 
human choice. Smelfungus “set out with the spleen and jaundice, and every 
object he pass’d by was discolored or distorted” (28). His resulting travel 
narrative is only and always “the account of his miserable feelings” (28). Yorick’s 
narrative and his travels may not always run smooth, but his encounters are 
represented by contrast as genuine and fulfilling. He very rarely has the money 
to give charity, thus suggesting that the emotional connection between the 
would-be giver and the would-be receiver is the only part of charity that truly 
matters. In maintaining this position I obviously disagree with those critics who 
construct Sterne’s project more negatively. Ahern, for example, claims that 
Yorick is “driven more by a desire to prove his sentimental credentials than by 
genuine concern”13 and that Sterne is most interested in demonstrating “the 
problems with an ethical code that depends on public performance of virtue.”14 
However, most of Yorick’s “performances” happen only privately, in the space 
between himself and the reader rather than between himself and the object of his 
sympathies.15 Sterne also makes no obvious claim that sentimentality is a perfect 
model. Rather, he argues that given our choice between the two extremes, 
Smelfungus and Yorick, Yorick is the more appropriate model for life. Smollett, 
                                                
13 Ahern 97. 
14 Ahern 115. 
15 Gillian Skinner cogently observes, “Given the number of sentimental 
encounters Yorick experiences, he succeeds in committing himself financially 
remarkably infrequently. Only on three occasions does he give money 
charitably.” See Sentimentality and Economics in the Novel, 1740-1800: The Price of a 
Tear (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999) 114. 
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obviously, will take a different angle, and one that has more lasting implications 
for the rhetoric of charity.  
 
II. Smollett’s oeuvre expresses a similar desire to follow the man of feeling to his 
extremes, although Smollett’s ultimate opinion, tempered by caution, is less 
amusingly optimistic than Sterne’s. Smollett is far more anxious about the 
implications of human emotions, seeing them as more than just passing states to 
relish. His earlier fiction, including The Adventures of Roderick Random (1748) and 
The Adventures of Ferdinand Count Fathom, warns its readers that one extreme of 
emotion leads to the next, perhaps less pleasant, one. These earlier novels are 
generally content to offer an exploration of the problems of sentimentality 
without a clearly demarcated solution. Roderick Random, in particular, points out 
to its readers the difficulty of being sentimental without also being easily 
angered or cheated. Roderick’s fortunes fluctuate wildly, in part because all of his 
emotions are unregulated. The same traits that a reader can admire in one 
vignette lead Roderick to misery in the next. Smollett, in one of his famous 
encapsulated narratives, condenses these problems with sentimentality into the 
story of Miss Williams, the prostitute who nearly lures Roderick into marriage. 
As she tells the story of her fall, Miss Williams depicts herself as the heroine of a 
sentimental novel. She is educated, polite, beautiful, and sensitive. More 
importantly she is, both within her narrative and to Roderick, the object of 
sympathy. Her narrative begins with her rescue from a would-be rapist and her 
expression of appropriate gratitude toward her savior. Indeed, this gratitude is 
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the beginning of her sexual downfall, showing just how easily charity gives rise 
to sexual desire: “If the obligations he had conferred upon me justly inspired me 
with sentiments of gratitude, his appearance and conversation seemed to intitle 
him to somewhat more.”16 At this point in her narrative, Miss Williams shifts 
from exploited victim within her tale to potential exploiter of Roderick, who is at 
this moment filled with sympathy for her. Describing the beauties of Lothario, 
her rescuer and eventual seducer, Miss Williams pauses to interject that, “I do 
not flatter, when I say he was the exact resemblance of you” (119). Given that 
Miss Williams has already attempted to seduce and cheat Roderick once, earlier 
in the novel, it is notable that she uses this moment of gratitude to shift to what is 
indeed flattery. Just as she, in the story of her past, is grateful to her rescuer and 
thus more likely to be seduced, Roderick is in the present moment sympathetic 
and thus more gullible.  
Miss Williams’s deft handling of Roderick’s emotions proves that she has 
learned, as Roderick eventually must, how to navigate turbulent emotional 
waters. She reenacts her past, but with herself in the more powerful role. She 
blames her education for making her “heart the more susceptible” to Lothario’s 
charms because of its part in “refining her sentiments,” but her subsequent 
education in the crimes of London shows her how to exploit the sentimental 
economy for her own ends (120). While Miss Williams proves herself able to 
negotiate the line between sentimentality and sexuality with at least some 
success (the last benefactor in her story also becomes her last positively described 
                                                
16 Tobias Smollett, The Adventures of Roderick Random, ed. Paul-Gabriel Boucé 
(1748; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 119. Further citations in text.  
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lover), Roderick is not yet able to do so. He makes “no scruple of believing every 
syllable of what she said” and in fact takes her on as a charitable object (136). 
When Miss Williams leaves Roderick, she is again able to reinsert herself into the 
sentimental model, leaving Roderick with “a torrent of tears, and a thousand 
protestations of eternal gratitude” even while she lies to him as to her future 
plans and intentions (138). Her careful control over the way others see her allows 
Miss Williams to move more fluidly than Roderick, even though he himself is 
well aware that men have more social mobility than women.17 Smollett, though, 
chooses not to portray this adaptability positively; it is, indeed, a sign of Miss 
Williams’s corruption. Knowing how to move through the world’s emotional 
complexity is, as Roderick’s adventures prove, necessary for survival. 
Understanding that system well enough to exploit it is, on the other hand, 
extreme moral depravity.  
By taking the villain of sentimental novels as its main character, Ferdinand 
Count Fathom ostensibly warns its readers of the dangers of emotional responses 
to the world even more directly than Roderick Random does. Ferdinand, like Miss 
Williams, lies, cheats, and manipulates his way through the novel. Smollett, 
perhaps anxious that his readers are enjoying Ferdinand’s exploits in the wrong 
way, interjects to explain the didactic purpose of his narrative: “Perfidious 
wretch! Thy crimes are so attrocious [sic], that I half repent me of having 
undertaken to record thy memoirs: yet such monsters ought to be exhibited to 
                                                
17 For more examples of Roderick’s own emotional instability and excess, see 
Juliet Shields, “Smollett’s Scots and Sodomites: British Masculinity in Roderick 
Random,” The Eighteenth Century 46.2 (2005). 
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public view, that mankind may be upon their guard” (239). There appears to be 
little reason to read this statement ironically. As the narrative progresses, the 
virtuous characters’ sentiments and optimism regarding human nature only 
make them more susceptible to rogues and cheats. The novel desires, by 
Smollett’s own claim, to teach good people to avoid exploitation. Yet despite this 
intention, the clear hierarchy Smollett attempts to construct between rogues and 
saints doesn’t yield a concrete lesson at the end of the novel. Renaldo and 
Serafina, the novel’s virtuous characters, frequently declare that divine 
Providence cannot let “true” benevolence be punished, a message that the novel 
upholds with its happy ending and Ferdinand’s conversion. This ending, given 
Smollett’s stated message, makes no sense, as it suggests that being exploited is 
impossible for the truly virtuous. Renaldo is so good that his benevolence will 
ultimately convert those who attempt to take advantage of it. More importantly, 
the novel goes to great lengths, as I’ve already discussed in relation to the 
preface, to prove that appearance is not equivalent to reality. Ferdinand, thanks 
to “those ingratiating qualifications he inherited from nature” (62) is able to 
simulate every possible mark of truth. By the end of his novel, however, Smollett 
lapses back into the conventions of sentimental fiction, allowing the very 
physical markers that the earlier parts of the narrative discount to reappear as 
transparent signs of legitimate virtue. “The drops of true benevolence,” “the 
shower of sympathetic pleasure,” and “the pearly drops of pity” flow from eyes 
(328, 319, 321); “the goodness of her heart” is shown in Madame Clement’s face 
(315); and Serafina’s beauty is unequivocally connected to her virtue. 
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Appearance, in the novel’s sentimental ending, is suddenly restored as truth. 
Ferdinand demonstrates that while Smollett is content to recognize that 
sentimentality is an imperfect model, he cannot truly embrace the most cynical 
message that his novel claims at its beginning. While much of the novel cautions 
readers against fraud, the final quarter proposes the fundamental goodness of 
human nature. Ferdinand, overwhelmed with Renaldo’s generosity and his own 
failure, decides to abandon his cheating ways. Benevolence not only is an 
unproblematic expression of human goodness, it also has the power to transform 
those who benefit from it. But, again, the narrative denies a stable reading of its 
characters’ emotions. While Renaldo’s benevolence ultimately saves Ferdinand, 
it first causes significant misery to both himself and others. Smollett uses this 
misery, though, to elicit the compassion of his readers, who are thus more 
completely drawn into being in sympathy with the characters. The ultimate 
weight of the novel perhaps only serves to reinforce the preexisting notions of 
the reader, who will remember either Ferdinand’s treachery or his ultimate 
conversion thanks to Renaldo’s goodness. Moreover, Renaldo himself 
undermines his own benevolent motives, suggesting that “he could not deny 
himself the luxurious enjoyment of communicating happiness to his fellow 
creatures in distress” (353). Ferdinand does more to expose a complex of problems 
surrounding sentimentality than to solve those problems. If the outward signs of 
goodness can be either fake or genuine, how can we possibly move through the 
world? If Renaldo’s goodness is really “luxury,” was it worth the price? The 
novel ultimately gives equal sanction to leaps of faith and to prudent caution, but 
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Smollett’s final novel will return to these questions with a quite different stance. 
 
III. Unlike Roderick Random and Ferdinand Count Fathom, The Expedition of 
Humphry Clinker contains an attempt to articulate a solution to the problems of 
charity and sentimentality. Most critics have come to think of The Expedition of 
Humphry Clinker more explicitly as a text about luxury than about feeling, due to 
John Sekora’s groundbreaking study of the concept across Smollett’s works. 
Sekora argues that “Humphry Clinker is what Smollett thought about luxury in 
contemporary England” and that “the attack on luxury gave focus and 
coherence” to the novel.18 The novel in this construction becomes, like all attacks 
on luxury in the late eighteenth century, both pessimistic and conservative. By 
the end of the novel, in Sekora’s view, “the people, their representatives, and 
their institutions have all been corrupted . . . . When national values have been 
twisted, personal choices alone remain, and these cannot represent the ideal but 
merely the inevitable.”19 David Weed presents a more modern view of this 
argument, suggesting that for Smollett “England’s social body incorporates the 
ill effects of commercialism into its public institutions and civil and social life, 
and that it produces effeminate men who participated in an epidemic spread of 
luxury, bodily waste, consumption, and ‘cannibalism’.”20 In Weed’s view, 
Smollett solves this problem by recreating “a model male landowner who is at 
                                                
18 John Sekora, Luxury: The Concept in Western Thought from Eden to Smollett 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1977) 241. Emphasis in original. 
19 Sekora 238. 
20 David M. Weed, “Sentimental Misogyny and Medicine in Humphry Clinker” 
SEL 37 (1997): 615. 
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once more cultivated and more masculine than his allegedly ‘modern’ 
counterpart.”21 The end of the novel “asserts a masculine, homosocial, rational 
society that restores male prerogative.”22 Only recently, in the hands of Michael 
McKeon, has this view been undermined. McKeon, instead of insisting, as Sekora 
does, that the novel is a perfect expression of authorial intent, suggests that we 
should carefully reconsider the idea that “Smollett’s central character, Matthew 
Bramble, speaks for its author and therefore articulates Humphry Clinker’s social 
and ethical norms.”23 (57). Questioning this assumption lets us recognize that 
“Matt ends by showing his involvement in, and tacit approval of, precisely those 
socioeconomic developments on which the rise of luxury depended.”24  For 
McKeon, the text’s statements against luxury only prove that the modern world 
enforces a complex reaction to consumption. 
Instead of seeing these two critical positions as polar opposites, I would 
argue that both of them articulate a deep anxiety that occurs differently 
throughout the first and second halves of the novel. Sekora’s insistence that the 
novel is a complete and perfect mirror of Smollett’s clearly established agenda 
toward luxury is damaging insofar as it flattens the text, repressing all signs of 
Smollett’s anxiety and questioning. While the text does, especially in its first half, 
condemn luxury in all the terms that Smollett had at his disposal, luxury’s 
                                                
21 Weed 616. 
22 Weed 634.  
23 Michael McKeon, “Aestheticizing the Critique of Luxury: Smollett’s Humphry 
Clinker,” Luxury in the Eighteenth Century: Debates, Desires, and Delectable Goods, 
eds. Maxine Berg and Elizabeth Eger (Houndsmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003) 
57. 
24 McKeon 66. 
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emotional companions are less comfortably handled. Smollett can excoriate 
social climbers and excessive spenders, but he has more trouble with those who 
enjoy the luxurious sensations of giving charity and receiving gratitude. In the 
early portions of the novel, Jery presents Matt as a man whose sensibility, in the 
eighteenth-century sense, drives his life. His physical sufferings make him 
cranky and short-tempered, but combine with an incredible humanity to make 
him charitable toward those in need. Matt spends his letters complaining bitterly 
about the luxury and excess of society, but rarely fails to conclude his letters 
without a charitable direction toward his tenants or the poor of his parish.25 Jery’s 
letters often reveal Matt’s charity toward those they meet on the road, not 
excluding Humphry Clinker himself. However, once Matt’s physical symptoms, 
real or imaginary, have ceased to occupy his entire attention, his attitude toward 
the world shifts remarkably. He becomes less likely to rant about the state of the 
world, but also less likely to perform spontaneous acts of charity. The novel thus 
suggests that charity is the same kind of emotional excess that produces Matt’s 
                                                
25 For more about the connection between Matt’s personality and his physical 
symptoms, see Thomas R. Preston, “Smollett and the Benevolent Misanthrope 
type,” PMLA 79.1 (1964). Preston suggests that “Matt is, then, in part an 
eighteenth-century splenetic humorist whose misanthropy can be traced 
medically to the humorous melancholy cynics and misanthropes of the 
Renaissance character-books and Stuart drama . . . . From another angle, 
however, Matt's ill health is the result, not the cause of his misanthropy, for the 
misanthropy itself derives also from what Jery calls Matt's ‘natural excess of 
mental sensibility.’ As Matt writes to Dr. Lewis, everything that ‘discomposes 
my mind, produces a correspondent disorder in my body.’ Matt's sensibility does 
not stem from the humor tradition, but from the eighteenth-century character 
usually described as the man of feeling. As a man of feeling, Matt is angered by 
the wickedness of the unfeeling world, and misanthropy is the result. Matt's 
indignation at the world thus represents a merger of physical and mental 
distress” (51). 
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physical illness. But, to further complicate matters, Smollett often praises charity. 
A central problem of the novel, then, is how one can be charitable without 
succumbing to the “luxurious pleasure” that Renaldo cited as charity’s most 
positive inducement. If charity and benevolence, as my introduction pointed out, 
are linked both to luxury and to Smollett’s non-luxurious paternalism, how can 
one be appropriately charitable? The remaining portion of this chapter will argue 
that Smollett’s choice to endorse a modified, limited model of charity, especially 
after exposing many of its potential downfalls, is an attempt to maintain some 
room for charity but also to distance it from its problematic emotional excesses. 
Matt comes, eventually, to represent a new masculine model, one that is less 
emotional than Sterne’s Yorick but still concerned with the welfare of others. 
Many scenes early in the novel explore charity as emotional excess, 
including the novel’s first extended treatment of charity. It is played by Jery for 
comic effect, but has serious implications for the novel. Matt Bramble, weary of 
the officious doctors of Hot Well, decides to assist a poor widow and her child. 
The scene is ideologically critical—Matt’s decision to aid the widow comes close 
on the heels of his criticisms of the town’s social disorder. His assistance to the 
widow serves not only to draw our sympathies to Matt, but also to provide an 
alternative social form. Matt’s charity directly contrasts with the disgusting 
selfishness displayed at Hot Well, later expanded in his discussion of Bath. He 
alone is able to be generous. His generosity, then, comes to stand as our only 
alternative to selfish display and social position jockeying. Or, in the more 
precise words of Stephen Ahern, his “sensibility entails an antistoic celebration of 
                                                                                                                          
 65 
feeling as an instinctive force for good, one that can function as a corrective to the 
calculating selfishness and deceit of aristocratic society.”26 We can be charitable, 
like Matt, or we can be terrible. Before the scene, Jery begins to prepare us to 
properly interpret Matt’s actions. He carefully informs us of the link between 
Matt’s emotional and physical state: “I think his peevishness arises partly from 
bodily pain, and partly from a natural excess of mental sensibility; for, I suppose, 
the mind as well as the body, is in some cases endued with a morbid excess of 
sensation.”27 While Jery’s judgments, particularly in the early sections of the 
novel, are not entirely trustworthy, his idea of the “morbid excess of sensation” 
demonstrates one of the problems with Matt’s charity. Matt’s previous letter 
establishes his unwillingness to make poor tenants pay their past-due rent, 
which can be constructed as either an act of paternalist generosity or as the worst 
kind of foolishness. Jery’s analysis only articulates the problem. Is Matt’s charity, 
too, “morbid excess”?  
Matt’s attempt to assist the poor widow is his first test. Jery’s letter is 
delightfully vague as to Matt’s original intentions. He sees Matt observe the 
widow with “a very suspicious expression,” followed by “evident marks of 
confusion” that might fit a lover. Jery is accordingly surprised to see her ushered 
into the library, “not into his bedchamber” (21). Matt’s awkwardness and 
“croaking tone of voice” further indicate a lover afraid of rejection. Instead, Matt 
offers her twenty pounds to aid her sick daughter, but her hysterical reception of 
                                                
26 Ahern 17. 
27 Tobias Smollett, The Expedition of Humphry Clinker, eds. Thomas R. Preston and 
O.M. Brack, Jr. (1771; Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990) 18. Further 
citations in text.   
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this gift only further implicates Matt in sexual scandal. Tabitha, Matt’s stingy 
sister, provides the most cynical reading of the situation. She enters the room 
exclaiming, “Fy upon you Matt! . . . What doings are these, to disgrace your own 
character and disparage your family?” (22). The widow’s reply sets the other side 
of the argument: “shall a worthy gentleman’s character suffer for an action that 
does honour to humanity?” (22). As much as Smollett seems to expect us to share 
the widow and Matt’s outrage, the answer to her question appears to be yes, 
which Jery acknowledges in the closing of his letter. While Jery admires Matt, he 
leaves the scene with the fear of “being detected in a weakness, that might entail 
the ridicule of the company” (24) if he performs a charitable deed himself. 
Indeed, without Jery’s spying to provide a witness, Matt might never have 
cleared himself from the suspicion of sexual misconduct. After Tabitha no longer 
thinks Matt is providing the widow with hush money to conceal an affair, she is 
even more outraged. Jery’s presentation of her uninterrupted speech makes her 
displeasure both more vague and more damning: “Oh, filthy! Hideous! 
Abominable! Child, child, talk not to me of charity—who gives twenty pounds in 
charity? . . . Besides, charity begins at home—twenty pounds would buy me a 
complete suit of flowered silk, trimmings and all” (24). Tabitha’s initial 
exclamations are precariously placed. While we can assume in the context of the 
larger passage that they refer to the idea of sexual misconduct, their grouping 
with her anti-charitable remarks highlights her feelings about Matt’s generosity. 
Her remaining dialogue reminds us of Jery’s earlier diagnosis of Matt as 
excessive. Twenty pounds is over-generous, leading to suspicions, again, of both 
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Matt’s motives and his prudence. Tabitha’s desire for additional clothes 
highlights her vanity, but also draws attention to exactly how much money Matt 
gives. The entire scene is steeped in hysteria, excess, and confusion. The reader 
comes away with a positive sense of Matt’s enormous generosity, but also with 
some of Jery’s trepidation about unrestrained giving.  
The party’s stay in Bath emphasizes this feeling that charity can sometimes 
be given a bit too liberally. Jery further illuminates Matt’s character by 
commenting that Matt’s “blood rises at every instance of insolence and cruelty, 
even where he himself is no way concerned; and ingratitude makes his teeth 
chatter. On the other hand, the recital of a generous, humane, or grateful action, 
never fails to draw from him tears of approbation, which he is often greatly 
distressed to conceal” (65). This comment establishes Matt as a traditionally 
imagined man of feeling, except for the crucial last qualification. Jery indicates 
Matt’s anxiety to conceal his emotions, thus bypassing the criticism of 
sentimentality as performance. If Matt’s tears were false, he would be at no pains 
to conceal them. However, Matt’s apparent failure to conceal his emotions (Jery, 
after all, has no trouble discerning them) gives him all the credit of genuine 
sensibility. The positive moral judgment Jery intends, however, is cast into 
shadow by the novel’s most pointed discussion of gratitude, the story of 
Paunceford and Serle. Serle ruined his own fortunes, thanks to a “romantic spirit 
of generosity, which he has often displayed, even at the expense of his discretion, 
in favor of worthless individuals” (66). Paunceford is the embodiment of this 
worthlessness, specifically in his ingratitude. Now that his own fortunes are 
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made, “he takes great pains to appear affable and gracious. But they say, he is 
remarkable for shrinking from his former friendships . . . . And that he seems 
uneasy at sight of some old benefactors, whom a man of honor would take 
pleasure to acknowledge” (65). Smollett takes this chance to completely revise 
the story of Ferdinand and Renaldo. Instead of virtue being rewarded and 
villainy reformed, the worst case has happened. Paunceford “lives in a palace, 
feeds upon dainties, is arrayed in sumptuous apparel, appears in all the pomp of 
equipage, and passes all his time among the nobles of the land” (67). His overly 
sentimental benefactor, on the other hand, “eats for twelve shillings a-week and 
drinks the water as a preservative against the gout and gravel” (67). Only in the 
indignation of Smollett’s readers is there any justice in the situation. The scene, 
indeed, is carefully calculated to raise our suspicions of charity and to encourage 
us to give it more carefully. Charity cannot only interrupt good fortune, it can 
also ruin your life and render you a social outcast. However beneficial sympathy 
is to the human character, overspending on charitable pursuits can damage one’s 
fortunes just as quickly as other extravagances, especially when one misjudges 
one’s charitable object.  
Matt is also forced to learn early in the novel that charity can cause more 
trouble at home than it is worth. While Matt’s early letters are filled with 
suggestions of things Dr. Lewis should do for the tenants on Matt’s estate, this 
trend abruptly stops mid-way through the first volume. Smollett is perhaps 
simply suggesting that as the party gets further from Wales Matt’s interventions 
are less needed—many of the early suggestions require trips to/from the estate—
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but a particular interchange with Tabby provides a more compelling explanation. 
Matt’s charity on the estate goes unnoticed, until it crosses into a domestic area 
that Tabby considers to be rightly her own, in which case Matt is forced to 
sullenly retract his gift. Matt’s letter from Bath on May 19 concludes with his 
typical paternalistic generosity: “If you think Davis has stock or credit enough to 
do justice to the farm, give him a discharge for the rent that is due: this will 
animate his industry, for I know that nothing is so discouraging to a farmer, as 
the thoughts of being in arrears with his landlord” (74). The letter continues, 
however, to Matt’s retraction of “the lamb’s skin, which Williams, the hind, 
begged of me, when he was last at Bath” (74). Tabby, it appears, has raised such 
an uproar over this piece of misplaced charity that Matt can have no rest. He 
claims (despite the concluding scenes with Baynard, to be discussed below) that 
“I shall never presume to despise or censure any poor man, for suffering himself 
to be henpecked; conscious how I myself am obliged to truckle to a domestic 
demon” (74). But while Matt presents Tabby’s interference as negative, and 
concludes his letter by mentioning how he “appeases” (i.e., pays off) the servants 
“by stealth” in order to keep them from rebelling against her, he appears to take 
Tabby’s advice to heart. This is the last letter that directly addresses charitable 
actions to be taken toward Matt’s tenants. Matt has presumably learned that 
domestic economy and charity cannot coexist, and he will perhaps be a thriftier 
landlord thanks to Tabitha’s interference. That interference, however, is 
presented negatively as “hen pecking” and noise.  
In this case, Tabitha gets literally the last word, sending a follow-up letter 
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chastising Dr. Lewis for his interference in her domestic arrangements. All of 
Tabby’s letters, except the one to Dr. Lewis in this passage, are to her 
housekeeper, dictating the tightest domestic economy. Tabby, for example, 
insists that her housekeeper, “clap a pad-luck on the wind-seller, and let none of 
the men have excess to the strong bear” (8) and “have an eye to the maids, and 
keep them to their spinning” (44). While Matt desires bounty without luxury on 
the estate, Tabby insists that her servants have neither and blames Matt’s charity 
for her own cheapness. In an earlier letter to the housekeeper, Tabby notes that 
Matt’s gift of her Alderney cow to one of the tenants takes “so much milk out of 
my dairy, and the press must stand still: but I won’t lose a cheese paring; and the 
milk shall be made good, if the sarvents should go without butter” (43). She sees 
Matt and Dr. Lewis’s charity as teaching “servants to pillage their masters” (74). 
Tabby goes so far as to lapse into perhaps unintentional obscenity in her anger: 
“Roger gets this, and Roger gets that; but I’d have you to know, I won’t be 
rogered at this rate by any ragmatical fellow in the kingdom” (75). For Tabby, 
any money saved from the domestic half of the estate goes into her own pocket 
(literally, almost, since she mentions saving enough wool to make her own 
petticoats). Her cheapness, whatever Matt does to counteract it, is what provides 
her with the means to attract a mate despite her lack of the usual qualifications. 
Tabby is, in a way, right to be angry, given that Matt’s charity is lessening her 
chance of finding a husband and setting up her own household. Dr. Lewis’s 
complicity, in putting “such phims into my brother’s head, to the prejudice of my 
pockat” (75) renders him equally to blame in Tabitha’s eyes. While many anti-
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charitable rants in the novel are undone by the subsequent letters, Tabitha’s ire 
stands fairly uncontested, as the last letter on this topic and the final letter from 
Bath.  
The question of the cheating Bath servants, to which Matt alludes in his 
letter, goes along with Tabitha’s anger to give her an unusual amount of credit. 
Win’s final letter from Bath proves that the servants were not just taking the 
“vails” that Matt alludes to, and to which custom gave them a right, but outright 
stealing. He, in turn, appears to pay off the corrupt servants in order to avoid a 
domestic scene. In addition to whatever they have already taken from the family, 
the servants thus get additional hush money. Matt comes away from this 
exchange seeming more than ever like something of a dupe, without the 
necessary determination to stand up to his own servants. Tabby’s fierce 
independence, though rendered objectionable by her tone and humorous by her 
spelling, appears pragmatic by comparison. Her terrible thrift looks more and 
more like prudence. One must be careful, Matt learns, that domestic generosity 
does not do more harm to household peace than good. More than ever, though, 
this scene calls into question the line between rational charity and emotionally 
driven extravagance. The fact that Matt sends no more charitable missions home 
perhaps suggests that Tabby has taught him to harden his heart against the 
importunities of his servants and tenants, who appear from her perspective as 
mercenary advantage-takers.28 And, indeed, Matt’s task for the rest of the novel 
becomes creating a masculine model in which a moderated version of Tabby’s 
                                                
28 For a slightly different, but still recuperative, reading of Tabitha, see Gillian 
Skinner 85-89. 
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thrift can become desirable. Gillian Skinner notes that, in its earliest form, 
economy was explicitly domestic, and by that standard Tabitha is a very good 
economist.29 Matt must find a way to meld that domestic economy with the 
increasingly questioned model of sentimental masculinity.  
Smollett’s portrait of himself, as Mr. S---- in London, perfectly encapsulates 
the novel’s deep ambiguity toward charity. The scene is, in a basic way, positive. 
Smollett presents his version of himself as someone who is deeply charitable, 
giving liberally to the literary community with little hope of reward. Whatever 
anxieties the novel has, Mr. S---- as a character still believes in the goodness of 
charity. The scene’s presentation through Jery’s slightly skeptical eyes, however, 
serves to emphasize alternate interpretations of Mr. S----’s actions. Jery’s 
companion Dick explains Mr. S----’s charity as liberal, but also slightly silly. After 
a more traditional list of charitable actions, including helping hack writers out of 
debtor’s prison, Dick ends his enumeration by pointing out the writers’ 
ingratitude: “when they see occasion, they make use of his name with the most 
petulant familiarity; nay, they do not even scruple to arrogate to themselves the 
merit of some of his performances, and have been known to sell their own 
lucubrations as the produce of his brain” (129). Since his beneficiaries are not 
grateful, the text struggles to articulate a motive for Mr. S----’s charity. Jery 
argues that “this appearance of liberality . . . was easily accounted for, on the 
supposition that they flattered him in private, and engaged his adversaries in 
public” (129). But Dick easily refutes this motive and instead points out, “those 
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very guests whom you saw at his table to-day were the authors of a great part of 
that abuse; and he himself is well aware of their particular favours” (129). Jery 
and Dick eventually come to the conclusion that there is “no reasonable motive” 
for S----’s actions. Dick goes even further, believing “that, if the truth must be 
told, the man was, in point of conduct, a most incorrigible fool” who “had not 
fortitude enough to resist the importunity even of the most worthless” (130). 
While Jery acknowledges that Dick’s complaints sound a good deal like sour 
grapes, he can come up with no better motive himself. He ends his passage with 
fairly weak praise: “By all accounts, S---- is not without weakness and caprice, 
but he is certainly good-humored and civilized” (130). While S----’s character is 
thus justified, his charity is not. The text proves unable to give a rational, or any, 
reason for S----’s actions. While his charity, until its final denunciation by Dick, is 
shown positively, it is also shown to be beyond explanation. It exists entirely as 
eccentric whim, not as a model for actions the reader should take. Indeed, 
allowing Dick to give the only attempted explanation draws even more attention 
to one of the novel’s deep concerns about charity—what the giver perceives as 
goodness or benevolence can easily be constructed by anyone else as foolishness 
or even malice.  
Smollett also presents scenes that demonstrate the pitfalls of charity 
misunderstood by its recipient. Humphry’s initial “rescue” of the “drowning” 
Matt is a very literal attempt to rescue virtue in distress. While the scene is not 
charitable in a traditional, monetary sense, the novel uses it to explore the 
problems of misplaced philanthropy. Matt’s initial shock upon entering the 
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water at Scarborough is perceived by Humphry as drowning, causing Humphry 
to rush into the sea and drag Matt out by the ear. Humphry’s attempt is based on 
entirely positive emotions—love for his master, a desire to save a human life, and 
a concern for others greater than that for his own well-being. At the same time, 
though, his attempt exposes himself and Matt only to ridicule. Humphry nearly 
drowns, exposes Matt’s state of undress to “all the people, men, women, and 
children” on the beach, and causes Matt to have “a burning-heat, and a strange 
buzzing noise” in his ear (179). Matt quickly acknowledges both his own anger 
and Humphry’s good intentions after the event, highlighting the emotional 
ambiguity of charity gone awry. Matt does not see himself as an appropriate 
charitable object, since from his own perspective he needed no help. This 
misalignment of perceptions causes Matt to lash out, striking Humphry almost 
on instinct. The moral of the story, so far, appears to be that waiting to make sure 
your charity is desired is perhaps best. But, if Matt had truly been drowning, 
waiting would have been more fatal than misapplied help. Even Matt is 
compelled to admit that “Clinker’s intention was laudable,” despite his own 
anger and his feeling that he is “a sufferer by [Humphry’s] simplicity” (179). The 
entire scene leads Matt to doubt the efficacy of basic human goodness. He 
concludes his letter by asking, acerbically, “whether a man had not better choose 
a sensible rogue, than an honest simpleton for his servant” (179).30 This scene 
argues that good intentions are not equivalent to thoughtfulness, a message that 
combines with Matt’s charity to the widow at Hot Well to suggest that the world 
                                                
30 The novel answers Matt’s rhetorical question when Jery’s servant, a sensible 
rogue, abandons the family to seduce an heiress.  
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needs fewer spontaneous charitable feelings and more deliberation.  
The subsequent scenes, however, shift the novel’s perspective toward 
charity again, suggesting an unwillingness to let Matt’s negative stance prevail 
even briefly. Jery’s letter immediately following Matt’s is filled with conventional 
sentimental tableaux, reorienting our feelings to a more traditional compass. In 
the first, a widow, deranged with grief, mistakes Humphry for her dead 
husband. In Jery’s own words, “the incident was too pathetic to occasion mirth—
it brought tears to the eyes of all present . . . . We did not leave the village 
without doing something for her benefit—Even Tabitha’s charity was awakened 
on this occasion” (180). Here, the traditional charitable tropes, exploded by 
Matt’s “drowning” and the novel’s other treatments of charity, are seamlessly 
reinstated. There is no hint of mirth, no implication that the widow is a cheat, 
and no question of helping her. This sentiment is reinforced immediately by the 
reintroduction of Martin the Highwayman. While we might expect Smollett to 
cast charity toward a known criminal as worthy of deeper thought or criticism, 
such is not the case. Martin’s scene is a very traditional one of patronage and 
gratitude. Matt gives Martin a letter of introduction to the East India Company, 
risking his own reputation to “procure [Martin] such credentials, that [he] will 
not be long without a commission” (182). Martin, in turn, demonstrates “strong 
symptoms of gratitude and attachment” (182). The charitable system is shown in 
both these scenes to be alive and well, and giving charity is again shown to be 
the mark of fundamental human virtue. Charity here is born from real concern 
and ends in appropriate gratitude, in scenes that could have been taken directly 
                                                                                                                          
 76 
from any more straightforward sentimental novel. This immediate reinforcement 
of ideal charity suggests that Smollett is simply unwilling to dismiss charity’s 
power and virtue, just as the character of Mr. S---- continued to be charitable in 
the most inhospitable circumstances.    
At the same time that this ongoing presentation and representation of 
charity occurs, Matt’s narrative voice shifts in its attitude toward the sights he 
observes, abandoning his high moral tone for a more dispassionate style. As 
many critics have pointed out, Matt’s early catalogs tend toward hysterical 
extremes of social commentary. In Bristol, Bath, and London, all is filth, disease, 
and disgust. Readers cannot help but have a visceral reaction to Matt’s 
horrifyingly intense descriptions of, for example, the Bath waters: 
Suppose the matter of those ulcers, floating on the water, comes in contact 
with my skin, when the pores are all open, I ask you what must be the 
consequence?—Good Heaven, the very thought makes my blood run cold! 
We know not what sores may be running into the water while we are 
bathing, and what sort of matter we may thus imbibe; the king’s evil, the 
scurvy, the cancer, and the pox . . . . I can’t help suspecting, that there is, or 
may be, some regurgitation from the bath into the cistern of the pump. In 
that case, what a delicate beveridge is every day quaffed by the drinkers; 
medicated with the sweat, and dirt, and dandruff; and the abominable 
discharges of various kinds from twenty different diseased bodies. (44-45).  
This description alone is certainly sufficient to give anyone with a modern 
understanding of germs a serious case of the heebie-jeebies. We sympathize 
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completely with Matt’s physical disgust. As Matt’s physical symptoms abate (he 
writes Dr. Lewis on July 18 to say that he is feeling stronger than ever and enjoys 
“a constant tide of spirits, equally distant from inanition and excess” [211]), and 
as the party approaches the less luxurious Scotland, Matt’s attitude becomes that 
of a political economist.31 Matt’s increasingly dispassionate reports of the diet, 
lifestyles, and spending habits of Scottish peasants demonstrate a remarkably 
shifted perspective. In contrast to the moral depravities of Bath, Matt finds 
purely economic reasons for the failings of Scottish peasants:  
As the soil and climate of the Highlands are but ill adapted to the 
cultivation of corn, the people apply themselves chiefly to the breeding and 
feeding of black cattle . . . . Perhaps this branch of husbandry, which 
requires very little attendance and labour, is one of the principal causes of 
that idleness and want of industry, which distinguishes these mountaineers 
in their own country—When they come forth into the world, they become 
as diligent and alert as any people upon earth. (245) 
Such coolly calculated remarks recur throughout Matt’s letters from Scotland. 
While the Scottish Smollett had an obvious interest in redeeming his fellow 
citizens in any way possible, even the redemption has shifted tone.32 Unlike 
Matt’s earlier hysterics, his discussion of Scotland arises from an intellectual, not 
                                                
31 While the genre of economic writing was not as well formed in 1771 as it 
would become after Smith’s 1776 publication of The Wealth of Nations, it certainly 
existed. Sir James Steuart published his Principles of Political Economy in 1767. 
Moreover, Smollett himself is likely to have been familiar with the burgeoning 
field, thanks to his role in editing the Critical Review. See Gottlieb for a more 
complete treatment of Smollett’s role as editor.  
32 For discussions of Smollett and Scottish nationalism, see Gottlieb and Shields. 
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an emotional, rationale. We are not meant to shudder along with Matt, but to 
agree with his calculating rationality. Just as Matt’s constipation appears to have 
been cured by his journey, his emotional backlog has been swept away by his 
earlier outbursts. Without these “excess” emotions, Matt has moved away from 
sentiment toward economics. This shift should perhaps not surprise readers who 
have noticed, as Thomas Preston does, that “Matt’s tenderness of heart generally 
expresses itself in gifts of money” and that “throughout the novel various 
characters discuss their own finances or the finances of others.”33 Matt and 
Lishmago even go so far as to debate the economic value of the Act of Union. 
Matt contends, in a starkly different tone from that of his discussions of England, 
that “the people lived better, had more trade, and a greater quantity of money 
circulating since the union, than before” (266). The very conditions that Matt 
earlier berated as causes for luxury are here revalued in the way that they came 
to be seen by economists, not moralists. The subsequent debate between Matt 
and Lishmago covers much the same territory as do many late eighteenth-
century economic texts—the social value of circulation, colonization, and trade. 
Matt’s final word on the subject is an only moderately qualified endorsement of 
the positive power of trade—”I am one of those who think that, by proper 
regulations, commerce may produce every national benefit, without the allay of 
such concomitant evils” (269). While Thomas Preston suggests that the “very 
world which admires the man of feeling forces him into the posture of a 
                                                
33 Thomas R. Preston, introduction, The Expedition of Humphry Clinker, by Tobias 
Smollett (Athens, U of Georgia P, 1990) xxix. 
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misanthrope and a satirist to defend himself from it,”34 in this case it forces him 
away from even misanthropy and into the arms of economics. Gillian Skinner 
contends, as do I, that this shift is a logical one. In her argument, 
“correspondence between the degree of financial generosity and the degree of 
proven sensibility immediately raises the possibility of excessive response—
extravagance of both financial and emotional (and often . . . sexual) kinds.”35 
Economy, as I will discuss below, is for Smollett a safeguard against the dangers 
of this kind of unrestrained sensibility.  
Indeed, the novel’s final charitable scene depends on this shift in Matt’s 
perspective and makes little sense without considering it. We meet Matt’s friend 
Baynard twice on the journey, once before the party goes to Scotland and again 
on their return. Baynard serves not only, as many critics have noted, as a focus 
for the text’s misogyny,36 but also as a dire warning of the dangers of 
sentimentality. As Baynard himself notes, and Matt criticizes, “the tenderness of 
his nature [is] the greatest defect of his constitution” (277). His wife, sensing this, 
“fastened upon the weak side of his soul” and exploits his delicacy by feigning 
illness when she is thwarted. Baynard is the embodiment of the man of feeling’s 
greatest fault. Baynard’s sensibility renders him unable to resist, even though 
Matt contends that his spirits would be able to counter the direct attacks of a 
“termagant” (278). Notable in these passages is the uncharacteristic harshness of 
Matt’s criticism. A man whom we have so often seen in the throes of 
                                                
34 Thomas R. Preston, “Smollett and the Benevolent Mistanthrope type,” 57. 
35 Skinner 4. 
36 See, particularly, David Weed’s “Sentimental Misogyny and Medicine in 
Humphry Clinker.” 
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sentimentality himself seems scarcely the voice to propose such an anti-
sentimental stance. Yet he criticizes everything about both Baynard himself, from 
his personality to his “meagre, yellow, and dejected” appearance, and his 
household (279).  
Throughout this section, Smollett carefully blends the language of 
sentimentality and the language of prudent economics in order to modify the 
reader’s expectation of generosity. In fact, the coupling of sentiment and 
economics makes Matt’s economic message more acceptable than it would have 
been in any other form. While Matt has been remarkably cold and critical 
throughout the section, he finally lapses into outright anger: “I inveighed bitterly 
against the indiscretion of his wife, and reproached him with his unmanly 
acquiescence under the absurd tyranny which she exerted. I exhorted him to 
recollect his resolution, and make one effectual effort to disengage himself from a 
thraldom equally shameful and pernicious” (281). Despite this strong language, 
Baynard reacts to Matt’s offer to “regulate his affairs” with the stock picture of 
sentimentality. Matt gives his lecture while “mingling tears with [his] 
remonstrances,” and Baynard is “so penetrated with these marks of my affection, 
that he lost all power of utterance. He pressed me to his breast with great 
emotion and wept in silence” (282). Baynard’s enthusiastic, and even sexualized, 
acceptance of Matt’s aid disguises how different Matt’s offer here is from his 
earlier charities. Matt gives no money or concrete aid, but instead helps Baynard 
wrest control of the family finances away from his wife. Gillian Skinner 
articulates the mechanisms by which this shift aligns perfectly with the shifting 
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provenance of economics from an area of female and strictly domestic control to 
a subject for male expertise.37 The loan also shows, though, the subtle revolution 
in Matt’s thinking about charity. After the various setbacks his charity has 
suffered in the story, he is no longer willing to give money without due 
consideration. The state of Baynard’s finances makes it less than prudent to 
simply give him a lump sum of money. But Matt’s assistance in accounting still 
draws an effusion of sentimental language. True charity here, as is indicated by 
Baynard’s profusely genuine gratitude, is economic. Smollett allows Matt’s 
ordering of Baynard’s affairs to stand in for more traditionally charitable acts; 
Baynard needs economic discipline even more than he needs an emotionally 
driven gift of money. Even if we give cautiously, Smollett suggests, our friends 
will be grateful.  
Baynard’s final appearance allows prudent financial transactions to replace 
Matt’s earlier, more emotional, charity even more smoothly. Baynard’s wife, the 
one sentimental weakness standing between him and financial accountability, 
dies, allowing Matt full control of his finances. Matt’s coldness continues in his 
absolute lack of sadness for his friend’s loss—“I was instantly seized with a 
violent emotion, but it was not grief” (325). Matt even goes so far as to console 
his friend by suggesting “that Heaven could not have interposed more 
effectually to rescue him from disgrace and ruin” (326). After two brief 
paragraphs detailing Baynard’s presumably unwarranted grief, the text 
immediately moves into Matt’s discussion of Baynard’s monetary affairs. Matt 
                                                
37 Skinner 5 and 59. 
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promptly dismisses servants, sends away Baynard’s relatives, and even has an 
account taken “of every single thing in the country house, including horses, 
carriages, and harness” (326). Emotion is replaced with accounting, feeling with 
exactitude. Baynard’s grief is not a natural feeling, but instead something to be 
conquered by “a complete victory over the infirmities of his nature” (327). 
Following this is an explicit catalog of Baynard’s exact debts and income, a literal 
conquering of emotion under a wave of financial facts. Matt’s final “charity” to 
Baynard is to arrange loans, at four percent interest, to help him gradually 
recover his estate. Not only does Matt risk Liddy and Tabby’s fortunes, which 
presumably cannot be replaced if they are lost, to help his nearly insolvent 
friend, the help is of a very limited kind. Baynard, though presented as the kind 
of man who deserves our sympathy, is instead given a mountain of debt. Matt is 
not charitable; he is a banker. This state of affairs is given as an unequivocally 
happy ending—Baynard’s emotional ties to his wife are replaced with a fiscally 
responsible role in his neighborhood, and readers are expected to find this an 
emotionally satisfying turn. Our complete alignment with Matt’s point of view 
makes it nearly impossible to do anything but cheer when Mrs. Baynard dies. At 
the same time, Matt’s charity here cannot possibly be constructed as anything but 
a financial investment. After the emotional upheavals caused by his charity in 
the earlier parts of the novel, Matt appears to have learned prudence. But that 
prudence is something less than generous to the exact extent that it is less than 
charitable. Smollett has constructed a way for Matt to help his friend while 
remaining beyond reproach for extravagance or emotional weakness, but to do 
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so he is forced into the arms of economics and its insistence on logical 
consequences.  
Thanks to this shift, Smollett is compelled to reevaluate Matt’s rescue of 
Humphry. His reinvention as Matt’s illegitimate son, rather than the servant 
Matt took on out of charity, has often been read harshly by critics. These writers 
tend to suggest that this act of belated paternity is part of the text’s inexorable 
conservatism, leaving the novel with a closed, private, backward-looking ending. 
For Humphry, Matt’s charity is able to translate seamlessly into Matt’s role as his 
father. The novel is thus able to end with, as Evan Gottlieb points out, a perfectly 
closed family unit. No one remains outside the circle of the patriarchal family. 
Win marries Humphry, Liddy and George’s marriage brings in the Denisons, 
and Tabby’s unsuccessful attempt to replace Lishmago with Baynard unites him, 
symbolically, with the family as well. The community is closed, and it becomes 
impossible to give charity outside the family circle. As Gottlieb notes, “the 
novel’s sympathetic relations are absorbed into familial ones.”38 Gillian Skinner 
states this even more strongly: “The ending of Humphry Clinker thus represents a 
form of triumph for Bramble, being in effect a sentimental fantasy, in which an 
expanding circle of personal contacts provides the bulwark against a world 
whose values seem fundamentally inimical.”39 Earlier we are invited to mock as 
selfishness Tabby’s repeated assertion that charity begins at home, but the final 
message of the novel appears, in this view, to invite just such a reading. Charity, 
                                                
38 Evan Gottlieb, “ ‘Fools of Prejudice’: Sympathy and National Identity in the 
Scottish Enlightenment and Humphry Clinker,” Eighteenth-Century Fiction 18.1 
(2005): 24.  
39 Skinner 82. 
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like the kind of emotional excess it takes to produce an illegitimate child, is 
hidden beneath the more proper sphere of familial duty and economic prudence. 
Despite these potentially negative readings of Humphry’s parentage, his 
inclusion in the Bramble family also works in a different, and somewhat more 
compelling, direction. First, we must remember that this revelation is a stock of 
pro-charity fiction. Fielding makes a similar gesture in Tom Jones, and Dickens 
would go on to borrow it for Oliver Twist. In such cases, charity helps those who 
secretly have a claim on the time and money of their benefactor. Being charitable, 
such texts argue, helps us to fulfill the very duty toward society that we would 
most want to fill, if only we could know every circumstance. Furthermore, as 
Michael McKeon notes, Matt’s charity toward Humphry succeeds in generating 
“the social ‘circulation’ and upward mobility needed to fulfill Humphry’s status 
as a dangerous germ of social disease.”40 Matt’s charity allows Humphry to 
transcend his class status, a social phenomenon Matt rails against time and again 
throughout the early part of the text, but is ultimately forced to abandon. The 
text’s positive treatment of Humphry, though, suggests strongly that this social 
rise is not as negative as Matt portrayed it in those early sections of the novel. It 
is not a failure, but rather a portrait of the modern world. Humphry and Win are 
treated much like any of the other couples at the novel’s end, and are able to 
move upward from servants to family members living on Matt’s estate. Because 
of Matt’s charity, his life has been saved, his family augmented, and the “sins of 
[his] youth” (305) have been expunged. But, before we take this as a completely 
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unequivocal embrace of charity, we must remember that Matt’s charity to 
Humphry was never emotionally or monetarily excessive. Matt employed 
Humphry as a necessary servant and never handed him money willy-nilly. Even 
when his parentage is discovered, Matt is remarkably reticent as to Humphry’s 
financial future. This undemonstrative charity, however, is suggested to be as 
emotionally satisfying as more excessive giving. Matt’s treatment of Humphry, 
like his dealings with Baynard, thus becomes a model for good, prudent, charity.  
 The form of Humphry Clinker reinforces a reading of the novel as a modified 
and narrowed endorsement of charity, at the same time that it crucially softens 
the ideological implications of the novel’s economic shift. John Sekora explains 
the novel’s structure as it relates to traditional attacks on luxury, but not its 
structure as a novel. Indeed, he goes so far as to suggest that “the attack upon 
luxury gave focus and coherence to the novel, whose travel form was not 
innately disciplinary.”41 Smollett’s choice of epistolary travel narrative is, in 
Sekora’s view, a method of more elaborate authorial control: “Smollett thus 
develops the incidents of Humphry Clinker in such a way that they constitute both 
the narrative itself and an attitude toward it, the structure he provides telling us 
not only what occurs but also how to interpret those occurrences.”42 But this 
construction of form’s inevitable reinforcement of a clearly defined message is a 
little too tidy. Instead, the form adds another way to interpret charitable 
sympathy. 
 The epistolary form, we must remember, had proven problematic from the 
                                                
41 Sekora 241. 
42 Sekora 267. 
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very beginning. The famous Pamela/Shamela debate highlights the way that 
epistolary novels emphasize all the problems of unreliable narration. In addition, 
epistolary novels have an innate duality of both audience and message. Not only 
must the novels be believable internally, each letter realistically appealing to its 
addressee, but they also assume an external audience with a compatible frame of 
reference, capable of understanding a story with minimal authorial interference. 
Richardson imagined this reader as a “country reader” who could logically be 
assumed to not only share the author’s social values but to see the author as a 
source of cultural power.43 For Smollett, though, and for many late-century 
writers, this reliance on social stability is more vexed. Blythe Forcey, writing 
about Anglo-American novelists of the same period, emphasizes this social 
breakdown: “knowing that they [late eighteenth-century Anglo-American 
writers] were writing in a time of rapid transition and for many possible 
audiences (rural/urban, British/American, naive/worldly, male/female, 
moral/amoral), they could no longer trust readers to interpret on their own.”44 
Forcey argues that this ambiguity drove many authors to abandon epistolary 
novels entirely, as they simply became too unstable to convey an unambiguous 
message. Furthermore, epistolary novels, by giving every character an equal 
voice, risk making every character equally persuasive. Many readers of Clarissa 
have enjoyed the disturbing sensation that Lovelace’s letters are often more 
charming, humorous, and entertaining than Clarissa’s, rendering him far more 
                                                
43 Samuel Richardson, Selected Letters, ed. John Carroll (Oxford: Clarendon P, 
1964) 232. 
44 Blythe Forcey, “Charlotte Temple and the End of Epistolarity,” American 
Literature 63.2 (1991): 229. 
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attractive than Richardson liked. Michael McKeon counters Sekora by reminding 
his readers of the power of this phenomenon. No matter what the majority of 
Matt’s letters may say, the choice to use a multiplicity of narrative voices allows 
other opinions time and space in the text. This disparity, McKeon argues, 
encourages and even demands readers to recognize that “the truth of things lies 
in a composite and mixed view of reality.”45  
This “mixed view” works in multiple ways in Humphry Clinker. The letters 
serve, first of all, as a device to alternately reinforce and undermine the novel’s 
explicit didacticism. Jery’s letters, and sometimes even Liddy’s, serve to drive 
home social points made by Matt. Jery’s reportage also shapes our opinion of 
Matt, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter. At the same time, even these 
“serious” letters undermine what could be read as the novel’s unequivocal anti-
luxury stance. Liddy and Jery are, to different degrees, fascinated by London and 
Bath and present moderated views of their uncle’s displeasure. While Matt, for 
example, complains of the stench caused by the crowd of Bath, Jery jokingly 
gives thanks “for the coarseness of my organs, being in no danger of ever falling 
a sacrifice to the delicacy of my nose” (64). Lydia, the novel’s most positive voice, 
likes “Bath so well, that I hope [Matt] won’t think of leaving it till the season is 
quite over” (57). She finds it all “gayety, good-humour, and diversion,” and sees 
everything in the most positive light (39), even though she, too, finds it 
overwhelming. London, even more than Bath, brings out differences of opinion 
in the party. Liddy’s letters, in particular, serve as almost a point-by-point 
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renunciation of Matt’s. He sees only signs of social pretension and filth, but 
Liddy is quite charmed by the very crowds of people. The “infinity of gay 
equipages, coaches, chariots, chaises, and other carriages” pleases her, leading 
her to reflect that “all that you read of wealth and grandeur in the Arabian 
Night’s Entertainment . . . is here realized” (91). Jery is more likely to see humor 
in events that Matt finds merely disgusting, while Liddy is more likely to be 
charmed by what Matt sees as excess and luxury. The very fact that the narrative 
otherwise values Jery and Liddy as basically moral people allows their letters to 
present readers with a softer version of Matt’s criticism. While the narrative 
certainly gives Matt’s voice more space and a powerful eloquence of disgust, 
Liddy and Jery are able to remind us that the world is not, perhaps, as terrible as 
Matt’s voluble descriptions of it. And while we might be tempted to dismiss 
Liddy’s voice as somewhat giddy, Tim Prior argues that her “impressionability is 
carefully qualified by more mature sentiments—sentiments directed toward her 
appreciation of friendship, solitude, and the natural world.”46 Liddy’s embrace of 
pastoral life as the novel progresses further softens Matt’s earlier views. She 
reaches his conclusions in favor of rural life, but without ever descending to his 
disgust. London is rich and exciting, but a quiet life is better for her in the long 
term. This alternate view of Matt’s subjects helps to voice, in a small way, a more 
optimistic view than Matt’s misanthropy allows. 
Win’s and Tabby’s letters serve to destabilize the narrative more directly, 
both through a presentation of radically different, although never seriously 
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sanctioned, viewpoints and through their humor. We laugh at their many 
“unintentional” errors, but also at their comic scenes. These, much like Liddy 
and Jery’s letters, can simultaneously support and undermine Matt’s more 
dominant message. Win, for example, inadvertently supports Matt’s claim as to 
the foolishness of upward mobility by dressing in Tabby’s cast-off clothing, only 
to be taken for a prostitute. Servants cannot emulate ladies of fashion without 
being mistaken for something even lower. The mere fact of our laughing at Win’s 
misfortunes causes us to align ourselves, however briefly, with the socially rigid 
model that Matt expresses in his letters. Win’s aspirations to be more like Tabby 
also allow Tabby’s faults, like cheapness and overdressing, to be rendered even 
more ridiculous.  
Tabby’s role in the story is even more complex. As discussed earlier, Tabby 
expresses an anti-charitable outlook that is partly ridiculous, but partly rewarded 
by the text. Her extreme cheapness is laughable, but also contributes vitally to 
the domestic economy that is lauded by both Matt and Liddy. We are supposed 
to mock her for an excess of traits that the text otherwise supports—prudence 
and restraint. Tabby is at once the text’s most anti-luxurious character, refusing 
to update her wardrobe even when she is far out of fashion and insisting that her 
servants use their time productively, and the text’s most selfish, resenting 
Liddy’s suitors, pinching pennies for her own dowry, and damaging the 
happiness of everyone around her. She is a cautionary tale in motion, intended to 
demonstrate the dangers of accepting Matt’s harsh rhetoric as a lifestyle. The line 
between the charitable prudence Matt learns and Tabby’s cheapness is one 
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Smollett believes is vitally important, but has difficulty articulating. We mock 
Tabby because she is ridiculous, but taken individually, none of her traits, except 
perhaps her grating personality, appears beyond the pale. Smollett thus 
exaggerates all of her extremities by the bizarre spelling and phrasing of her 
letters. When she, for example, wants to complain of Matt’s charity to one of the 
servants, she writes, “God forbid that I should lack Christian charity; but charity 
begins at huom, and sure forbid nothing can be a more charitable work than to 
rid the family of such vermine” (153). In the same letter, she refuses to forgive 
Dr. Lewis for aiding Matt’s charity “though he beshits me on his bended knees” 
(153). Smollett’s epistolary form allows him to use the technicalities of Tabby’s 
language to discredit ideas, like dismissing servants who beg too many favors, 
which might be more persuasive in the hands of a more literate writer. This 
deliberate control of our response to Tabby is indeed the text’s strongest 
indication that her ideas are unacceptable to Smollett. He may temper Matt’s 
generosity with caution, but he can never abandon charity as completely as 
Tabby does.   
More importantly than any specific shifts in view, however, these letters 
force us into the consciousness of a multitude of characters. We see events first 
from one perspective, then from another, in what Janet Altman calls Smollett’s 
“fragmentation and deformation of reality.”47 We see Matt’s charity presented by 
Tabby as waste, and Tabby’s finery presented by Jery and Liddy as disgusting 
display. This constant shift keeps the reader at all times aware of the infinite 
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number of ways that a scene can be constructed. More than just a device to 
forward the plot or enhance the novel’s humor, this is a fundamental exercise in 
sympathy. Altman reminds her readers that “the more fragmented and 
disconnected the narrative appears, the more actively the outside reader seeks to 
discover the connections.”48 Smollett’s multiple narrators compel us to work at 
unifying his story. Adam Smith, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1792), argues 
that we primarily learn to sympathize and to judge our own behavior by 
imagining how others might see it. Only by shifting our perspective can we learn 
to judge the propriety of our own actions. Smollett’s narrative form demands 
exactly this. Constantly revising and re-imagining scenes forces the reader to 
always be aware of the different ways actions can be perceived. By doing what 
Altman calls “perceiving coherence and fragmentation simultaneously,”49 
readers enact the basic mechanism of sympathy. While Smollett’s narration 
rarely uses the multitude of voices to produce true ambiguity of action, the very 
act of reading Tabby’s letters, for example, forces readers to imagine, however 
briefly, the events of the novel from her perspective. In order to read the novel 
successfully, we must be able to sympathize with every character in their turn. 
The grammatical and spelling errors, in fact, mean we have to sympathize even 
more with Win and Tabby to extract any meaning from their letters at all. Despite 
Smollett’s reservations about unrestrained emotions, his style demands the exact 
kind of creative reimagining that is required in order for us to feel sympathy for 
other humans. This fundamental core of human interaction cannot possibly be 
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completely broken down by any novel whose basic construction demands so 
much sympathetic imagination from its readers. Smollett never embraces these 
emotional bonds as enthusiastically as Sterne does, but the very structure of his 
novel reminds readers of their importance.  
The more Matt resists the confines of luxury, the more he has in common 
with a political economist. But, his increasingly dispassionate, observatorial style 
has little emotional reward, for either the readers or the other characters in the 
novel. Matt loses his personality and the more interesting part of his actions. At 
the close of the novel, Smollett seeks to revise this case by allowing Matt to 
return to his charitable ways. This charity, though, lacks the emotional 
satisfaction of the earlier parts of the novel, despite Smollett’s attempts to prove 
otherwise. Instead of a heartfelt act of love, we see Matt loan his friend money, at 
interest, after Matt has refused to understand his friend’s love for his wife. We 
have escaped luxury, but appear to have escaped love—and even friendship—at 
the same time. Perhaps Smollett is attempting to acknowledge, as many 
Victorians would, that the problems of England, in his case luxury and 
degeneration, are larger than can be solved with charity alone. But his inclusion 
of his portrait of Dr. S----, an obvious play on Smollett himself, and many other 
positively portrayed acts of generosity, suggests that he does not in fact wish for 
his readers to abandon charity. Indeed, the very form of the novel demands that 
we experience a kind of charitable sympathy with its characters. Rather, the 
ending of the novel presents the deeply troubled fact that charity has become 
coupled, for its critics, with negative, luxurious emotions. While Smollett seldom 
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portrays charity perpetrated for selfish ends, he allows us to glimpse that world 
as others misconstrue Matt’s actions. His loan is safer from misconstruction, and 
thus safer emotionally. The act of charity, though, to become immune from 
misperception, must become remarkably uncharitable. The novel thus ends with 
a problem. Smollett succeeds in separating charity from luxury only by a 
substantial reduction in charity’s power. At the same time, he begins to establish 
a powerful link between charity and proper economy, in both the older domestic 
and newer public sense. The novel’s final act of charity is an act of modern 
economics. For Smollett, this sacrifice is acceptable, because of his fears of 
modern degeneracy. For his Victorian followers, witnessing the social damage 
caused by the unrestrained exercise of economics, Smollett’s coupling of charity 
with economics and prudence will be perhaps even more troubling than the 
problem Smollett seeks to avoid. The ending of Humphry Clinker serves to prove 
that charity can under no circumstances be applied to social problems without 
serious questioning. The economic revolution, only dimly on the horizon for 





“Genuine Orphan Stock”: Dickens and the Economics of Charity 
 
 
Charles Dickens began his career just as the “dismal science” of political 
economy was at its most dismal.1 The 1810’s and 1820’s saw the greatest debates 
over the inevitability of Malthusian principles of population, leaving the more 
casual charity of the eighteenth century far behind. The British public still 
wanted to be charitable, but in a more scientific and less emotionally fraught 
way. Thanks largely to Malthus’s fear of surplus population, merely saving the 
lives of the indigent was no longer an unmixed blessing. Instead, charitable acts 
began to shift away from preservative efforts such as foundling hospitals toward 
efforts to educate or morally reform the poor.2 Thomas Chalmers voiced this 
opinion by emphasizing that true charity need not involve money at all. Indeed, 
in his view, large-scale public relief only corrupted the poor, making it 
impossible for them to care for themselves later. Even the workhouse would only 
teach the poor how to bear its evils, giving them “a stouter stomach for the 
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digestion” of all new legal obstacles to poor relief.3  Instead, the burden of 
helping the poor should fall on private benefactors, strictly instructed to give 
everything except alms. Chalmers suggests that it is best to help the poor with:  
The education of their families; the good order of their houses; the little 
schemes of economy and management in which he requests their 
cooperation; the parish bank, for which he has to solicit their agency and 
their contributions; the counsel, the service, the little presents of courtesy, 
by which he does not sink but signalize them; the cheap and simple 
attentions by which cottage children can be made happy, and their parents 
grateful; those thousand nameless graces and benignities by which the 
accomplished female can light up a moral gladness in the hamlet . . . . There 
is a way of prosecuting all these without alimenting the rapacity or the 
sordidness of our laboring classes . . . . (265) 
In the rhetoric of Chalmers, widely adopted by those opposed to mandatory 
public poor relief, the poor needed training, not money. These ideological 
changes combined with changes in the structure of rural poverty to make the Old 
Poor Laws seem grossly inadequate. The resulting New Poor Laws of 1834 were 
more institutional, less emotional, and, in the eyes of their critics, more blatantly 
cruel, than their predecessor.4 While the Old and New Poor Laws differed in a 
variety of ways, the most important and most deeply contested was the adoption 
of the workhouse. Paupers could receive relief only “indoors,” where they were 
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separated from their homes, families, and community in order to be both 
deterred from seeking relief and managed as cheaply as possible. Thus by 1835 
charity was largely seen as a matter of science, not emotion. For those like 
Dickens, steeped in the intensely sentimental charitable rhetoric of the eighteenth 
century, this shift was nothing short of an insult to the poor and to their 
benefactors.  
Dickens not only wanted to right these social ills, as shown in, among other 
places, the anti-Poor Law polemics of Oliver Twist (1837-39), but he also 
recognized that the very subject of fiction was increasingly being taken over by 
political economy. If political economy had, as its practitioners implicitly 
claimed, the right to discuss the human institutions of marriage, family, life, and 
death, then literature’s own particular territory was being invaded. Catherine 
Gallagher discusses this phenomenon as political economy’s claim to both the 
“somaeconomic” and the “bioeconomic.” Gallagher argues that once both 
human choice and natural law are constructed as strictly economic matters, 
literature must take an anti-economic stance.5 But this opposition could never be 
complete, given the increasing dominance of Victorian society by market forces. 
Mary Poovey demonstrates how fiction itself is complicit with the modern 
economy: fiction teaches its readers to “practice trust, tolerate deferral, evaluate 
character, and, in a general sense, believe in things that were immaterial,” all 
traits necessary for life in the very credit economy fiction so often tries to 
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oppose.6 While someone like Tobias Smollett had no genuine reason to be 
apprehensive about a shift toward economic ways of thinking, and indeed could 
see it as a way to regulate the emotional chaos of society, the increasing 
application of economics to social problems rendered it more objectionable to 
later writers. Victorian writers, especially Dickens, were keenly aware that 
mathematical models destroy the individuality of the poor and encourage 
solutions, like the New Poor Laws, that leave the fundamental problem of 
poverty unsolved. In this chapter, I will discuss how this tension surfaces in Our 
Mutual Friend (1864-65). Though this is by no means the only Dickens novel to 
address this same intellectual problem, it is by far the most complicated and 
varied in its treatment. I will argue that Dickens counters the totalizing mentality 
of economics both by attempting to articulate non-economic solutions to what 
were increasingly seen as economic problems and by representing near absolute 
financial chaos. Dickens deftly demonstrates mid-Victorian anxieties about 
charity and money, critically examining the role of private charity in a modern 
society while also upholding, within newly defined limits, its positive power.  
The remaining authors in this study came to a fight between literature and 
economics that was already formed, but Dickens gave that fight much of its 
initial direction and remained invested in its outcome throughout his long 
career.7 Protecting the subjects and material of fiction combines for Dickens with 
defending the subjects of political economy, the poor, from political economy 
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itself. Not only did Dickens feel compelled to distance his writing from the 
writing of economists, he also sought to provide through his fiction an 
alternative view of social problems. His dedication to the same social problems 
as economists, however, forces his fiction always and inevitably to keep that 
economy in mind. Trying to provide an alternative way of thinking, that is, keeps 
the original mode ever present. Thus, while Dickens wants desperately to 
distance his readers from economic approaches to social problems, he is 
compelled to remind them of political economy’s power over and over. The 
simple fact that both literature and economics wish to describe the same lived 
reality and social experiences inextricably binds them. Examining this process as 
it appears in Our Mutual Friend illuminates one of the most consistent threads of 
Dickens’s fiction, at the same time that it provides a compelling way to trace his 
shifting attitudes toward the social and political problems of the nineteenth 
century.  
Norris Pope’s full-length treatment, Dickens and Charity, remains one of the 
best sources for the specifics of Dickens’s own personal involvement with the 
charitable causes of mid-century. Pope reveals that while Dickens was harshly 
critical of evangelical Christian attitudes toward poverty and social reform, he 
was positively involved in many quasi-evangelical philanthropic efforts. He was, 
for example, an avid supporter of the ragged schools movement, a cause that 
owed much of its early vigor to evangelical efforts to increase biblical literacy.8 
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However, both Dickens and the founders of the ragged school movement were 
greatly disappointed by the general failure of the government to capitalize on the 
progress made by private philanthropy. Both the ragged schools and sanitation 
reform faced grave setbacks as the government declined to support them 
consistently.9 Additionally, Dickens’s decision to separate from his wife in 1858 
appears to have strained his relationship with Angela Burdett Coutts, the 
financial partner of many of Dickens’s most directly charitable efforts.10 Thus, by 
the time of Our Mutual Friend, Dickens was increasingly pinched on both sides of 
the charity question. The government’s abstinence from charitable efforts left the 
poor still largely in the hands of volunteers for basic necessities like education 
and decent housing. Dickens had never had great faith in individual charity as a 
panacea, and he (along with his charitable peers) was increasingly forced to 
realize that even large-scale private philanthropy could accomplish very little for 
the majority of the poor without substantial government support. His own 
weekly  journal, All the Year Round, confessed in April of 1866 that “mere 
benevolence” couldn’t solve complex social problems. Thus, even though his 
later novels still mock failed individual charity, the bulk of his wrath is often 
addressed toward political power used for the wrong ends. While social criticism 
is a fundamental component of all of Dickens’s novels, the later fiction grows 
increasingly bitter and despairing toward institutions that avoid accepting 
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responsibility for social ills, like Chancery (Bleak House, 1852-53), the 
Circumlocution Office (Little Dorrit, 1855-57), and even Parliament (Our Mutual 
Friend). 
 
II. Our Mutual Friend is a novel obsessed with money. How do we get it? How do 
we keep it? How do we avoid being tainted by it? Like poor Sloppy’s 
“considerable capital of knee and elbow and wrist and ankle” constantly peeking 
from his clothes, Dickens cannot avoid showing his financial preoccupations.11 
Every major strand of the novel’s plot, and most of the minor ones, centers on 
money, while financial metaphors pepper the novel’s pages. Even the romance 
plot doubles as a lesson in the perils of materialism. The novel simultaneously 
desires its readers, like Bella and the Boffins, to abandon money for love and 
demands that we remain intensely conscious of the power and effects of money. 
This double pressure—that money means nothing and that money means 
everything—encapsulates the text’s extreme social anxiety. It is no coincidence 
that Our Mutual Friend involves more social mobility, and correspondingly more 
fear of social chaos, than any of Dickens’s earlier novels. Bella Wilfer, the Boffins, 
John Harmon, Sloppy, and Lizzie and Charlie Hexam move up in the world, 
while the Veneerings, the Lammles, Bradley Headstone, and Betty Higden fall 
precipitously. Even those who ostensibly remain in stasis prove how difficult 
that is, with Twemlow as the text’s main example of just how very much “work” 
it takes to maintain a social position, even as a poor relation. John Harmon 
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constantly debates “returning to life,” pondering, as Catherine Gallagher phrases 
it, the possibility of “his possession of (instead of by) his money.”12 By requiring 
his readers to constantly track these social and economic movements, Dickens 
forces us into a species of financial paranoia. Nothing in Our Mutual Friend is as it 
seems, especially when it involves money, and only by fully internalizing this 
problem can the reader survive the novel. This novel, that is, teaches its readers 
to suspect financial transactions.  
This deep preoccupation forces Our Mutual Friend into an ethical quandary. 
As I discuss below, Dickens goes to great pains to prove money’s exact powers of 
corruption. At the same time, Dickens’s devotion to the ideals of the Victorian 
middle class—including financial comfort—prevents him from rejecting money 
outright. As a result, Dickens’s characters live in a world of complex financial 
uncertainty. This deep ambiguity about money carries over into the novel’s 
discourse of charity and sympathy. As Nancy Yousef suggests about Bleak House, 
“sympathetic attention is complex and unstable in the novel as a whole, and 
sympathy itself was a complex and variously defined concept in the ethics and 
moral psychology that formed part of Dickens’s cultural context.”13 While 
economic writers could use the distance of science to remove themselves from 
emotional questions, Dickens must reckon with the powerful and ambiguous 
force of sympathy, the emotion that attracts readers to both his characters and to 
acts of charity. Our Mutual Friend contains Dickens’s most stringent rejection of 
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the Poor Laws since Oliver Twist, but it also continues the deep skepticism of 
personal charity that is so familiar to readers of Bleak House. The novel 
powerfully rejects the classic economic dichotomy between the “deserving” and 
“undeserving” poor with regard to public charity. But, while, pragmatically 
speaking, private donors with limited pockets must have some kind of criteria 
for selecting their charitable objects, Dickens is uncomfortable with the aesthetic 
component of such discriminations of sympathy. This novel, I argue, uses a 
variety of financial plots to work through this and other monetary dilemmas, but 
these plots raise more questions than answers. Our Mutual Friend articulates an 
angry rejection of political economy, but has no sustained suggestions for its 
replacement. Instead, its final proposal is at best a weak reaffirmation of the 
belief that people can spend money ethically, with minimal guidelines for how 
they should do so in the immensely complicated world the novel outlines. Here, 
perhaps, is Dickens strongest rejection of political economy: money in this novel 
refuses system and category.  
I would like to begin my specific treatment of Our Mutual Friend at the end 
of the novel, with the financial collapse of the Veneerings. The narration of such 
collapse isn’t new, either to Dickens or to Victorian novels. Indeed, it was quite a 
staple of Victorian fiction, figuring in, just to name a few examples, Thackeray’s 
The Newcomes (1855), Charles Reade’s Hard Cash (1863), and Dickens’s Little 
Dorrit (in two different plot lines; 1855-57) and Martin Chuzzlewit (1843-44). The 
plot of financial collapse had, in fact, become so familiar to readers that Dickens 
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doesn’t even need to narrate it—the novel stops just short.14 The Veneerings are 
left always just before the “resounding smash” they will make “next week” 
(4.17.792). This financial “smash” is prefigured so early in the text that the only 
surprise is how long it takes. The Veneerings are so conspicuously self-made that 
their downfall seems perfectly inevitable to any reader familiar with those other 
Victorian tales of financial collapse. They read like a checklist of the form: wealth 
from an unknown source, shiny new belongings, a suspicious way of integrating 
themselves into society, and corrupt political power.  
Instead of contributing anything new to the idea of financial collapse, 
Dickens uses the Veneerings to institute the crash in a new, more ominous way. 
We get no closure with the punishment of the bad investor, comparable with 
Merdle’s death in Little Dorrit.  In fact, the Veneerings (in the future tense) won’t 
suffer much at all: “the Veneerings will retire to Calais, there to live on Mrs. 
Veneering’s diamonds” (4.17.792). Their only punishment appears to be their fall 
from social grace when society learns “that it always did despise the Veneerings” 
(4.17.792). The delayed collapse of the Veneering fortunes leaves their ruin 
constantly hanging over the reader’s head as an ominous reminder that not all 
money is as it seems. But, since they are neither punished by the text nor 
presented in their decayed fortunes, they serve as a stronger reminder of the 
corruptions of materialism. Their collapse takes so little time, in comparison to 
the elaborate descriptions of their social excess, that it serves more as a way to tie 
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up loose ends than as the moral of their plot. In contrast, Dickens’s constant and 
extended distaste at their “veneered” lifestyle appears again and again in the 
novel. His early descriptions of them are both uncharacteristically terse and, 
much like the Veneerings themselves, overly focused on material details:  
Mr. and Mrs. Veneering were bran-new people in a bran-new house in a 
bran-new quarter of London. Everything about the Veneerings was spick 
and span new. All their furniture was new, all their friends were new, all 
their servants were new, their plate was new, their carriage was new, their 
harness was new, their horses were new, their pictures were new, they 
themselves were new . . . . (1.2.17) 
The Veneering household is filled with overly sumptuous objects, including the 
“gold and silver camels” that decorate the table (3.17.605) and elicit Dickens’s 
near-constant disapproval. While their companions the Podsnaps serve largely as 
an indictment of upper-middle class moral narrowness, they, too, are criticized 
for their elaborate household goods: “Everything said boastfully, ‘Here, you have 
as much of me in my ugliness as if I were only lead, but I am so many ounces of 
precious metal worth so much an ounce; wouldn’t you like to melt me down?’” 
(1.11.135). The Veneerings and their circle are almost crushed under the luxury of 
their own possessions.  
This sharp criticism of exposed and misused wealth places Dickens firmly 
in the midst of a much older debate about luxury that has complex ramifications 
for the rest of the novel. To say that the luxury debates continued unchanged 
into the nineteenth century would, of course, be false. As John Sekora notes, the 
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term “luxury” itself is remarkably adaptable, allowing people in any age to 
criticize “those things within their societies they most distrusted.”15 A key 
example of this shift, with serious implications for Dickens’s work in this novel, 
is the influence luxury was held to have on population growth, the great 
preoccupation of political economy. Sekora claims that a standard fear in the 
height of the mid-eighteenth century was that luxury would keep the poor from 
having an adequate number of children to drive economic growth, perhaps 
thanks to venereal disease or a belief that coffee and tea stunted fertility.16 Fewer 
children means fewer workers, which in turn means higher wages and lowered 
industrial profits. In the opinion of eighteenth-century economists, higher wages 
caused economic stagnation.  
By the time John Stuart Mill wrote his Principles of Political Economy in 1848, 
this position had reversed on all fronts. Mill suggests that too many workers 
causes poverty, which can only be solved if workers would have fewer children 
and thus cause their wages to rise. Luxury in Mill’s argument comes to occupy a 
place on both sides of the population debate: negatively, the luxury of sexual 
indulgence, as opposed to the “prudence” of abstinence, drives population 
growth. Mill also contends, however, that luxury in the form of consumption is 
what keeps the middle class comfortably well-off. Their desire for social mobility 
and ever-increasing material goods requires that they have fewer children to 
absorb the family resources. Indeed, Mill claims that the only way to restrain 
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population is to convince the poor to follow the example of the middle class and 
channel additional resources into additional goods rather than increased family 
size.17 The poor need to adopt the same kind of luxury as their middle-class 
counterparts. While developing an almost Mandevillian belief that a certain 
amount of luxury is both a necessary cause of and a benefit to social 
advancement, the Victorians remained deeply suspicious of the line between 
“luxury” and “comfort.” Mill’s ultimate position, in fact, is that the English are 
constitutionally incapable of enjoying the items purchased with their wealth. 
They “derive less pleasure than perhaps any other [society] in the world from 
what it spends.” English people have “an extreme incapacity . . . for personal 
enjoyment” that extends to their increasingly opulent households.18 Instead, 
Mill’s model allows that moderate purchases might be, and indeed should be, 
accompanied by moderate pleasure. 
For someone like Dickens who championed working-class culture and who 
was deeply skeptical of political economy, luxury thus becomes sensitive topic. 
The line between enjoyable comforts and excessive luxury in his novels is often 
class-marked, rather than linked to any particular goods. The working and 
middle classes have appropriate domestic comforts, while the rich, or those who 
desire to appear rich, live in a world of false luxury. Dickens is careful to expose 
his largely middle-class readership to the shallowness of materialism. His 
message is a cautious reminder that “old-fashioned” comforts are more 
                                                
17 John Stuart Mill, The Principles of Political Economy (1848 & 1865, Amherst: 
Prometheus Books, 2004). See Book I, Chapter 10 and Book II, Chapter 13.  
18 Mill 187. 
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important than any amount of modern showiness. As a contrast to the 
Veneerings, he posits the comfort of Boffin’s Bower, just beginning to be 
corrupted by Veneering-style luxury:  
On the hob, a kettle steamed; on the hearth, a cat reposed. Facing the fire 
between the settles, a sofa, a footstool, and a little table formed a centrepiece 
devoted to Mrs. Boffin. They were garish in taste and color, but were 
expensive articles of drawing room furniture that had a very odd look 
beside the settles . . . . While the flowery land displayed such hollow 
ornamentation . . . there were, in the territory where vegetation ceased, 
compensatory shelves on which the best part of a large pie and likewise of a 
cold joint were plainly discernible. (1.5.63) 
The luxuries here, represented by Mrs. Boffin’s garish furniture and brightly 
flowered rug, are corruptions of the older comforts of the Boffin household. The 
old-fashioned open pantry and steaming kettle aren’t meant to be approved only 
by Silas Wegg. This description, importantly poised between the presentation of 
the Veneerings and the Podsnaps, reminds readers that an older, more 
essentially British, comfort is always in danger of being replaced by a hollow and 
garish luxury.  
Nowhere does Dickens make this point more clear than in his description of 
The Six Jolly Fellowship-Porters. His initial description is enough to chill anyone. 
It is “a narrow, lopsided, wooden jumble of corpulent windows” that exists in “a 
state of hale infirmity” (1.6.67). Inside, though: 
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The bar of the Six Jolly Fellowship-Porters was a bar to soften the human 
breast . . . . No one could have wished the bar bigger, the space was so girt 
in by corpulent little casks, and by cordial-bottles radiant with fictitious 
grapes in bunches, and by lemons in nets, and by biscuits in baskets, and by 
the polite beer-pulls that made low bows when customers were served with 
beer, and by the cheese in a snug corner, and by the landlady’s own small 
table in a snugger corner near the fire, with the cloth everlastingly laid. 
(1.6.68) 
While reformers were busily constructing the public houses frequented by the 
poor as dens of iniquity, Dickens demonstrates that they can be, in fact, havens of 
domestic comforts that even the middle class have forgotten.19 In this nostalgia 
for the world of The Pickwick Papers, nothing is luxurious or refined, but 
everything is warm, welcoming, and comfortable. The old-fashioned inn 
represents what Dickens sees as a set of quintessentially British values, 
positioned against both the hazards of life in the inn’s poor neighborhood and 
the more luxurious environments witnessed by the bar’s middle-class patrons. 
The ideal environment is comfortable, and, above all, hospitable. True domestic 
harmony, in these scenes, always warmly—perhaps even charitably—welcomes 
outsiders. Eugene, Mortimer, John Harmon, and even Bella are brought in to 
witness this particular lesson as part of their monetary reeducation.  
                                                
19 Brian Harrison’s Drink and the Victorians: The Temperance Question in England 
1815-1872 (London: Faber and Faber, 1971) provides a comprehensive view of 
public-house debates from this period. 
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Dickens’s rejection of luxury here carries a different ideological baggage 
than its eighteenth-century counterparts. In the eighteenth century, to oppose 
luxury also meant opposing “feminizing” and “extravagant” sentimental 
emotions, including but not limited to benevolence. The man of feeling was 
deeply sympathetic to the unfortunate, but he was also a fop. Smollett, as I have 
already established, is so uncomfortable with the emotional excess inherent in 
the eighteenth-century sentimental model that he is driven to adopt political 
economy as a corrective. Dickens and many other Victorians, however, felt 
deeply that new, more efficient, more “economical” models of dealing with 
poverty suppressed feeling so thoroughly that basic human decency was 
compromised. In part because of this growing awareness, Dickens’s 
representations of luxury completely shift the emotional valence of the anti-
luxury argument. Instead of showing, as earlier anti-luxury writers did, that 
luxury feminizes by removing opportunities for manly endurance of hardship, 
Dickens repositions it as an evil of laissez-faire capitalism and the adherence to 
the calculating principles of political economy. He mocks wealthy, shallow 
characters like the Podsnaps because they have no feelings. Mr. Podsnap’s 
notable ability to dismiss social problems with “a peculiar flourish of his right 
arm” (1.11.131) represents what Dickens sees as the emotional state of much of 
the political elite in Britain. When faced with the idea of poverty, Mr. Podsnap 
can only proclaim that “it was their own fault” and “that Providence has 
declared that you shall have the poor always with you” (1.11.143-44). Money in 
this novel deadens feelings. While John Stuart Mill was able to partially 
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rehabilitate luxury into a way for the poor to progress in the world, Dickens is 
still imbued with the older sense that material luxury is a moral failing. His novel 
is thus required to mediate the tension between two distinctly different ethical 
frames: on one hand, he wants to fulfill readers’ expectations by rewarding 
“good” characters with “good” fortune, but on the other hand he wants to 
present the serious ethical perils that an uncritical adoption of such good fortune 
presents.   
 
III. The most fundamental way this tension manifests itself is in the extreme 
overcomplication of the main inheritance plot. John Harmon stands to inherit his 
father’s entire fortune if he marries Bella Wilfer. His apparent tragic death early 
in the novel prevents the marriage. In the meantime, the Boffins, once faithful 
servants to the Harmon family, gain the fortune. Readers watch in horror as the 
money corrupts the Boffins—first forcing Mrs. Boffin into the shallowly 
luxurious arms of fashion, and then turning Mr. Boffin into a miser. Bella, chosen 
out of pity as a companion for the Boffins, appears to be on the same trajectory, 
confiding to her father that she is becoming hopelessly mercenary thanks to her 
new life of luxury. After being exposed to the “good life,” she can no longer 
marry without money. Only when Mr. Boffin’s greed causes him to dismiss his 
secretary, John Rokesmith, does Bella defend generosity and poverty. Bella and 
John marry, becoming a perfect Victorian couple with a modest income. A new 
will comes to light, in which the Boffins only get a much smaller inheritance, 
thus saving them, too, from the corruptions of wealth. Fifteen years before, 
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Dickens would have ended his novel here. Everyone has learned his or her 
lesson, and domestic harmony is established. Except, John Rokesmith really is 
John Harmon, a fact the Boffins have known all along and readers for quite a 
while. His marriage to Bella proves the conditions of the first will, and they can 
happily have their fortune. Except, there is a third will, leaving the entire fortune 
to Mr. and Mrs. Boffin with no conditions. Except, they decide to give John and 
Bella the money anyway, in effect reinstating the first will.  
Not only does turn after turn undermine what would have been a clear 
moral, the final turn appears to be completely egregious. Why introduce the 
second and third wills at all? At the most basic plot level, the answer is 
apparently to facilitate the humiliation of Silas Wegg, who used the second will 
to blackmail Mr. Boffin. Thematically, though, the inheritance plot proves an 
ever-shifting moral morass, of which the ambiguous position of the later wills is 
only one symptom. Through the constant reevaluation of social position this plot 
demands, Dickens unequivocally argues that money corrupts and then, finally, 
softens this position to suggest that such corruption isn’t inevitable. Silas Wegg 
becomes a criminal on the mere possibility of extracting a small portion of the 
Harmon estate, while Mr. and Mrs. Boffin demonstrate their fundamental virtue 
through their ability to relinquish the entire property. Bella is tainted first by 
poverty and then by money, only to be redeemed by the same pairing. The 
constant shifting of values keeps the ending from feeling entirely comfortable. 
While the novel expects it readers to be happy for John and Bella, who now live 
the dream-life of Victorian fiction, modern readers squirm at the fundamental 
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deception implied by their relationship. As John Kucich puts it, “John Harmon’s 
scheme to reeducate Bella, which seems generous on the surface, ultimately 
imprisons her as a kind of possession in Harmon’s own private dollhouse.”20 
Bella learns to love and trust her husband, who spends most of the novel as a liar 
and an obstructer of justice. Furthermore, the Boffins’ reward for moral behavior 
is a social descent back to their “rightful place” as family servants. 
The massive complication of the novel’s plot demands critical attention. In 
addition to the wild inheritance narrative outlined above, the novel contains 
numerous subplots—those of Eugene Wrayburn and Lizzie Hexam, of Jenny 
Wren, of Mr. Venus and Precious Riderhood, and of “Fascination” Fledgeby, just 
to name a few—that fail to connect as neatly as they do in Dickens’s previous 
multi-plot novels. The effect of this disunity is to dull the “meaning” of any 
particular plot. Nancy Metz points out that “because the perspectives of the 
novel are so diffuse, . . . no one solution can stand for the reintegration on a 
larger scale of humanistic values and beliefs,”21 while J. Hillis Miller argues that 
the novel rejects “the idea that there is an unity of the world transcending the 
differences between individual lives.”22 The novel, in other words, is 
intentionally chaotic, failing to comfort its readers with any grand sense of unity 
in a disordered world. Michal Ginsburg constructs this resistance to clarity as an 
expression of Dickens’s feeling toward free will. The elaborate plot “has precisely 
                                                
20 John Kucich, “Repression and Representation: Dickens’s General Economy,” 
Charles Dickens. ed. Stephen Connor (New York: Longman, 1996) 204. 
21 Nancy Aycock Metz, “The Artistic Reclamation of Waste in Our Mutual 
Friend,” Nineteenth Century Fiction 34.1 (1979): 60. 
22 J. Hillis Miller, Charles Dickens: The World of His Novels (Cambridge: Harvard 
UP, 1958) 292. 
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the function of making us hear at the end of the novel two distinct and opposed 
voices: the terms of the will that gave rise to the plot have been fulfilled, but the 
characters have freely chosen to bring their story to this particular end.”23 For 
Ginsburg, the ending’s over complication helps Dickens to address the inherent 
tensions in the novel genre between free will and determinism. I would also 
argue that the ending and the multiple plots comment on the monetary ethics of 
Dickens’s Victorian readers. As noted above, Dickens wants his readers to 
viscerally feel the peril of corruption, which occurs in both the major and minor 
storylines. If the sweetly jolly Mr. Boffin can be soured by good fortune, so can 
any of us, no matter how value-neutral political economists render money. At the 
same time, Dickens, speaking as a man who participated in his very own rags-to-
riches story, wants to demonstrate that money can have a redemptive power. Mr. 
Podsnap freely ignores the poor, but the Boffins, Bella, and John Harmon cannot. 
The Veneerings spend money on lavish dinner services, while the Harmons 
spend it in decorating Baby’s nursery and providing a new, more humane job for 
Bella’s father. Losing money, then regaining it with a new conscience, teaches 
Bella, and by extension Dickens’s readers, how money and sympathy can coexist. 
The novel’s elaborate plot serves, again and again, to remind characters and 
readers of the “correct” way to behave toward money, partly by showing every 
“incorrect” way as well. Money, that is, constantly fluctuates between “gold” 
and “dust.” 
 
                                                
23 Michal Ginsburg, Economies of Change: Form and Transformation in the 
Nineteenth-Century Novel (Stanford, Stanford UP, 1996) 149. 
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IV. Because money itself presents such an ethical quagmire, charity isn’t an easy 
task in this novel. No one in Our Mutual Friend simultaneously desires and 
deserves charity. Dickens, notoriously beset by begging letter writers who 
demanded his charity, unleashes his full ire on those who write to request money 
from Mr. and Mrs. Boffin. Both institutional charities and private beggars see 
Dickens’s scorn in an elaborate passage on the perils of new money:  
Oh, the varieties of dust for ocular use, offered in exchange for the gold 
dust of the Golden Dustman! Fifty-seven churches to be erected with half-
crowns, forty-two parsonage houses to be repaired with shillings, seven-
and-twenty organs to be built with halfpence, twelve hundred children to 
be brought up on postage stamps. Not that a half-crown, shilling, 
halfpenny, or postage stamp would be particularly acceptable from Mr. 
Boffin, but that it is so obvious he is the man to make up the deficiency. 
And then the charities, my Christian brother! And mostly in difficulties, yet 
mostly lavish, too, in the expensive articles of print and paper. (1.17.209) 
Dickens’s mockery here is particularly damning because its specificity both 
humiliates the writers of these letters and illuminates just how foolish their 
problems are.24 Evangelical philanthropists in mid-century certainly did worry 
                                                
24 Daniel Hack articulates an additional source of anxiety for Dickens over 
begging-letter writers: career anxiety. “The actual movement of individuals 
across the boundary between the writing of books and articles and the writing of 
begging letters,” a movement Dickens’s involvement in literary charities would 
have constantly reminded him of, “underscores not only the notorious economic 
precariousness of authorship but also the conceptual precariousness of this 
boundary.” See The Material Interests of the Victorian Novel (Charlottesville: U of 
Virginia P, 2005) 107. Dickens thus needs to defend himself not only against the 
illegitimate requests of these writers, but also from their illegitimate authorship.  
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about the lack of churches in poor urban districts, and the other problems 
Dickens mentions would have been equally real to his readers. But by conflating 
these goals and dismissing them as “dust,” Dickens serves to highlight their 
gross insufficiency. How can twelve hundred children really be helped with the 
price of postage? Even the letter writers, who obviously expect more than the 
nominal charity they mention, seem aware that a half-crown will help no one 
very much. Dickens goes on to lampoon the rich and powerful who join 
charitable organizations, as Bernard Mandeville criticized them over a hundred 
years before, just for the power and authority of belonging to one. Less 
influential individuals writing to request money confuse selfishness with charity 
in the grossest of ways, asking for money in ways that humiliate, such as the 
“daughters of general officers, long accustomed to every luxury of life (except 
spelling) who little thought, when their gallant fathers waged war in the 
Peninsula, that they would ever have to appeal to those whom Providence, in its 
inscrutable wisdom, had blessed with untold gold” (1.17.210). (The Peninsular 
wars, we should note, ended in 1814.) In Household Words Dickens had lambasted 
such letter writers for “dirtying the stream of true benevolence.” Their 
presentation here reminds readers that it is impossible to practice indiscriminate 
charity in the modern world. Acting on even a portion of these requests would 
destroy the Boffins’ ability to live at all, let alone help the truly needy. Processing 
the requests of the begging letter writers is, in fact, John Rokesmith’s only clearly 
defined and extensively discussed job. The unworldly Boffins simply lack the 
requisite cunning to distinguish true charity from false.  
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Dickens’s frustration over the need to distinguish true and false charity 
even extends to the ragged schools movement, something to which he, as I 
demonstrated above, had given considerable support. Both Charley Hexam and 
Bradley Headstone, the novel’s two products of the ragged schools, are shown to 
be morally hollow, deeply ingrained with an intensely selfish desire to rise above 
their class. We can see in Bradley’s description the seeds of Charley’s future: 
“regarding that origin of his, he was proud, moody, and sullen, desiring it to be 
forgotten” (2.1.218). Furthermore, the education that Bradley has received, and is 
likely to give, is only by rote. He can “do mental arithmetic mechanically, sing at 
sight mechanically, blow various wind instruments mechanically, even play the 
great church organ mechanically” (2.1.218). Bradley’s moral influence so 
intensifies Charley’s innate selfishness that he can only see Lizzie’s possible 
marriage to Bradley as “respectability, an excellent connexion for me, common 
sense, everything!” (2.15.384), and there is nothing in the education he is 
provided to correct such faults. Charley, like Bradley, learns by rote and 
desperately seeks to hide his past.  
 Beyond simply noting this deficiency, however, Dickens also dwells at 
some length on the dangers and failings of the ragged schools as philanthropic 
bodies. The teachers, like good philanthropists, believe the best of the poor 
children in a strictly middle-class sense, which gives them no access to the kinds 
of education the children truly need. According to Peter Stokes, Dickens is 
keenly aware that many of the school’s strategies exist only so “that the teachers 
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may sustain their own fiction that they are imparting an important education.”25 
The school in Our Mutual Friend is “pervaded by a grimly ludicrous pretence that 
every pupil was childish and innocent,” so that “young women old in the vices 
of the commonest and worst life were expected to profess themselves enthralled 
by the good child’s book” (2.1.215). Perhaps it is for this reason that the school’s 
most intensely examined “products,“ Charley and Bradley, are so morally 
empty. They have never been taught a lesson that matched the fabric of their 
daily ethical existence. Even worse than perpetuating this pedagogical mismatch, 
the school, lodged in “a miserable loft in an unsavoury yard,” serves as a 
breeding ground for disease, a “hot-bed of flushed and exhausted infants 
exchanging measles, rashes, whooping-cough, fever, and stomach disorders, as if 
they were assembled in High Market for the purpose” (2.1.215-16). It is not 
knowledge that is exchanged in this school, nor are children taught lessons that 
would give them better future employment. Instead the school is the worst kind 
of market—a vehicle for spreading physical and moral contagion, whooping 
cough and vice. Ethically and biologically, the education given to these poor 
children is a failure, and only “an exceptionally sharp boy, exceptionally 
determined to learn” can gain anything from it (2.1.215-16). These criticisms echo 
a popular line of argument about the ragged schools, which were notoriously 
uneven in both the quality of the instruction, left entirely to volunteers, and in 
attendance. Our Mutual Friend contains no stated alternative to this “jumble,” but 
in reality many philanthropists at this time began to argue in favor of state-run, 
                                                




and thus presumably more uniform and better-regulated, education for all 
children. Voluntary charity has too many serious flaws to address a social issue 
so important. 
The novel contains another, somewhat more poignant, model of pauper 
childhood in its portrait of the orphan Johnny. The Boffins, filled with good 
intentions, attempt to fill the role that Dickens gave unequivocally to benefactors 
in his earlier novels—they, like Mr. Brownlow in Oliver Twist, would like to 
adopt an attractive orphan to replace a lost friend. But adopting an orphan is not 
quite as straightforward as Dickens imagined it in 1837, and the Boffins find 
themselves and their charity considerably abused. Indeed, instead of 
philanthropy, the Boffins must participate in a complex market of exchange. Mrs. 
Boffin’s view of charity is old-fashioned, well-intentioned, and straightforward: 
“Don’t you begin to find it pleasant already, to think that a child will be made 
brighter, and better, and happier, because of that poor sad child that day? And 
isn’t it pleasant to know that the good will be done with the poor sad child’s 
[John Harmon’s] own money?” (1.9.105). Like Mr. Brownlow, Mrs. Boffin 
imagines a world of charitable equity. The money they received from the death 
of John Harmon can go toward making a new child happy in his place, and the 
world will benefit. One fewer orphan, one more educated and prosperous boy in 
his place. What could possibly be the harm?  
As it does for many of Dickens’s late benefactors, however, the gap between 
charitable theory and practice proves almost overwhelming for the Boffins. 
Selecting a charitable object from the multitude is nearly impossible, and 
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involves a series of uncomfortable criteria. There is, for example, the question of 
gratitude to consider. Can the poor really appreciate the Boffins’ charity? The 
curate’s wife, enlisted in the search for an orphan, rejects the first candidate, Mrs. 
Goody’s grandchild, because Mrs. Goody proves herself incapable of receiving 
charity properly: “I hope it’s not uncharitable to remember that last Christmas 
Eve she drank eleven cups of tea, and grumbled all the time. And she is not a 
grateful woman . . . . she brought back the petticoat of new flannel that had been 
given her, because it was too short” (1.9.109). Other orphans are rejected for 
aesthetics—”I don’t think Mrs. Boffin would like an orphan who squints so 
much” (1.9.110)—or age. More seriously to the Boffins, though, than these semi-
sarcastic criteria, is the very fine line between benefaction and purchasing. Mr. 
Milvey, the curate, considers the danger, at the same time that he falls into the 
very trap he describes:  
“We have orphans, I know,” pursued Mr. Milvey, quite with the air as if he 
might have added “in stock,” and quite as anxiously as if there were great 
competition in the business and he were afraid of losing an order, “over at 
the clay-pits; but they are employed by relations or friends, and I am afraid 
it would come at last to a transaction in the way of barter. And even if you 
exchanged blankets for the child—or books and firing—it would be 
impossible to prevent their being turned into liquor. (1.9.110) 
While Mr. Milvey is anxious to prevent the sales of orphans for liquor, he openly 
imagines the orphans themselves as commodities. In his shopkeeper’s attitude, 
there is no harm in exchanging orphans for blankets, only in those blankets being 
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subsequently exchanged for alcohol. His ethical problem is not, as we might 
expect, the sale, but rather the currency.  
In case readers missed the obvious moral fallacy here, Dickens drives it 
home later in the search. When the quest for an orphan resurfaces later in the 
book, we see that Mr. and Mrs. Milvey have faced difficulties. Often: 
it was found impossible to complete the philanthropic transaction without 
buying the orphan. For the instant it became known that anybody wanted 
the orphan, up started some affectionate relative of the orphan who put a 
price on the orphan’s head. The suddenness of the orphan’s rise in the 
market was not to be paralleled by the maddest records of the Stock 
Exchange. He would be at five thousand percent discount out at nurse 
making a mud pie at nine in the morning, and (being inquired for) would 
go up to five thousand percent premium before noon. The market was 
“rigged” in various artful ways. Counterfeit stock got into circulation. 
Parents boldly represented themselves as dead, and brought their orphans 
with them. Genuine orphan stock was surreptitiously withdrawn from the 
market . . . . orphan scrip would be instantly concealed, and production 
refused, save on a condition usually stated as “a gallon of beer.” Likewise, 
fluctuations of a wild South Sea nature were occasioned, by orphan-holders 
keeping back, and then rushing into the market a dozen together. But the 
uniform principle at the root of all these various organizations was bargain 




This bizarre passage serves two complexly connected functions. By pointing out 
that orphans are being treated as a market commodity, literally here as shares in 
a human stock market, Dickens makes an argument both about philanthropy and 
about the nature of economy’s relation to society. First, as much as Mr. and Mrs. 
Milvey refuse to participate in the orphan market by “purchasing” any of the 
offered wares, the market is of their own creation. It is only when Mr. and Mrs. 
Milvey’s inquiries reach the poor that the “price” of orphans begins to fluctuate. 
In a mild way, Dickens condemns their well-intentioned philanthropy for 
corrupting the poor. While their hands are technically clean, the Milveys are the 
rhetorical stock-jobbers of the orphan market, or, more damningly, the purveyors 
of slaves. Most strongly, though, Dickens criticizes the market itself for 
overreaching its bounds. As Tamara Wagner argues, the Boffins’s “failure is also 
part and parcel of a much larger collapse of financial discourse into domestic 
space” that Dickens finds appalling.26 The corrupting power of money is 
articulated in very similar terms here as it will be later on about Mr. Veneerings’s 
business friends, who can only reckon value in terms of supply and demand. In 
order to even understand the satire, readers must have an intimate knowledge of 
the mercurial and often corrupt Victorian stock market. Lying, cheating, bargain, 
and sale become completely synonymous when everything is imagined as a 
monetary transaction. The criticism in this passage is directed as much at readers 
for understanding the situation as it is as the Milveys for creating it. The 
                                                
26 Tamara S. Wagner, “‘We have orphans [. . .] in stock’: Crime and the 
Consumption of Sensational Children,” The Nineteenth-Century Child and 
Consumer Culture, ed. Dennis Denisoff (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008) 201.  
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untainted giving of money from benevolent motives becomes, in such an over-
determined “market,” impossible.  
Dickens is anxious, however, that his criticism might deter needed and 
genuine sympathy for poor children. To correct his harshness here, Dickens 
accompanies it with a traditional scene of childhood pathos—the death of the 
innocent Johnny. His sickness and disease, filled with the same melodrama that, 
years before, accompanied the deaths of Little Nell and Paul Dombey, serve as 
an emotional corrective for readers whose sentiments have possibly been over-
hardened. Like Oliver Twist, Johnny represents pure, untainted childhood 
innocence, immune from the corruptions of poverty. His deathbed piety, asking 
if “God had brought them [the sick children] all together there?” (2.9.326) in the 
hospital, and his final bequest of his favorite toy to a fellow patient, remind 
readers that poor children are deserving of help. Johnny is morally and ethically 
pure, a thoroughly deserving object of sympathy. Even this message can’t be 
delivered without a chastisement, however. It is his guardian Betty Higden’s 
deep suspicion of public charity that keeps Johnny from the hospital until it is 
too late. Dickens directly addresses his readers: “The shameful accounts we read, 
every week in the Christian year, my lords and gentlemen and honorable boards, 
the infamous records of small official inhumanity, do not pass by the people as 
they pass by us.” Hearing the terrors of the poor laws has taught Betty Higden to 
“catch up in her arms the sick child who was dear to her, and hide it as if it were 
a criminal” (2.9.321). The current system directly encourages the death of sweet 
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and adorable Johnny, the very emblem of the “deserving poor,” because it 
teaches the poor to suspect the motives of public charity.  
By exciting readerly sympathy for the attractive and interesting poor child, 
Dickens puts his readers in the same moral quandary as the Boffins. Poor 
children deserve sympathy and help, but we’ve just seen a handful of reasons 
that we can’t ethically give them that help. So what do we do? The answer, for 
Mrs. Boffin, is to learn that even charity can be selfish: “This little death has made 
me ask myself the question, seriously, whether I wasn’t too bent on pleasing 
myself. Else why did I seek out so much for a pretty child, and a child quite to 
my own liking? Wanting to do good, why not do it for its own sake, and put my 
tastes and likings by?” (2.10.330). The right kind of charity should help “a 
creature . . . for its own sake” (2.10.331). Mrs. Boffin points out the precarious 
position of her own charity. By looking for a particular kind of orphan to help, 
Mrs. Boffin trapped every poor child in the neighborhood in a brutal market 
system. Charitable objects can’t be selected like furniture, by personal preference, 
or the entire benevolent system collapses under the weight of the choice. 
Selection based on taste is a matter for the market, not for benevolence. The text’s 
solution is to take the first legitimate problem that presents itself, disregarding 
the irrationally aesthetic elements of our sympathy. Charity must be divorced 
from luxury. Readers, like the Boffins, need to care as much for the strange, 
awkward, damaged Sloppy as for the cherubic Johnny. The tall and ungainly 
Sloppy has, in the words of Tamara Wagner, “literally outgrown the 
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sentimentalized orphan’s role,”27 and his position in the text demands readers to 
think outside of those stock sentimental parameters for charity.  
Institutionalized charity is, of course, not an ideal alternative to overly 
luxurious and sentimental charity either. Dickens allows Betty Higden to serve as 
a voice for the working class’s anxiety about charity. Her frequent speeches 
detail why the poor might desire to exchange charity toward their children for 
outright sale, at the same time that they bitterly mock the Poor Law’s claim to 
separate the deserving and undeserving poor. No one is more deserving than 
Betty Higden, and for exactly that reason Betty Higden refuses charity. But, 
again, Dickens is treading on ideologically thin ice. He is perhaps more aware 
here of the flaw Bruce Robbins discovers at the heart of Bleak House: “to clutch 
the ethical and experiential, while letting go of the global and the systematic, is to 
give up on teaching people how they can act in, on, and against System.”28 If he 
wants to act against the Poor Law system at large, his characterization of Betty 
cannot prove that all deserving candidates would refuse charity. This misplaced 
criticism would instead convince readers that charity is a waste of time—only 
drunkards and thieves would accept it. Instead, Dickens wants to prove that 
specific evils of the Poor Law system drive away the very candidates the public 
desires to serve. The Poor Law is so corrupt that only morally damaged people 
would have anything to do with it. Betty is thus portrayed as naturally and 
rationally, but also unfortunately, suspicious of a corrupt system.   
                                                
27 Wagner 211. 
28 Bruce Robbins, “Telescopic Philanthropy: Professionalism and Responsibility 




Mrs. Higden’s impassioned speeches might well be cobbled from Dickens’s 
own journalism, giving powerful voice to the various anti-Poor Law sentiments 
more gently discussed elsewhere. Unlike the hint in A Christmas Carol that “some 
had rather die” than go to the Poor House, Betty stridently declares: “Come to us 
and find us all a-dying, and set a light to us where we lie, and let us blaze away 
with the house into a heap of cinders, sooner than move a corpse of us there!” 
(1.16.199). Why does she feel this so strongly? The depictions of the Poor Laws in 
newspapers and the popular press. “Do I never read how they [the poor] are put 
off, put off, put off — how they are grudged, grudged, grudged, the shelter, or 
the doctor, or the drop of physic, or the bit of bread?” (1.16.199). Dickens 
satirically notes that this has had its desired deterrent effect: “A brilliant success, 
my Lords and Gentlemen and Honorable Boards to have brought it to this in the 
minds of the best of the poor!” (1.16.200). Mrs. Higden has been so terrified of 
public charity that she can’t even bring herself to accept the private aid of the 
Boffins, arguing, “I’ve never took to charity yet, nor yet has any one belonging to 
me. And it would be forsaking of myself indeed, and forsaking of my children 
dead and gone . . . to set up a contradiction now at last” (2.14.377). Mrs. Higden 
has so deeply internalized anti-charitable rhetoric that even in her old age she 
cannot accept the gift of a quiet retirement. For this refusal , Dickens calls her a 
“brave old heroine” (2.14.377).  
As Mrs. Higden dies, without rest and without aid, Dickens delivers his 
message: the Poor Laws only deter those who most need help. Their degrading 
scrutiny is too much for anyone who is still moral:  
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For when we have got things to the pass that with an enormous treasure at 
disposal to relieve the poor, the best of the poor detest our mercies, hide 
their heads from us, and shame us by starving to death in the midst of us, it 
is a pass impossible of prosperity, impossible of continuance. . . . This 
boastful handiwork of ours, which fails in its terrors for the professional 
pauper, the sturdy breaker of windows, and the rampant tearer of clothes, 
strikes with a cruel and wicked stab at the stricken sufferer, and is a horror 
to the deserving and unfortunate. We must mend it, lords and gentlemen 
and honorable boards, or in its own evil hour it will mar every one of us. 
(3.8.496) 
Attempting to distinguish the deserving from the undeserving poor is not only 
impossible, but the mere attempt will drive away anyone decent enough to feel 
self-conscious at such examinations. Betty’s ramblings expose additional possible 
misery at the hands of the Poor Laws. Women “linger on a doorstep, while the 
appointed evader of the public trust did his dirty office of trying to . . . get rid of 
them,” while others make rigorous trips cross country to visit relatives in 
centralized workhouses far from home (3.8.498). The Poor Laws make no attempt 
to personalize their care, and no attempt to lessen the humiliations of taking such 
aid. Betty’s burning desire to die an honorable death, outside of the workhouse, 
reminds readers over and over of the abhorrence of these institutions. Betty’s tale 
makes its point quite clear; the “Honorable boards” Dickens so frequently 
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addresses must learn the lesson of the Boffins, to give charity, without subjecting 
it to individual desires.29  
Dismissing the cheerful comfort of his early novels, in Our Mutual Friend 
Dickens is compelled to admit that even charity itself is subject to the ruthless 
dictates of the market. Good people are overwhelmed trying to determine the 
best ways to help, while powerful people are, through the messages of political 
economy, busy determining the most effective ways to help as little as possible. 
The corrective for this situation is never perfected in this novel. While the early 
fiction let well-meaning philanthropists do unequivocal good, Dickens has 
obviously become more skeptical about individual power to solve large social 
problems. We can see this anxiety clearly by noting how often his direct 
addresses on the topic of poverty are not to the reader, but to those with political 
power. This shift leaves individuals at loose ends.  Much like Bleak House, Our 
Mutual Friend never suggests that readers shouldn’t help, but it never provides a 
way that they can. Johnny and Betty die, and Sloppy is left to a strangely unclear 
future. But this lack of direction is only a smaller part of the immense financial 
confusion of this novel. Bella learns the lesson that money is not necessary for 
happiness, only to be rewarded by the very money she has learned not to want. 
The Veneerings teeter forever on the precipice of financial ruin, but their fellow 
                                                
29 In this position, Dickens approaches J.S. Mill’s belief that the state could never 
have adequate tools to make such distinctions. Mill notes that “what the state 
may and should abandon to private charity is the task of distinguishing between 
one case of real necessity and another. . . . The dispensers of public relief have no 
business to be inquisitors. Guardians and overseers are not fit to be trusted to 
give or withhold other people’s money according to their verdict on the morality 
of the person soliciting it.” See Principles 882. 
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cheaters and stock jobbers go unpunished. Dickens opens the abyss. Money is 
everywhere, and everyone is forced to interact with it, but it corrupts. Except for 
the “Lords and Gentlemen and Honorable Boards” with their political power, 
our only influence is in the care we take with our own money. While Dickens 
wants to deny and undercut the power of economic principles to control society, 








When Elizabeth Barrett Browning wrote Aurora Leigh (1856), she was a 
middle-aged woman living in Florence, Italy. She knew very little about the life 
of England’s poor, her experiences limited by her own ill health, her natural 
reclusiveness, and her family circumstances. Her experience of London was 
remarkably limited given the number of years she resided there. Unlike Dickens, 
she was not a great urban explorer, and her health had limited her social 
engagements. Yet in Aurora Leigh she writes a poem filled with concern for 
England’s poor and for the political future of her nation. Readers acquainted 
only with her biography might well be surprised by the poem’s content. But 
Elizabeth Barrett Browning believed deeply that poetry could and should help 
shape current events. She had written political poetry before, against slavery in 
“The Runaway Slave at Pilgrim’s Point” (1848), against the exploitation of factory 
workers in “The Cry of the Children” (1843), and most notably against the 
political divisions of Italy in Casa Guidi Windows (1851) and later in Poems Before 
Congress (1860). Her belief in the political efficacy of poetry is strongly expressed 
in Aurora Leigh, her story of the rise of a woman poet. The poem articulates 
Barrett Browning’s personal feelings about poetry and its status even though the 
details of Aurora’s life are not drawn directly from Barrett Browning’s own. In 
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this chapter I will argue, however, that Aurora Leigh has a clear agenda aside 
from merely establishing women’s rights as artists. Through Aurora’s 
interactions with the discourses of charity, art, and political reform, Barrett 
Browning carefully rearticulates the place of poetry in serious social debate, 
while simultaneously undercutting the rights of political economy to influence 
that same policy.  
Criticism of Aurora Leigh usually attempts, often with an air of desperation, 
to turn Barrett Browning into a clear and consistent feminist. Anne D. Wallace, in 
her essay “’Nor in Fading Silks Compose’: Sewing, Walking, and Poetic Labor in 
Aurora Leigh,” comments that the primary concern of scholarship on the poem 
should be to “describe Aurora Leigh’s position in the contemporary discussion of 
women and in our current discussion of gender.”1 Most criticism of the poem has 
followed this prescribed course. Quite often such feminist critics are, 
understandably, most interested in Aurora Leigh’s woman-as-artist plot, which 
Helen Cooper calls an illustration of “the process whereby [Elizabeth Barrett 
Browning] achieved that integration of woman and poet.”2 As a result of such 
focus, Cynthia Scheinberg can say, with confidence, that the “three goals of this 
poem” are “authorizing female experience, asserting women’s poetic authority, 
and imagining new Christian heterosexual relationships.”3 Similarly, Laura 
                                                
1 Anne D. Wallace, “’Nor in Fading Silks Compose’: Sewing, Walking, and Poetic 
Labor in Aurora Leigh,” ELH 64.1 (1997): 223.  
2 Helen Cooper, Elizabeth Barrett Browning: Woman and Artist (Chapel Hill: U of 
North Carolina P, 1988) 145. 
3 Cynthia Scheinberg, “Elizabeth Barrett Browning's Hebraic Conversions: 
Feminism and Christian Typology in Aurora Leigh,” Victorian Literature and 
Culture 22 (1994): 65. 
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Rotunno suggests that the poem’s most powerful message is for “women [to] 
reform their visions of what women can uniquely contribute to the literary 
marketplace” (66), bypassing any mention of the poem’s direct challenges to 
other Victorian norms.4 In agreement, Joyce Zonana claims that Aurora 
empowers women by becoming her own poetic muse, thus letting her sound, at 
the end of the poem, “more like a twentieth-century feminist or ecologist than a 
Victorian divine.”5 
Despite their convictions, these feminist critics often crash on the rocks of 
the poem’s ending, which Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar call a “veil of self-
abnegating servitude,”6 and Wallace herself is compelled to admit that the poem 
ultimately “refuse[s] complete resolution” of gender questions, thus leaving us 
with “unresolvable textual ambivalence.”7 Cora Kaplan’s groundbreaking work 
on Aurora Leigh set the tone for many critics, regarding the poem as something of 
a grand failure for modern feminism: “What is really missing is any attempt at 
analysis of the intersecting oppressions of capitalism and patriarchy.”8 
Continuing, Kaplan suggests that Barrett Browning’s “solutions to class 
controversy are even less adequate” than those posed by Christian Socialists 
                                                
4 Laura Rotunno, “Writers of Reform and Reforming Writers in Aurora Leigh and 
A Writer of Books,” Gender and Reform in Victorian England, ed Anita Rose 
(Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008) 66. 
5 Joyce Zonana, “The Embodied Muse: Elizabeth Barrett Browning's Aurora Leigh 
and Feminist Poetics,” Tulsa Studies in Women’s Literature 8.2 (1989): 247. 
6 Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman 
Writer and the Nineteenth Century Literary Imagination, 2nd. ed. (1979; New Haven: 
Yale UP, 2000) 580. 
7 Wallace 251, 250. 
8 Cora Kaplan, Introduction, Elizabeth Barrett Browning: Aurora Leigh and Other 
Poems (London: Women’s Press, 1978) 12.  
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because they are “unconnected with reality and deeply elitist.”9 Deirdre David 
reads the poem even more bleakly, claiming “whatever feminist sympathies she 
may be said to possess” are “strongly compromised” by Elizabeth Barrett 
Browning’s “firm identification with male modes of political thought and 
aesthetic practice.”10 Stephanie Johnson takes this argument a step further by 
arguing that “because Barrett Browning’s apocalyptic vision in Aurora Leigh 
relies so heavily . . . on Aurora’s transformation into a spokesperson for the male, 
the potential radicalism of the novel-poem’s call for such change is deflated.”11  
But such consent is not unanimous. The contrary opinion is voiced by those, such 
as Kathleen Renk, who are happy to suggest that the poem remains 
revolutionary even with Aurora’s marriage, “shattering female stereotypes and   
. . . loosening the tongue of the woman poet.”12 The poem’s happy return to the 
marriage plot, in such critical constructions, either betrays the poem’s earlier 
feminist fervor, reveals that the poem never had feminist intentions at all, or 
redefines marriage as a less restrictive institution.  
While the debate over the exact nature and depth of the poem’s feminism 
has yielded many valuable insights, I would suggest that it also limits our 
ultimate understanding of the poem’s other social claims. The difficulty posed by 
fitting the poem’s final book into a cohesive statement is merely a symptom of 
                                                
9 Kaplan 12.  
10 Deirdre David, Intellectual Women and the Victorian Patriarchy (Ithaca: Cornell 
UP, 1987) 98.  
11 Stephanie Johnson, “Aurora Leigh's Radical Youth: Derridean Parergon and the 
Narrative Frame in 'A Vision of Poets,'” Victorian Poetry 44.4 (2006): 441.  
12 Kathleen Renk, “Resurrecting the Living Dead: Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s 
Poetic Vision in Aurora Leigh,” Studies in Browning and His Circle 23 (2000): 47. 
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the problem. The poem itself does, obviously, demand a consideration of gender: 
Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s repeated and explicit calls to action over such 
issues as female financial independence make it clear that such concerns must be 
attended to. Focusing on such gender issues exclusively, however, reduces the 
complexity of this epic work. Attempting to answer the one question “How can 
we reconcile the poem’s traditional end to its feminist beginning?” undervalues 
the poem’s vast scope and extensive social concerns. While Barrett Browning was 
most certainly concerned with the feminist politics of her own day, the poem 
demands attention to other social issues almost as insistently. Marjorie Stone sees 
this broader political tension when she argues that Aurora Leigh is “one of the 
Victorian period’s most notable works of sage discourse,” although, like the 
critics above, she is quick to point out that “Barrett Browning’s representation of 
the ‘woman question’ generated the most innovative and iconoclastic 
elements.”13 Thus, while Stone touches on the poem’s other social goals, she 
never considers the sum of these separate discourses. Kaplan similarly articulates 
that “gender difference, class warfare, the relation of art to politics . . . are all 
engaged as intersecting issues in the poem” but then claims that the poem 
ultimately “cannot answer the questions which the work as a whole puts to 
discourses outside it.”14 For both Stone and Kaplan, Aurora Leigh spreads itself 
too thin, and as a result fails to make significant contributions to any one 
discourse. 
                                                
13 Marjorie Stone, Elizabeth Barrett Browning (Houndsmills: MacMillan, 1995) 137, 
144. 
14 Kaplan 5, 16. 
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The poem’s diverse commitments mean that it is difficult to make a clear 
statement without narrowing one’s focus to only one of its major plots or only 
one of its major messages. Choosing to focus on either the romantic story of 
Aurora and her cousin Romney or the dramatic fall of Marian Erle lets critics 
construct a much neater, more compact argument. Similarly, one can choose 
between the poem’s message of independence for female artists or its difficult 
philanthropic idealism. Only by considering these strands simultaneously, 
however, can we possibly hope to grasp the poem’s full message. I will argue 
that Elizabeth Barrett Browning addresses the same tensions between literature 
and economics that I have already discussed in relation to Dickens and Smollett. 
Her rejection of economics, though, is both more nuanced and more aesthetic 
than that of her male counterparts. This delicately balanced position is partly due 
to the poem’s gender politics. For Barrett Browning, the same statistical models 
that treat the poor, unjustly, as objects of analysis, drive paternalist treatments of 
women.  Thus, Barrett Browning needs to do the complicated work of both 
deconstructing Victorian ideals of gender and rejecting the vast bulwark of 
political economy. By creating a place for Aurora, the female poet, in the 
discourse of philanthropy, Barrett Browning ultimately creates a non-economic 
model of charity that allows the full participation of women. While that 
participation is not without problems, as we shall see, it enables her to return to a 
pre-economic model of charity that completely rejects economic and statistical 
models for “managing” both women and the poor.  
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In this reading of the text as a modified endorsement of Christian 
philanthropy, I disagree with Lana Dalley, the only other critic to discuss the 
economic aspects of the poem in any depth. Dalley valuably attempts to broaden 
our understanding of the poem’s stance on women’s work by redirecting our 
attention to its concern with women’s roles in political economy. As she notes, 
Barrett Browning’s “treatment of political economy in Aurora Leigh is largely 
unexplored critical terrain,” a shortcoming that is odd in light of the way the 
poem “draws attention to the limitations of the liberal economic paradigm for 
conceptualizing women’s waged labor.”15 Dalley’s focus on Aurora Leigh herself, 
however, at the expense of the poem’s philanthropic sub-plot, leads her to 
overlook Barrett Browning’s vital contributions to mid-Victorian ideas of charity 
and charitable reform. Dalley centers her argument so narrowly on Aurora Leigh’s 
impact on later female economists that she overlooks the poem’s attempts to 
radically resituate the very genres of political economics and poetry. That is, 
despite Dalley’s argument to the contrary, Barrett Browning doesn’t write about 
exclusively female interactions with economics, but rather with the relationship 
between political economy as a whole and artistic value at large. It is only 
because Dalley refuses to consider Romney’s role and the poem’s broad reaction 
to philanthropy that she is able to declare confidently that there is a “union of 
economics and Christianity at the poem’s conclusion” (526) or that “the text’s 
                                                
15 Lana L. Dalley, “‘The least ‘Angelical’ poem in the language’: Political 
Economy, Gender, and the Heritage of Aurora Leigh,” Victorian Poetry 44.4 (2006): 
525, 526.   
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vision of female economic empowerment is a repudiation of . . . philanthropic 
self-sacrifice.”16 
Instead, I argue that Barrett Browning chooses to rewrite philanthropy by 
re-coupling poetry (art) and social reform. Aurora declares, defiantly, that poetry 
has the power to reform both individual souls and society at large, because only 
poets “Exert a double vision” that enables them to “catch / Upon the burning 
lava of a song / The full-veined, heaving, double-breasted Age ( 5.183, 213-15).17 
This double vision lets poets “see near things as comprehensively / As if afar      
[. . .] / And distant things [. . .] intimately deep” (5.185-187), thus giving them a 
unique power to both understand and explain large social patterns. While others 
“ill discern” the events of their own lifetimes, poets can see them truly (5.167).18 
This special power means that poetry has not just a right, but also an obligation 
to pass along its more accurate representation.  Poetry, too, is the purest of the 
literary genres, because it is least subject to fickle public taste. Drama, in contrast, 
“wears a dog-chain round / Its regal neck, and learns to carry and fetch / The 
                                                
16 Dalley 526, 530. 
17 Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Aurora Leigh and Other Poems, ed. John Robert 
Glorney Bolton and Julia Bolton Holloway (1856; London: Penguin Books, 1995). 
All subsequent citations in text. For ease of reference, my line citations 
throughout this chapter will be formatted as (volume.line). Please note that the 
edition I have used throughout is based on the original publication of the text 
rather than on later revisions, and thus line numbers might vary.  Also note that 
Elizabeth Barrett Browning frequently uses ellipses, including a double rather 
than triple period. For ease of distinguishing, my own omissions will be marked 
within brackets. 
18 While Barrett Browning herself does not gender this construction, Gilbert and 
Gubar see a variety of double vision as the female artist’s most necessary 
survival skill: “women have created submerged meanings, meanings hidden 
within or behind the more accessible, ‘public’ content of their works, so that their 
literature could be read and appreciated even when its vital concern with female 
dispossession and disease was ignored.” See Madwoman in the Attic 72.  
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fashions of the day” (5.270-72), while a true poet “does not write for you / Or 
me” (5.251-52) but rather for the sake of art. That is to say, poets have both the 
requisite vision to see the world as it really is, and independence enough from 
public opinion to portray that world truthfully. 
Poetry has another power, too. It not only reveals truth in its arguments, 
but it also renders the human soul more beautiful by its very poetic devices. This 
elevation of the soul is what Barrett Browning ultimately sees as the most 
powerful gift poetry can give to all classes, even the poor. In one of Romney and 
Aurora’s early quarrels, she claims:  
It takes a soul,  
To move a body: it takes a high-souled man,  
To move the masses . . Even to a cleaner stye:  
It takes the ideal, to blow a hair’s breadth off  
The dust of the actual.—Ah, your Fouriers fail,  
Because not poets enough to understand  
That life develops from within. (2.478-84) 
Aurora here and elsewhere deliberately contrasts poetry and the social sciences. 
By rendering social change in terms of aesthetics, Barrett Browning is able to 
remove it from the realm of science. As Aurora herself ultimately argues, poetry 
is thus more important even than bread:  
‘Tis impossible  
To get at men excepting through their souls,  
However open their carniverous jaws;  
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And poets get directlier at the soul  
Than any of your economists. (8.537-41, sic) 
In the poem’s much-debated ending, Aurora’s poetry ultimately influences 
society more than Romney’s philanthropy. By giving poetry so much power, 
Barrett Browning sets out to rectify the great genre debate, outlined in my 
previous chapters, between literature and economics. Economics, has, in contrast 
to poetry, no right to discuss human life.  
Aurora Leigh illuminates this alignment of true philanthropy with art 
through each of its main plots. While the two stories of Romney and Marian 
work simultaneously in the poem, I will separate them here for ease of 
discussion. Romney’s decline, which I shall discuss first, proves directly that the 
power of political economy and statistics is largely illusory. Even in Romney’s 
capable and well-intentioned hands statistics create only a soulless and 
ultimately destructive charity. The evil of institutional charity is shown not to be 
its control by the state, as both Utopians and economists often protested, but its 
very institutional status. Romney painfully proves that even private hands 
cannot successfully perform large-scale social reform, however noble or socialist. 
Marian’s story is intimately connected with Romney’s failure, but it also 
ultimately showcases the positive power of Aurora’s more poetic methods of 
reform. Romney’s attempt to save Marian from the conventional fallen-woman 
plot only drives her to it—her track from seamstress to prostitute is slightly less 
direct, but as inevitable as in any “social problem” literature. Aurora, on the 
other hand, is given so much more power that she can do the impossible: restore 
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the fallen Marian to a role in respectable society.19 It is through Aurora’s means 
that Marian is able to declare herself, ultimately, so pure that she doesn’t require 
a marriage to “save” her reputation or her soul. These two narrative threads, 
taken together, thus reveal all the faults of impersonal charity and all the benefits 
of true, mutual sympathy. 
 
II. Romney Leigh represents the most positive aspects of large-scale Victorian 
philanthropy. He believes passionately in his work and, unlike many other 
literary philanthropists, wants to completely undermine the rigid class structures 
of nineteenth-century England. Romney sees, with an acute sensitivity, the 
misery that prevails among the poor, and thus desperately attempts to use his 
wealth to reform their lot:  
Who,  
Being man and human, can stand calmly by  
And view these things, and never tease his soul  
For some great cure? (2.279-82)  
To Romney, the rich have an overwhelming ethical obligation to remove social 
evils, and failing to do so creates an immense, painful burden on the rest of 
society. The poem recognizes the ethical strength of Romney’s ideals. The initial 
presentation of Romney’s social goals is quite positive, and the even the critical 
Aurora paints his character in a noble light. He has read the best social theories 
that Victorian England has to offer and has seen in “statistical despairs” the 
                                                
19 Early critics debated the poem’s success in this regard, but it is unquestioned 
within the poem. 
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“long sum of ill” inherent in Victorian culture (2.313, 309). By taking such care in 
her descriptions, Barrett Browning avoids depicting Romney as an example of 
the charitable stereotypes most easily dismissed by the previous authors in this 
study. He is not rapacious like Mrs. Pardiggle, nor does he avoid England’s own 
problems like Mrs. Jellyby, the charitable stereotypes of Dickens’s Bleak House. 
Most importantly, he is not a blindly benevolent fool, giving money without 
considering the consequences. Romney is both educated and compassionate, 
both sympathetic to individuals and aware of large social trends. And yet still his 
charity will fail.  
Barrett Browning needs, in part, to deconstruct Romney’s model of charity 
because it inevitably limits the charitable participation of women. Romney’s 
statistics and science force women to the margins of charitable work, doomed to 
be “directed” in their activities by more “objective” men. At the same time, only 
those with an incredible desire to dedicate their entire lives and incomes, not just 
their spare hours, to charitable causes will succeed at the kinds of charity 
Romney envisions. Aurora is well aware of what it would mean to be the wife of 
a dedicated philanthropist, noting with near hysteria: 
He might cut  
My body into coins to give away  
Among his other paupers [. . .]  
  [. . .] might unquestioned set  
My right hand teaching in the Ragged Schools,  
My left hand washing in the Public Baths,  
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What time my angel of the Ideal stretched  
Both his to me in vain. (2.789-97)  
Aurora’s insistence that she will not be Romney’s “helpmate” (2. 401) is both a 
recognition of the time that such philanthropy would take from her own work 
and a refusal to be confined to the limited role of washer or teacher, rather than 
an equal to Romney as a developer of policy. Note, too, Aurora’s keen perception 
of economic reality. Not only would marriage subsume her own small 
inheritance, but charity work on such a large scale will also destroy her ability to 
participate in the waged labor of writing. She will, like “his other paupers,” be 
reduced to Romney’s financial and ethical dependent.  
While Aurora fears that Romney’s charity would absorb the time and 
energy needed for her “real” work, Romney directly questions her ability to 
accomplish either. He condemns the value of women as both poets and 
philanthropists, noting that their compassion, and thus their understanding of 
the world, is too limited to immediately visible problems:  
A red-haired child  
Sick in a fever, if you touch him once,  
Will set you weeping; but a million sick . .  
You could as soon weep for the rule of three,  
Or compound fractions. Therefore, this same world,  
Uncomprehended by you, must remain 
Uninfluenced by you. (2.213-20)  
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Romney, that is, denies that women could ever have the “double vision” that 
Aurora sees as necessary for true poetry. Controlled by their emotions, women 
can never look at the “big picture” of social problems. Since women are so 
limited to the present and immediate in their understanding of the world, they 
can be neither great philanthropists nor great artists. In Romney’s words, “We 
get no Christ from you, —and verily / We shall not get a poet” (2.224-25). Barrett 
Browning couples charity and art from the very beginning of her long poem. 
Being properly charitable requires, in Romney’s equation, the same skills as 
being a good poet. For this reason, it is absolutely crucial that his masculine, 
statistical conception of charity is proven to be a failure. Barrett Browning 
dramatically undermines his claim that such abstract sympathy is truly powerful 
in favor of reinstating women’s right to the “double vision” of immediate 
sympathy and large social vision.  
The emotional component of charity thus becomes one of the poem’s great 
ideological battles. The remainder of the poem systematically deconstructs the 
emotional fallacy inherent in Romney’s type of large-scale social work. Diffuse 
sympathy for the world at large, quite simply, proves to be too much for one 
man to bear. Romney is tortured by the gap between his wealth and the poverty 
of the world, from his very first appearance in the poem as : 
early master of Leigh Hall,  
Whereof the nightmare sate upon his youth, 
Repressing all its seasonable delights, 
And agonising with a ghastly sense  
 
 143 
Of universal hideous want and wrong 
To incriminate possession. (1.516-21)  
This guilty distaste for wealth drives Romney to his philanthropy, which the 
poem suggests is too immoderate to be rational. Romney hints at his unnatural 
burden from quite early in the poem, with his “statistical despairs” mentioned 
above. The guests at his failed wedding to Marian observe that he is, rather than 
a philanthropist, a fanatic, having “turned quite lunatic upon / This modern 
question of the poor” (4.662-63). Lady Waldemar, though not the best judge of 
character, notes that Romney’s social mission made him do poorly at Oxford, as 
“he lost count of Homer’s ships / in Melbourne’s poor-bills, Ashley’s factory 
bills” (3.547-48) while in society “If you do not starve, or sin, / You’re nothing to 
him” (3.564-65). Romney’s philanthropy, in short, causes him to lose perspective, 
to overlook the world’s beauty and obsess about its unfairness. His immoderate 
dedication to social questions means that it is Romney, not Aurora, who cannot 
understand the world. He becomes a monomaniac and can no longer 
successfully participate in society. Or, in Aurora’s most damning understatement 
of their difference, “he [is], overfull / of what is, and I, haply, overbold / For 
what might be” (1.1108-10). The poem, more closely aligned with Aurora’s view, 
argues that in order for Romney’s philanthropy to be truly successful, he will be 
compelled to reject his despairing statistics in favor of Aurora’s optimism.  
Romney’s methods are ultimately as much criticized as his motives. Barrett 
Browning argues that Romney, and by extension political economy, misses the 
true goal of philanthropy by focusing on the body, not the soul. Helping the soul 
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is, of course, the realm of poetry. Mere physical improvement of the type 
demanded by Romney’s impersonal charity is misunderstood, misconstructed, 
and resented by those it should help. Nowhere does Aurora Leigh demonstrate 
this bitterness more strongly than in the burning of Leigh Hall, an act 
representing the most powerful rejection of Romney’s style of charity. He is 
compelled to understand that the poor need more than merely food and shelter, 
and, finally, must confess in agony:  
I beheld the world  
As one great famishing carniverous mouth, —  
A huge, deserted, callow, black, bird Thing,  
With piteous open beak that hurt my heart,  
Till down upon the filthy ground I dropped,  
And tore the violets up to get the worms.  
Worms, worms, was all my cry: an open mouth,  
A gross want, bread to fill it to the lips,  
No more! (8. 395-402, sic) 
The reduction of social problems to bodily needs, Romney realizes, “makes 
libertines” of all men by compelling attention toward the body instead of the 
soul (8.412). Focusing on only basic physical requirements for survival, that is, 
degrades morality. Even worse, the moral reforms that Romney attempted to 
impose, top-down, at Leigh Hall were “waxen masks” and “tyrannous 
constraint[s]” that the poor came to deeply resent. The very people he attempted 
to help “helped the burners, it was said, / And certainly a few clapped hands 
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and yelled” (8.962-63). Not only is Romney’s charity misunderstood by his 
community, who, both rich and poor, resent his changes to tradition, but it is also 
seen as tyranny by those reaping its benefits. By demonstrating this resentment, 
Barrett Browning attempts to remove charity from the range of such large 
projects. Helping the individual, whose circumstances can be truly understood 
and changed both materially and immaterially, is more fitting than attempting to 
force one solution on an entire community.  
Romney thus comes to recognize the power of smaller, more personal, 
philanthropy. His blindness makes him physically unable to act on his previous 
scale, but he has also come to accept Aurora’s definition of compassion. Rather 
than seeing the evils of society as a vast and overwhelming whole, Romney 
learns to “be content in work, / To do the thing we can, and not presume / To 
Fret because it’s little” (8.732-34). But here the pendulum has swung too far, and 
Aurora must step in. After his grand failure, he is tempted to throw up his hands 
entirely, arguing:  
God will have His work done [. . .] 
And that we need not be disturbed too much  
For Romney Leigh or others having failed  
With this or that quack nostrum [. . . .] (8.684-87)  
Romney, having done too much, is now tempted into the language of “the poor 
are always with us,” a standard argument against charity. (Dickens, for example, 
considers this a foundational attitude of “Podsnappery.”) Aurora must intervene 
to remind him that: 
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no earnest work  
[. . .] fails so much  
It is not gathered as a grain of sand  
To enlarge the sum of human action used  
For carrying out God’s end. (8.705-10)  
All charity, by this measure, will do some good. Still, the emphasis is on smaller 
charitable acts, which, as I will discuss in more detail below, gain the poem’s 
final endorsement.   
By using Romney’s plot to show that true charity is individual and focused 
on the human soul, Barrett Browning grants agency to women, who often had 
neither means nor opportunity for such large projects, either as benefactors or as 
artists. She also systematically undermines the paternalistic model of 
philanthropy that Romney and his political economists espouse. After the 
burning of Leigh Hall, Romney himself must confess:  
We talk by aggregates,  
And think by systems; and, being used to face  
Our evils by statistics, are inclined  
To cap them with unreal remedies  
Drawn out in haste [. . . .] (8.801-805)  
Unlike poets, political economists cannot preserve a proper sense of scale. Their 
statistics only overwhelm and their solutions are never real answers to the 
problem. Their “unreal” attempts to face social problems, as Romney’s failure so 
painfully demonstrates, will only divide classes further and cause the poor to 
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resent their apparent benefactors. The destruction of Leigh Hall proved that the 
poor do not want or need fatherly guidance. Romney’s final words on the subject 
conclusively replace social theory with personal feeling:  
Fewer programmes, we who have no prescience.  
Fewer systems; we who are held and do not hold.  
Less mapping out of masses, to be saved,  
By nations or by sexes. Fourier’s void,  
And Comte is dwarfed, —and Cabet, puerile. (9.865-69)  
Romney, and supposedly the poem’s readers, has learned that true charity has 
nothing to do with numbers, or even with money, but with love. And love, the 
poem suggests, is very much the domain of women and of poets.  
 
III. Marian Erle’s story first appears as the most direct representation of 
Romney’s charity, and until the last quarter of the poem that story relies heavily 
on melodramatic charitable stereotyping.  Marian begins her life as the virtuous 
child of wayward parents, learning to read from the scraps of poetry that 
peddlers throw away from damaged books. When she becomes an attractive 
young woman, her mother attempts to sell her in sexual slavery to the local 
aristocrat. Marian flees to the city, where she falls insensible and awakens inside 
the ward of a charity hospital. She there meets Romney Leigh, who finds her a 
job as a seamstress. Romney eventually proposes marriage, not for love, but in 
order to demonstrate his beliefs about the insidious effects of the English class 
system. Marian accepts, until the wicked Lady Waldemar, who wants Romney 
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for herself, persuades Marian to emigrate from England to Australia. Marian’s 
traveling companion instead sends her to a Parisian brothel. Marian, virtuously 
refusing prostitution, is raped and goes mad. After being cared for by French 
peasants, Marian recovers her senses and acquires a job as a servant, until she 
discovers her pregnancy. She is then cast out, destitute, on the streets. Only 
Aurora’s charity, to be discussed below, saves her from the remainder of the 
typical story: being driven back into prostitution to save her child, then dying of 
disease or starvation. Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s readers would have known 
that version of the story quite well.  
When we first “see” Marian in the poem, it is through Aurora’s description. 
As she goes to visit her cousin’s future bride, we are prepared for the encounter 
through the standard language of nineteenth-century charity work. Aurora 
ventures through a courtyard, and sees:  
  A sick child, from an ague-fit, 
Whose wasted right hand gambled ’gainst his left 
With an old brass button; [. . .]  
While a woman, rouged  
Upon the angular cheek-bones, kerchief torn,  
Thin dangling locks and a flat lascivious mouth,  
Cursed at a window [. . . .] (3.759-66)   
Poverty and vice go hand in hand, just as popular charitable works suggested. 
Aurora’s only available reaction is, accordingly, the stock language and gestures 
of philanthropy. Saying “The dear Christ comfort you / [. . .] you must have been 
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most miserable / To be so cruel,” she pours the money from her purse onto the 
pavement and runs to Marian’s apartment (3.779-81). By these gestures, we are 
prepared to view Marian exclusively as a charitable object, since they frame 
Marian as only one of the poor creatures living in this terrifying urban den. But, 
according to these same charitable tropes, she must be remarkable in order to be 
distinguished as a separate object of charity from the masses who come “boiling, 
bubbling up” to take Aurora’s money (3.784). As could be expected, then, the 
first thing that Aurora notices is Marian’s delicacy:  
She touched me with her face and with her voice,  
This daughter of the people. Such soft flowers  
From such rough roots? the people, under there,  
Can sin so, curse so, look so, smell so .  . faugh! 
Yet have such daughters? (3.804-808) 
Marian’s appearance instantly sets her apart from the other dwellers in 
Margaret’s Court, giving Aurora the right to appropriate her story in a way that 
she cannot attempt to do with the rougher women outside. Aurora is quite clear 
about her role: “I tell her story and grow passionate. / She, Marian, did not tell it 
so, but used / Meek words” (3.846-48). At this first encounter, then, the poem 
opens itself to all the standard criticisms of charity—Aurora is too interested in 
her own perceptions, too invested in seeing a difference between herself and 
Marian, and too anxious to take Marian’s story as a part of her own experience.  
Marian, as the poor but beautiful woman, is silenced, even as Aurora ostensibly 
gives her a voice. Aurora’s sympathy so far is complicit with the exact system of 
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charity that fails so miserably for Romney. 
 When Aurora and Marian have their second major encounter, however, the 
scenario no longer aligns with the usual models of charity. Marian, empowered 
by her suffering, refuses to fit Aurora’s narrow vision of what options a poor 
woman has at her disposal. When Aurora has seen, but not conversed with, 
Marian, she can still easily stereotype her: 
 And oh, as truly as that was Marian’s face, 
 The arms of that same Marian clasped a thing 
 .  . Not hid so well beneath the scanty shawl,  
 I cannot name it now for what it was.  
  
 A child. (6.342-46) 
Aurora quickly leaps to the conclusion of didactic literature, that Marian is “not 
dead, / But only . . damned” (6.364-65), and that she must be saved “if she will, 
or will not—child / Or no child, —if a child, then one to save!” (6.387-88).  
Aurora still imaginatively overrides all of Marian’s agency. When the two finally 
speak, however, Marian is no longer the sweetly innocent bystander who allows 
her voice to be overridden. She counteracts Aurora’s offer of a home by quickly 
replying “A home for you and me and no one else / Ill suits one of us” (6.459-
60).  She will not be made the victim of someone else’s charitable scheme again. 
She also has the strength to criticize the past charitable efforts of Aurora and of 
Romney, whose attempts to help her almost ended in destruction. She scathingly 
describes herself as “that little stone, called Marian Erle, / Picked up and 
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dropped by you and another friend, / . . . / And bruised from what she was” 
(6.808-11). Marian has seen, and understands, the dark side of being constructed 
as an object of charity. 
 Aurora, too, finally recognizes both Marian’s fundamental virtue and the 
damage that her half-hearted intentions have caused. For the fist time, Aurora 
seems to realize that Marian, too, deserves treatment as an equal. In this scene, 
the final plea comes from Aurora herself, who now begs Marian to: 
  Come with me, sweetest sister [. . .]  
 And sit within my house and do me good [. . . .]  
 I am lonely in the world,  
 And thou art lonely, and the child is half  
 An orphan. (7.117-22)  
Their relationship can finally, with this shift, move beyond one of charity and 
into genuine companionship. Aurora lets go of her position as benefactor. 
Recognizing their new relationship, Marian “neither signed she was unworthy, 
nor gave thanks” (7.134), but merely assents, signaling the end of her role as 
charitable object. No thanks are needed because the situation will be mutually 
beneficial. The two women can live together in isolation without facing the 
criticism of the world, which has not yet made the leap that Aurora has in 
learning to recognize the individual merits of Marian’s case, rather than resorting 
to charitable stereotypes. The two women, finally, can exist outside the norms 
dictated by conventional charity.  
For a brief moment, Aurora and Marian demonstrate a feminist utopia—
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two women helping each other to live independently. Marian’s representation at 
the end of the poem, however, undermines this position and raises serious 
questions about the overall coherence of the poem’s intentions. First, we must 
look, from a slightly different angle, back to a passage I also analyzed in the 
previous section, in which Romney argues that the larger problems of the world 
are outside female understanding:  
   Women as you are,  
Mere women, personal and passionate,  
You give us doating mothers, and chaste wives,  
Sublime Madonnas, and enduring saints! 
We get no Christ from you, —and verily 
We shall not get a poet, in my mind. (2.220-25, sic.)  
Romney here, as I indicated earlier, sets the bar for socially accepted roles for 
women. In my previous analysis I argued that Aurora’s adoption of charity 
undermines these clear roles. Marian, explicitly cast as a Madonna, examines this 
construction from another, more troubling, angle. Is she proving a larger social 
point, or does she merely allow a return to the socially mandated roles for 
women that Aurora seems to escape? While Marian and Aurora can briefly 
coexist outside of charity, that narrative does not have the final word in the 
poem. Barrett Browning attempts to render Marian more revolutionary by the 
major turns of the plot, but the very poetic language she both uses and praises 
restricts Marian’s future. Unlike her literary predecessors, Marian does not die 
on the streets after she gives birth, but she does keep the rhetoric of death at her 
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disposal. In her rejection of Romney, she claims, “I told your cousin, sir, that I 
was dead; / And now she thinks I’ll get up from my grave, / And wear my chin 
cloth for a wedding-veil” (9.391-93). Though she is technically alive, Marian is 
completely removed from the sexual sphere of the living. At the same time that 
Marian claims that she is as “clean as Marian Erle / As Marian Leigh” (9.399-400) 
she explicitly denies her own right to socially-sanctioned marriage, relying on 
isolated individual understanding to absolve what would be perceived as her 
guilt. These verbal gestures remove Marian from the role of the fallen woman, at 
the same time that they serve very much to keep her subject to the same 
limitations. While Marian herself may feel that she needs no social approval, the 
reader has to wonder how, for example, she might be able to provide for herself 
without remaining Romney’s and Aurora’s charitable object. If the text ends with 
Marian as a desexualized charity case, her situation has actually been 
downgraded significantly even from Romney’s initial charitable outreach, which 
at the least gave her legitimate employment.  
Marian’s renunciation of marriage takes on a specifically religious and 
aesthetic cast. Beyond the connotations of her very name, she also rejects 
Romney’s proposals in part because she refuses to have other children, who 
would be “called happier, / A fathered child, with father’s love and race / [. . .] / 
To vex my darling when he’s asked his name” (9.418-21). She will devote herself, 
as in some presentations of the Virgin Mary, to her one child exclusively:  
  Here’s a hand shall keep 
For ever clean without a marriage ring,  
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To tend my boy, until he cease to need 
One steadying finger of it, and desert 
(Not miss) his mother’s lap, to sit with men.  
And when I miss him (not he me) I’ll come 
And say “Now give me some of Romney’s work,  
To help your outcast orphans of the world, 
And comfort grief with grief.” (9.431-39) 
In this context, the language that Marian uses to refer to her own child has 
specific religious ramifications. Marian’s child, as the young Christ, will leave her 
of his own volition to “sit with men” and do serious work. Marian, then, will be 
left to carry on an appropriately feminized charity. Motherhood makes Marian 
both sacred (“for ever clean”) and ultimately expendable. She fully recognizes 
both that her son will inevitably leave her and that once he is gone, her purpose 
in life will have already been fulfilled. Her life becomes one of renunciation in 
more than one sense: she will give up marriage and other children for the sake of 
her illegitimate child, who will leave her behind. Her grief for him and for her 
past life can then be used to comfort motherless children. This language further 
casts us back to Romney’s initial views of women and charity. Marian here 
fulfills exactly the roles that Romney prescribes. She, as Madonna, gives birth to 
Christ but cannot become a savior herself. Even in her transcendence, she never 
offers to become a model for other outcast women, and she turns down her 
chance to be a social model by marrying Romney. She is limited to doing 
“Romney’s work,” not her own, in the charity that she can most closely identify 
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with. Bereft of her own child, she will fill the void by helping other lost children. 
In the end it is Marian who becomes exactly what Aurora rejected—Romney’s 
pauper helpmate. 
While in the end Aurora’s position as Romney’s equal might perhaps 
counter this limitation of female agency, the reader is still left with the question 
of what to do with Marian. The plot reduces her at last to a kind of moral 
obstacle to overcome: Romney must rid himself of his feelings of responsibility to 
her before he can marry Aurora and make what, despite all of the poem’s earlier 
protests, is the socially-acceptable union. Marian’s claims to innocence and 
purity, which fill her final speech, are actually a less effective defense of her 
position than the more impassioned and defensive answer that she gives to 
Aurora earlier in the poem. There, she can exonerate herself by giving the 
specifics of her case. In this final scene, she merely reverts to a slightly different 
aesthetic position that still leaves her subject to the vicissitudes of charitable 
responses by others. While Romney and Aurora found their new union on the 
idea of Christian work and Christian ethics, Marian is the text’s simultaneous 
proof that acts of charity can still have unintended and damaging consequences. 
Her successful relationship with Aurora can only begin where charity ends, and 
her ambiguous status at the poem’s end reminds us of the precarious state of 
women who become dependent on personal charity. 
 
IV. As the poem’s final, deeply ambiguous portrait of Marian shows, the charity 
that Aurora and Romney plan to have in the future remains profoundly limited. 
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Aurora and Marian’s friendship allows them to move, tentatively, beyond the 
giver/receiver dichotomy that forces charity out of the ethical comfort of many 
introspective would-be donors. Aurora can recognize what she will gain from 
Marian’s company, and Marian has a voice in their relationship. Note, too, that 
this relationship is never portrayed as giving the easy emotional satisfaction 
often lauded as the “pay back” for charitable work. Aurora is allowed to 
participate in Marian’s family life, not, like Ebenezer Scrooge at the end of A 
Christmas Carol, to use her power as a benefactor to force her way onto Marian’s 
hearth. Marian’s case initially lets Barrett Browning have the best of both 
charitable worlds. She can elevate Marian over her mere physical needs for food 
and shelter at the same time that Marian’s aid to Aurora keeps their role from 
devolving into conventional paternalistic charity. The problem for Elizabeth 
Barrett Browning comes in trying to sustain that model of charity and extend it 
beyond the personal. Aurora and Marian avoid the structures of paternalism 
because they have a complex pre-existing relationship that feeds their ultimate 
position toward each other. Any future charitable relationships will be, in 
comparison, artificial and limited, and even Romney’s addition as a third party 
disturbs the delicate balance.  
We must also note that neither Romney nor Aurora is exactly a saint at the 
poem’s end. Romney, even into the poem’s final book, still blunders in his 
treatment of Marian because he cannot recognize her true desires. For Romney, 
the best charity is still helping others to conform to social standards, and he 
cannot understand why Marian might be wary of doing so. Aurora, in turn, 
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articulates the position that helping souls is more important than helping bodies, 
at the same time that those very bodies terrify her. On three notable occasions 
she witnesses the life of the poor: in Margaret’s Court when she first meets 
Marian, at Romney’s wedding, and when she encounters Marian in Paris. In all 
three situations, her reaction is panic. The first and last of those I have already 
outlined. At Romney’s wedding, in the most extreme of the three, Aurora 
becomes overwhelmed by the physical presence of the poor:  
    Faces! . .  phew 
We’ll call them vices festering to despairs,  
Or sorrows petrifying to vices: not 
A finger-touch of God left whole on them;  
All ruined, lost—the countenance worn out 
As the garments, the will dissolute as the acts,  
The passions loose and draggling in the dirt 
To trip a foot up at the first free step!— 
Those faces! ‘twas as if you had stirred up hell 
To heave its lowest dreg-fiends uppermost 
In fiery swirls of slime [. . . .] (4.579-89) 
Aurora has a trace of sympathy here, acknowledging, briefly, that sorrow is the 
source of the vice that turns the poor into devils, but devils they remain. Her 
claims later that the souls of the poor can be helped by beauty and poetry jar 
falsely against her conclusion, here, that the poor are the fiends of hell, without 
“a finger-touch of God.”  
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So, while Aurora seems to believe deeply in poetry’s power for reform, the 
practicality of such a project remains entirely outside the poem’s scope. Beyond 
the poem’s treatment of Marian, which could hardly be constructed as a typical, 
or entirely successful, act of charity, and Romney’s vast failures, no actual charity 
is portrayed. It is hard to envision Aurora, with her imaginative terrors at the 
mere sight of dirt, participating valiantly in the reform of a slum. We could, if 
feeling rancorous, blame this gap partly on a failure of Barrett Browning’s own 
imagination—Deirdre David scathingly, perhaps even unfairly, notes that “the 
closest Barrett Browning ever got” to the real poor was “on a rare cab trip to 
Shoreditch in search of Flush.”20 More importantly, though, the poem has an 
ideological concern that forces it to avoid specificity. Namely, Barrett Browning 
very, very carefully separates spiritual reform from physical reform and poetry 
from science. The poem as it stands ends, triumphantly, with the declaration that  
Art’s a service [. . .] 
To open, so, that intermediate door 
Betwixt the different planes of sensuous form 
And form insensuous, that inferior men 
May learn to feel on still through these to those,  
And bless thy ministration. The world waits 
For help. [. . .] 
New hearts in individual growth 
Must quicken, and increase to multitude 
                                                
20 David 124. 
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In new dynasties of the race of men, — 
Developed whence, shall grow spontaneously  
New churches, new economies, new laws 
Admitting freedom, new societies 
Excluding falsehood. (9.915-24, 943-49) 
In this vision of the future, art will so redeem the souls of men that, in time, 
society itself will be completely restructured. It is a grand, vague, proposition, 
easily countered by pragmatics. Critics of Barrett Browning’s new model can 
quickly agree with the acerbic judgment of the Westminster Review in 1857, that 
the poem makes “the mistake of exaggerating the effect of Art—in ameliorating 
or elevating the condition of the masses or the people in any age or country.”21  
And, as slightly different formulations are for every author in this project, 
the precise relationship between literature and the subjects it hopes to wrest from 
economics is deeply troublesome. The last two books of Aurora Leigh routinely 
deny the power of philanthropy because it is limited by statistics and 
mathematical reductions. It is about bread, not souls. Conventional philanthropy 
has been so linked to economic theories that it must be completely cast out in 
order to make room for this new empowering of art. The poem allows for and 
encourages a certain kind of small charity (even the disabled Romney vows to 
work “silently / and simply,” with “fewer programmes,” but not to quit 
abandon charity [9.859-60, 865]), but Barrett Browning can’t begin to explain 
                                                
21 Westminster Review 68.134 (1857). Qtd. in Lynee Lewis Gaillet, “Reception of 
Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s Aurora Leigh: An Insight Into the Age’s Turmoil 
Over the Representation of Gender and Theories of Art,” Studies in Browning and 
His Circle 20 (1993): 120. 
 
 160 
exactly what that charity would look like. Specific systems, that is, have been so 
routinely denied that the room simply doesn’t remain to name a new kind of 
system. Prescribing the exact future work of Aurora and Romney, especially if it 
were to touch on money, would return Aurora’s philanthropic art to the service 
of economics.22 Focusing exclusively on souls and on emotions allows the most 
complete separation from the old, derided political economy, even if it leaves 
readers at slightly loose ends. 
Elizabeth Barrett Browning is thus left with an incomplete picture of her 
newly defined charity. Showing it in action would be limiting, reducing it to the 
exact kind of statistical particulars she has been so busy to deny in the rest of the 
poem. But in another sense she achieves her object entirely. In their first debates 
about philanthropy, Aurora and Romney cannot reconcile charity, art, and the 
position of women. Romney contends that both charity and poetry are beyond 
the scope of women, and Aurora keenly sees how his beliefs would limit her role 
as Romney’s wife. Aurora’s achievement in writing the book that transforms 
Romney and, by extension, Barrett Browning’s achievement in writing the poem 
that we have read for over 10,000 lines, proves that poetry is within women’s 
power. By then linking that poetry to the only part of charity that is shown to 
matter—sympathy and mutual elevation of the soul—Barrett Browning thus 
creates a philanthropic role for women. Aurora can participate not only in the 
                                                
22 Leslee Thorne-Murphy similarly assesses the ending’s charitable vagueness as 
deliberate, although we disagree about the purpose: “Indeed, Barrett Browning 
purposely leaves many of these details obscure, because she is convinced that 
true poetry inspires beneficent change rather than predetermines what that 
change will be.” See “Prostitute Rescue, Rape, and Poetic Inspiration in Elizabeth 
Barrett Browning’s Aurora Leigh,” Women’s Writing 12.2 (2005): 242. 
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conventionally feminine charity of sympathizing with individuals in distress but 
also in the grand ideological work of the new philanthropy of art. She does not 
need to become an economist to help the world on a more than individual scale. 
Art, not science, will redeem the world, and women, as Barrett Browning argues, 





An Economics of Renunciation: Felix Holt: The Radical and Middlemarch 
 
 
“Young ladies don’t understand political economy, you know,” said Mr. 
Brooke, smiling towards Mr. Casaubon. “I remember when we were all 
reading Adam Smith. There’s a book, now. I took in all the new ideas at 
one time – human perfectibility, now.”1 
Mr. Brooke’s equation of political economy and human perfectibility is initially 
puzzling. Adam Smith’s construction of human nature in The Wealth of Nations 
(1776) certainly implies less than perfection. He scathingly notes the failings of 
government, the exploitation of workmen by their masters, and the inevitable 
follies of modern society. By the time Eliot wrote, political economy, “the dismal 
science,” was largely invested in proving human failure, especially the failure of 
prudence and the ineffectiveness of market interventions. But Smith does remain 
less negative than his followers. Indeed, it is The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) 
that expresses the strongest notion of perfectibility. Smith there constructs 
humans as forever learning from their experiences, and then using those 
experiences to better themselves. We are always able to learn more and do more. 
To this extent, the possibility of human perfection does figure even in The Wealth 
of Nations—every worker is able to be more efficient, and every capitalist could 
be more effective. More broadly, economics as a discipline hinges on the idea 
                                                
1 George Eliot, Middlemarch, ed. Rosemary Ashton (1871; London: Penguin Books, 




that people can be accurately predicted, counted, and legislated. Eliot writes on 
the cusp of the shift to more purely mathematical economics, which depends 
exclusively on this tenet. Over the course of her works, George Eliot is anxious to 
undermine these notions of both human perfectibility and human predictability, 
constructing each as pernicious. Failing to recognize inalterable human weakness 
remains the most common, and often most tragic, flaw in any of Eliot’s 
characters, from Maggie Tulliver to Dorothea herself.  
Eliot thus articulates much of her age’s distrust of economics as a fruitless 
attempt to categorize objects beyond category. For Eliot, however, this suspicion 
is broader than anything expressed in the works of Charles Dickens or Elizabeth 
Barrett Browning. In addition to rejecting the premise of human perfectibility, 
Eliot further chooses to focus on a more general ethics of renunciation. Both Felix 
Holt: The Radical (1866) and Middlemarch (1871) feature endings in which heroines 
abdicate their fortunes for love, an ending often constructed as anti-feminist, 
especially by casual readers. Instead, I will argue that Eliot’s model of 
renunciation is less about fear of female empowerment than it is about a deep 
distrust of the monetary system. This anxiety is most present in the very 
interaction that Mr. Brooke encapsulates so early in Middlemarch: the junction 
between human behavior and political economy. In short, Eliot chooses to reject 
money, including monetary charity, in favor of her famously abstract, and thus 
more powerful, sense of sympathy. Only by leaving money behind can we truly 




As Mr. Brooke reminds us, George Eliot occupied a world in which the 
dictates of political economy could easily be called upon to replace moral claims. 
Adam Smith’s kinder economies had, by the time Eliot wrote, been replaced with 
the stricter dictates of the New Poor Laws of 1834 and the theories that helped to 
justify them. Increasing dedication to the free market in the hands of newer 
political economists made it a right, if not an obligation, to be as prosperous as 
possible. By these criteria, Eliot’s “young ladies,” with their philanthropic 
tendencies, certainly don’t “understand political economy,” as Mr. Brooke 
phrases it. At the same time, however, a strong counter-discourse of moral 
obligation to the poor arose. Igor Webb refers to the moral conflict over poverty 
as part of the nineteenth century’s “debate about the sources of value.”2 In 
Webb’s terms, the debate hinges on the value of labor: “if labor [rather than 
market force] is the source of value, then social life and its products and the 
meaning of social life all derive from human activity.”3 Recognizing the 
fundamental value of human work, people were compelled to recognize the 
fundamental value of the human worker. G.R. Searle groups the moral responses 
to this shift into two major anxieties. People needed to address both “the 
exploitation of the poor and the soul destroying monotony of their existence” 
and the “deep-seated spiritual malady, resulting from a changed perspective on 
life [brought on by industrialization].”4 Every member of Victorian society, in 
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Searle’s view, needed to come to terms with his or her exact response to these 
two historical facts. The middle classes, in particular, needed to balance their 
increasingly comfortable standard of living with a simultaneously increasing 
awareness, thanks to public debate and economics itself, of the crushing poverty 
of industrial workers. While economic discourse and institutions such as the 
Poor Laws attempted to naturalize poverty, writers like Eliot, particularly 
interested in Searle’s “spiritual malady,” found little comfort in such platitudes.  
As my previous chapters have argued, Eliot’s fellow writers articulated 
their anxieties about poverty and the social state of England largely through 
ambiguous scenes of monetary charity. Dickens and Barrett Browning wanted to 
reject charity’s tainted associations with political economy by focusing on 
smaller, less-legislated actions. My previous chapters have demonstrated that 
these explicitly private charities represent an attempt to retain personal agency in 
a complex political and social environment. Unlike her contemporaries, Eliot 
presents few direct scenes of charitable encounters and rarely depicts poverty. 
Instead, her works focus more on what I have termed benevolence, or, in Eliot’s 
own vocabulary, sympathy. As many critics have noted, Eliot expands sympathy 
to include a far more diffuse range of human emotions than mere fellow feeling 
in suffering, and her sympathy very rarely connects with monetary charity.5 This 
sympathy then becomes the almost exclusive source of moral value in Eliot’s 
works. Ann Cvetkovich sums up Eliot’s position neatly: “The foundation of 
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ethical behavior is emotional investment in objects or persons outside the self       
. . . . In Eliot’s moral universe, the original sin is narcissism or egoism, that is, an 
inability to have feelings about or to cathect on, anything other than the self.”6 
Audrey Jaffe is sharply critical of Eliot’s sympathetic project, arguing that, 
especially in Daniel Deronda, sympathy creates “an identity politics in which 
differences between individuals are flattened out in favor of a reassuring fantasy 
of similitude.”7 I disagree, arguing instead that Eliot’s sympathy is intended as a 
powerful antidote to the too-flattening discourse of political economics, which 
confines everyone to their prescribed role in the market.   
This chapter will argue that Eliot deliberately replaces charity with 
benevolence/sympathy in order to distance herself and her characters from the 
moral ambiguities my previous chapters have illustrated. True sympathy is, by 
its very definition, incapable of being incorrect, although Eliot does show time 
and again that this correctness is capable of misconstruction by those outside of 
the sympathetic bond. Moreover, Eliot’s construction of sympathy hinges upon 
what I will here call an ethics of renunciation—only by actively distancing 
ourselves from the influence of money and the market can we become truly 
sympathetic to our fellow creatures. In this stance I am modifying a view taken 
by Rachel Ablow, who contends that “Eliot attempts to imagine how sympathy 
might be supplemented with remorse or gratitude, emotions able to eradicate 
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selfishness while preserving self-consciousness.”8 For those steeped in the 
Victorian ideology of accumulation, the deliberate choice of an austere life is the 
ultimately anti-selfish gesture. While this theme figures most prominently and 
didactically in Felix Holt: The Radical, it also helps to illuminate crucial 
ambiguities in Middlemarch. While both Dickens and Barrett Browning make a 
compromise of sorts between economics and human behavior, Eliot desires no 
such bargain. But her attempts to completely remove money from human 
morality are stymied by her need to demonstrate to her pragmatic audience that 
her heroes and heroines have an adequate income for life’s necessities. Her 
idealism is trumped by the mimetic requirements of realist fiction. While Eliot 
effectively separates money and morality, she is simultaneously compelled to 
both admit and draw attention to the fiscal realities of Victorian life. 
In both Felix Holt: The Radical and Middlemarch, George Eliot expresses her 
attempts to negotiate complicated economic dilemmas. The similarities between 
these two novels are remarkable, but, most importantly for our purposes, both 
Dorothea Brooke and Esther Lyon sacrifice fortunes for love and moral influence. 
Dorothea cannot keep her money because her first husband’s will prohibits her 
second marriage, while Esther’s lover fears that prosperity would alienate him 
from his working-class objects of charity. Both heroines, in addition to these 
reasons, come to find wealth itself to be objectionable. Dorothea famously claims 
to “hate her wealth” (83.811), and Esther sees only the unhappiness that money 
has brought to the Transome family, from whom she would inherit. Middlemarch 
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and Felix Holt thus present an ethics of resistance to the market. Both of these 
resistances, however, trouble modern-day readerly desires to see a sense of 
feminist purpose in George Eliot’s heroines. Deirdre David condemns Esther as 
“a domestic coquette,”9 and other have argued that it is very difficult to read 
Middlemarch without feeling that Eliot simply backed down from making a 
strong feminist statement.10 Dorice Williams Elliott sees this failure as explicitly 
linked to Eliot’s suspicion of charity: the plot of Middlemarch “displaces” 
Dorothea’s “ambitious desires” onto Will Ladislaw. This “emotionally 
disappointing ending . . . can thus be read as a lament for the failure of 
philanthropy to fulfill the desires its representations have aroused.”11 I will 
argue, however, that Eliot’s novels instead seek to remodel the category of 
philanthropy. In order to explicate Eliot’s negotiation of these issues, this chapter 
will first detail Eliot’s treatment of economic ideas in the less studied Felix Holt 
and then move to a reading of Middlemarch. In doing so I hope to prove that the 
intersection of the domestic/charitable and economic spheres was genuinely, 
rather than transparently, troublesome for Eliot. She struggles to find a 
satisfactorily moral way to allow the two areas to correspond, which in turn 
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leads to an attempted abandonment of the economic sphere. Her gesture of 
renunciation is thus more strongly linked to her ethics than to her sexual politics. 
Catherine Gallagher establishes the moral terrain that Eliot attempts to 
negotiate. Examining the tension between economics and literature in the mid-
nineteenth century, she claims that both economics and its critics, in essence, 
moved to a more secular, humanist notion of value. At the same time, she argues, 
economics itself split between two types of discourse: the “bioeconomic” and the 
“somaeconomic.” Bioeconomics describes “interconnections among populations, 
the food supply, modes of production and exchange, and their impact on life 
forms generally.”12 Somaeconomics, on the other hand, examines “economic 
behavior in terms of the emotional and sensual feelings that are both causes and 
consequences of economic exertions.”13 All forms of value thus become, in effect, 
economic relationships, as all human interactions can be made to fit one of these 
categories. While all the authors in this study have been troubled by this 
construction, George Eliot anxiously desired to move back to a non-economic 
center of value, characterized most strongly by sympathy both toward and 
between her characters. She attempts, that is, to present a secular alternative to 
what Gallagher terms the “transcendent spiritual meanings” of pre-economic 
life.14 But, because Eliot does exist in an intensely economic world, this move 
can’t be made without difficulty.  
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Eliot’s choice of, or the literary market’s expectation of, the marriage plot 
novel also hampers her freedom to abandon the economic sphere. Marriage 
easily falls into Gallagher’s category of “somaeconomics”: middle-class 
standards being what they were, love and marriage came to require an elaborate 
series of financial arrangements, from having eligible employment to buying the 
correct furniture. In addition, there were also ideological ramifications, hinging 
on both the financial and emotional sides of the equation. G.R. Searle’s 
examination of marriage debates in the mid-nineteenth century provides a 
groundwork from which to examine some of Eliot’s moral frustration. Searle 
notes that while John Stuart Mill, among others, believed that marriage could be 
a contractual arrangement, with equal participation by both parties, opposing 
thinkers held that such arrangements denied women their unique moral sphere 
as “the angel in the house.” In Mill’s view, “true partnerships rested upon 
affection and, in particular, upon sympathy,” which was an emotion only 
possible between equals.15 Thus, marriage could be entered into as a contract, 
another type of arrangement between equals. Many contemporaries felt that 
Mill’s position hinged too much on the ruthless dictates of political economy, 
according to which a person’s worth was solely what he or she could bring to the 
market. Furthermore, however much Mill relied on the idea of sympathy 
between spouses, he denied the popular claim that women were naturally more 
sympathetic and altruistic than men. On the other side of the debate, both men 
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and women wondered what would happen to the home if marriage became a 
contract and women increasingly participated in the outside world. Herbert 
Spencer, a great friend of Eliot’s, cautioned against the social dangers that would 
arise if women were “enfranchised prematurely,” at the same time that popular 
domestic ideologies offered women a way, via the sphere of their home, to 
counteract the increasingly negative, commercial worlds inhabited by their 
husbands.16 While we would think of this economic denial as an anti-feminist 
stance, the moral power given to women in an argument like Spencer’s is 
persuasive in its context. Eliot’s gender politics are further complicated by the 
very coupling of marital and market equality in these debates. The fact that 
equality, rhetorically if not in actuality, forces women into the market makes 
Eliot, ever suspicious of the market, hesitant to embrace it. Instead, she appears 
to desire her male characters to adopt the “feminine” attributes of sympathy and 
separateness from the market.  
 
II. With this framework in mind, we can begin examining the vexed morality of 
Felix Holt and Middlemarch to see why Eliot’s moral and economic anxiety might 
center itself so strongly on marriage. Felix Holt, at first glance, presents a 
perfectly stable moral sphere in which economic interactions are to be avoided, 
beyond supplying the necessities of life. First, we must remember that Felix is 
never seriously undermined as the novel’s moral center. He appears in the novel 
fully-formed, and aside from abandoning his views on marriage, we witness no 
                                                




substantial ideological changes in him. Indeed, critics have long seen Felix 
himself as one of the novel’s most serious flaws, with Arnold Kettle soundly 
condemning Eliot for “the artistic failure to create a figure commensurate with 
the needs of her central theme.”17 Colene Bentley pointedly notes that “as a 
character [Felix] often lacks narrative realization because at key moments in the 
novel Eliot does not provide an account of how her protagonist came to hold the 
opinions he in fact does.”18 More tersely, Evan Horowitz remarks that “Felix is 
not the kind of radical who believes in praxis. He is the kind of radical who 
believes in rhetoric.”19 For similar reasons, Barbara Hardy calls Mrs. Transome 
“the only really successful character in the book.”20 I would argue instead that 
Felix’s position is intended to serve as an example for readers, not of a “good” 
(dynamic) character, but of a good role model. We are intended, as Esther is, to 
be converted by Felix’s goodness. While this didactic purpose is perhaps less 
compelling to readers than other approaches, we must remember that Eliot often 
chooses it in her fiction. Dorothea herself, while she makes some mistakes, is 
presented as the embodiment of saintly perfection at the beginning of 
Middlemarch, as are characters like Adam Bede and Romola. For all these 
characters, the trial of life is coupling moral correctness with the actions of an 
unfair and censorious world. By providing readers with Esther’s conversion, 
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presumably similar to Felix’s, Eliot attempts to show us both a model for Felix’s 
transition and his unblemished moral correctness. 
Felix is allowed to voice his own position through a number of speeches in 
the novel, most convincingly to Esther, but also to a variety of other characters. 
He gives the fullest account of his own conversion to Mr. Lyon, presenting a very 
radical—to Eliot’s original readers—series of life choices as pure common sense:  
This world is not a very fine place for a good many of the people in it. But 
I’ve made up my mind it shan’t be the worse for me, if I can help it. They 
may tell me I can’t alter the world—that there must be a certain number of 
sneaks and robbers in it, and if I don’t lie and filch somebody else will. 
Well, then, somebody else shall, for I won’t.21 
This language is unusually strong for Eliot, who more often deals out her moral 
absolutes quietly. Felix reduces, indeed, a good number of Eliot’s readers to 
“sneaks and robbers,” since in its context this speech indicts fairly standard 
nineteenth-century business practices. This strong language so early in the novel 
is deliberately cast to shock readers, who can then be persuaded by Felix’s more 
detailed explanations and his later, somewhat more moderate, speeches. While 
Eliot’s modern readers might be surprised to find this kind of rhetoric in one of 
her novels, we must remember that Felix’s language would not have been 
completely new to a Victorian audience. Here, and elsewhere, Felix draws on the 
language made popular by anti-luxury sermons and pamphlets for a century 
before Eliot begins to write her novel. Felix’s views are compellingly phrased, 
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but their strength of delivery is more essential than their originality. He 
advocates stepping away from the market, but, as my discussion demonstrates, 
this proves as difficult for Felix as it did for the audiences of those sermons.  
Felix’s most direct challenge arises in his home, the one place supposedly 
untainted by the market. Just as the novel begins, Felix convinces his aging 
mother to stop selling patent medicines that may injure patients. He would 
rather support his mother himself, through the “honest” trade of watch making, 
than have her “poison” her customers. This moral intervention in the market 
serves as our first introduction to Felix, and it remains throughout the novel one 
of his most concretely described actions. As discussed below, his charities and 
direct interactions with the working class are less directly presented. While it is 
obvious, though, that readers are intended to approve of Felix’s choices, his 
reasoning remains vague. His only explanation is tendered to Mr. Lyon, who 
confronts him about his mother’s livelihood. Felix makes a strongly anti-market 
claim, arguing that selling damaging goods to the public is equivalent to theft:  
I’ve no more doubt about them [the medicines] than I have about pocket-
picking. I know there’s a stage of speculation in which a man may doubt 
whether a pickpocket is blameworthy—but I’m not one of your subtle 
fellows . . . . If I allowed the sale of those medicines to go on, and my 
mother to live out of the proceeds when I can keep her by the honest 
labour of my hands, I’ve not the least doubt I would be a rascal. (5.61) 
More subtly than the overt equation of stealing and selling dangerous 




way of deprecation, that it is possible to be sympathetic to outright theft, 
presumably (in Felix’s logic) because thieves are often poor men slighted by the 
economic system. More importantly, Felix aligns manual labor with honesty, and 
capitalism with being a “rascal.” He is welcome to make money repairing 
watches, but his mother is condemned for selling bad goods to an unsuspecting 
public. What Felix chooses not to see, or not to dwell on, is that his very 
livelihood itself is dependent upon the existence of inferior goods. He tells 
Esther, who visits on the pretense of having her watch repaired, that “these little 
Geneva toys are cleverly constructed to go always a little wrong” (22.224). But, 
Eliot’s point remains, even with this oversight: the market is not removed from 
moral considerations, no matter what economists or capitalists might attempt to 
make people believe.  
Felix’s attempt to deal absolutely with the morality of the market faces 
some serious challenges within the novel, where other characters are allowed to 
voice more economically-minded objections. For example, Mrs. Holt, Felix’s 
mother, responds to his demand that she give up her remunerative trade in 
patent medicines with a purely free-market claim: “the pills . . . had a sale, as you 
may be sure they suited people’s insides. And what folks can never have boxes 
enough to swallow, I should think you have a right to sell” (43.415). Mrs. Holt 
makes a series of simple equations here. If a medicine sells, it must be good for 
people, and if people are willing to buy something, you have every right to sell 
it. The latter claim is especially strong in the counter-discourse of the novel, 




relentlessly negative portrayal of Mrs. Holt helps to discredit her claims, but her 
voluminous repetitions serve as a constant reminder of exactly what Felix plans 
to work against. In his world, you do not have a right to sell anything that people 
will buy, but rather must protect the ignorant public from their own folly. On the 
other hand, Felix’s true endangerment of his mother’s livelihood is called into 
question by her complaints and by the circumstances of the novel. While Felix is 
in prison, his mother, rendered economically dependent by his actions, is forced 
to live on charity. In the end, Esther provides for Mrs. Holt out of her own 
fortune, undermining the moral purity of Felix’s claim. In a world where the 
working classes had no insurance and no financial security, Felix’s action can be 
criticized, despite Eliot’s attempts to direct the reader away from the 
fundamental justice of Mrs. Holt’s claim. It is, even in this seemingly obvious 
example of economic “right” and “wrong,” impossible to make an entirely 
ethical choice to either embrace or disdain the market. This tension dramatically 
complicates Eliot’s otherwise straightforward message. 
Eliot allows similar anxieties to surface in less didactic scenes as well. 
Thanks to its political nature, the novel showcases several debates that touch on 
economic topics. One of the more extensively treated discussions among the 
townspeople centers on trade unions and working conditions. A young farmer 
proposes the idea that trade unions will be the root of future troubles for 
England, concluding, “You may tell what it is for a country to trust to trade [for 
its prosperity] when it breeds such spindling fellows as those [union men]” 




themselves, they cannot possibly bring prosperity to England. Mr. Nolan, a 
retired weaver, promptly counters him with a beneficent view of trade. He 
claims that “trade, properly conducted, is good for a man’s constitution” 
(20.207). With some refinement of “properly conducted,” he is in complete 
agreement with Felix Holt. His speech becomes more conservative as it 
continues, however. He concludes his argument with the idea that “trade makes 
property, my good sir, and property is Conservative. . . . The prosperity of the 
country is one web” (20.208). Mr. Nolan’s argument is a standard of political 
economic writers, who often suggest that the interests of large trade are identical 
with the interests of the country. Eliot’s use of her favorite image, the web, 
complicates an easy dismissal of Mr. Nolan’s position. The reader is expected to 
approve of Felix’s attempts to live a more ethical and less market-driven life. The 
very image of the web, however, demonstrates that we cannot escape the 
economic sphere. Gillian Beer notes that Eliot’s web is “a product as much of 
strain and conflict as of supple interconnection.” This serves as a dramatic image 
of Eliot’s economic dilemma: we may wish, with Felix, to escape from the 
market, but its web inevitably holds and touches us all.22  
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At the same time, though, the difference between Mr. Nolan’s views and 
Felix’s illuminates something crucial in Felix’s notions of good prosperity. Felix 
would, almost certainly, agree that the fortunes of all people in the country are 
linked, and people do have a moral obligation to properly (meaning, minimally) 
participate in the market. For example, even Felix feels the moral obligation to 
support his mother and to work, and would never suggest begging, roving, or 
living entirely from the land. His opposition to property, and thereby to Mr. 
Nolan’s views, stems from a similar notion that property is Conservative. He can, 
for instance, never truly believe that the wealthy Harold Transome is a Radical. 
Felix’s resistance to Mr. Nolan’s careful outline comes in the shape of a resistance 
to property and prosperity itself. In one of his impassioned speeches to Esther, 
Felix remarks that a man should never enter a career that requires him to be 
“detestable” for “the sake of two parlours [and] a rank eligible for the 
churchwardenship” (27.260). A man should be only as involved in the market as 
is absolutely necessary to let him help others, but to that extent he cannot escape 
it.  
The ethical issue of market involvement inevitably centers itself on the 
novel’s romantic plot. Esther Lyon holds a more typical understanding of 
economic virtue, believing herself correct to spend her small income purchasing 
the “essential” luxuries she feels requisite to her station. While Esther occupies a 
monetary position probably shared by many of Eliot’s readers, she receives no 
support from either the other characters or the main narrative voice. Even 




what she wants and spends only what money she makes, her economic choices 
are represented as deviant. Esther’s spending habits are given to readers even 
before her own first appearance, when her father tells Felix, “You are doubtless 
amazed to see me with a wax-light, my young friend; but this undue luxury is 
paid for with the earnings of my daughter, who is so delicately framed that the 
smell of tallow is loathsome to her” (5.60). The “undue luxury,” like Esther’s 
reading habits (Byron and French novels) comes to be a moral bone of contention 
between Esther and Felix. In one of their early meetings, he admonishes:  
You don’t care to be better than a bird trimming its feathers, and pecking 
about after what pleases it. You are discontented with the world because 
you can’t get just the small things that suit your pleasure, not because it’s 
a world where myriads of men and women are ground by wrong and 
misery and tainted with pollution. (10.123) 
Esther’s small luxuries, like wax candles instead of tallow, strike Felix as the 
signs of her moral degradation. Spending only her own income in luxuries still 
supports a morally corrupt lifestyle, which she must promise to give up before 
their relationship can continue. In a world filled with poverty, worrying about 
the scent of candles is unethical. The first sign of Esther’s redemption occurs 
when, upon learning of her mother’s true identity, she is able to instantly 
exclaim, “But that must be the best life, father . . . that where one bears and does 
everything because of some great and strong feeling–so that this and that in one’s 




Lyon does, that Esther has finally made moral progress: she is able to see why 
someone might go without luxuries.  
Eliot gives Esther a second and larger reason, beyond Felix’s disapproval, 
to change her lifestyle. While Esther has longed to be “a fine lady” her entire life, 
she finds life at Transome Court to be less perfect than expected: 
Now that her ladyhood was not simply in Utopia, she found herself 
arrested and painfully grasped by the means through which the ladyhood 
was to be obtained . . . . all these things made a picture, not for her own 
tastes and fancies to float in with Elysian indulgence, but in which she 
was compelled to gaze on the degrading hard experience of other human 
beings, and on a humiliating loss which was the obverse of her own proud 
gain. (38.361)  
Even in this initial moment of her fortune, Esther is filled with a vision of 
consequences. Her gain means a loss to Harold and his family, which her 
sympathy makes difficult for her to accept. At the same time, she remembers 
Felix’s lessons and imagines him instructing her to “take care where your fortune 
leads you” (38.362). Esther stands on the brink of the text’s ultimate corruption—
taking money from others for her own personal gain. Until Esther sees life at the 
court first-hand, though, these moral concerns remain in the background for her. 
She is first compelled to recognize her temptation fully, in order to understand 
the exact nature of her sacrifice. She sees that life at Transome Court would be 




easy” (38.367)—but the text insists that she learn to reject not just the luxuries of 
that life but also the morally empty “ease” that it offers.  
Many critics consider the scenes at Transome Court, especially the 
tortured inner life of Mrs. Transome, to be the most realistically and carefully 
depicted scenes of the novel.23 The primary purpose of these scenes, however, is 
to convert Esther, and by implication the reader, toward the joys of a simpler life. 
Felix provides the framework, but Mrs. Transome provides the ultimate motive 
for Esther’s conversion. Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth marks Mrs Transome’s role: 
“Mrs. Transome is a sort of historic alter ego for Esther, a possible version of 
herself, an embodiment of one alternative which Esther may choose if she 
decides to become mistress of Transome court.”24 She is the novel’s cautionary 
tale. Mrs. Transome’s pride and class anxieties have kept her almost literally 
imprisoned in Transome Court, paralyzed by the fear that her past indiscretions 
will be revealed. From her initial introduction, Mrs. Transome is a picture of 
thwarted womanhood, repressed by her life: “like all eager-minded women who 
advance in life without any activity of tenderness or any large sympathy, she had 
contracted small rigid habits of thinking and acting” (1.24). Mrs. Transome’s 
experience forces Esther to learn that money, rank, and happiness are far from 
synonymous. Esther is “touched with pity at [Mrs. Transome’s] signs of 
unhappiness” (45.432) and observes “some indefinable indications of a hidden 
anxiety” (40.381). It is, even to Esther’s wealth-bedazzled eyes, “impossible to 
                                                
23 Barabara Hardy cites F. R. Leavis to support her belief that Mrs. Transome is 
the novel’s strongest character. See Novels 93. 
24 Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, “George Eliot’s Conception of Sympathy,” 




mistake her for a happy woman” (40.381). Indeed, Mrs. Transome provides 
Esther with her final motive to reject her fortune, as “the dimly-suggested 
tragedy of this woman’s life, the dreary waste of years empty of sweet trust and 
affection, afflicted her even to horror” (50.470). Deirdre David considers Eliot’s 
devotion to Mrs. Transome’s story a deviation from the main points of the 
novel—“she invests so much narrative energy in Mrs. Transome’s unfolding 
family drama and so little in the ‘study of the people as they are,’ that the ideal 
social novel gets contradicted in her practice”25—but this very attention drives 
home Eliot’s most powerful point. Esther has spent her formative years desiring 
wealth, but Mrs. Transome proves to her that wealth brings no happiness, 
especially when unaccompanied by familial love.  
More importantly than this fairly obvious moral, however, Esther learns 
in dismay that Mrs. Transome is “useless.” Esther, despite her depiction as the 
embodiment of corrupted luxury, is accustomed to working for her living. She 
pays for her own wax candles and perfumes through her work as a governess. 
And, as she tells Mrs. Transome herself, these are relatively modest expenses. 
She knows “what to buy with fifty pounds a year, but . . . the price of nothing 
beyond that” (38.365). When Esther sees Mrs. Transome, surrounded by luxuries, 
she comes to realize the true implications of Felix’s desire for women to be 
useful. Mrs. Transome, even though she has her small charities as a landlady, 
“insisting on medicines for infirm cottagers” (1.24-25), is even excluded from 
managing the estate, first by Jermyn and then by Harold. This model of enforced 
                                                




leisure is new and disturbing to Esther, especially given her talks to Felix. Once 
she has been made to see the larger problems in the world, she cannot simply be 
content to sit idle. She comes to see Transome court as a life of “middling 
delights, overhung with the languorous haziness of motiveless ease, where 
poetry was only literature, and the fine ideas had to be taken down from the 
shelves of the library when her husband’s back was turned” (44.426). This life of 
luxury is “a silken bondage that arrested all motive, and was nothing better than 
a well-cushioned despair” (49.465). Being the wife of Harold Transome, who has 
ominously lived in the East and owned female slaves, would only intensify 
Esther’s sense of entrapment. Harold’s belief that “a woman ought never to have 
any trouble” (40.384) is exactly opposed to the things Esther has learned from 
both Felix and her father. She is desperate for the higher calling that life with 
Felix would allow, at least in part because that life would allow her to be useful.  
For these reasons, Esther chooses to sacrifice her fortune, although Eliot 
doesn’t allow Esther to do so easily. Instead, Eliot gives us the full, halting 
progress of Esther’s conversion. In part this is due to Esther’s real experience of 
poverty. Unlike Dorothea, Esther has seen “the dim life of the back street” and 
fears facing it alone (49.464). Furthermore, as Colene Bentley observes, Felix’s 
change of heart happens before the novel begins, so we don’t witness his own 
inner workings.26 Our lack of access to Felix’s interiority prevents readerly 
identification with his conversion. If Eliot truly intends to use Esther’s and Felix’s 
life as a way to model an ethical response to the world, she needs to give readers 
                                                




a more detailed sense of Esther’s change of heart. Esther’s decision not to marry 
Harold is rendered with a keen eye to presenting the vividness of Esther’s 
psychological state and a serious attention to the pressure of marriage on 
Victorian women. Esther is torn between a marriage that would be socially 
approved and one that would be seen as a downfall in the eyes of the world. Yet 
for her, the moral situation is exactly the opposite: to marry Harold is moral 
compromise. Eliot artfully shifts the narrative voice as she discusses Esther’s 
dilemma: “It comes in so many forms in this life of ours—the knowledge that 
there is something sweetest and noblest of which we despair, and the sense of 
something present that solicits us with an immediate and easy indulgence. And 
there is a pernicious falsity in the pretence that a woman’s love lies above the 
range of such temptations” (43.406). By choosing this neutral first-person tone, 
which she does much less often in Felix Holt than in the later fiction, Eliot 
compels her readers to internalize Esther’s moral quandary as an abstraction: do 
we accept the easier path, or the more virtuous one? By removing the 
particularities of Esther’s choice Eliot draws us in to sympathy with Esther in a 
more exact way than she ever does with Felix.  
Unfortunately for Eliot’s purpose, we actually see very little direct action 
taken by either Felix or Esther. Esther’s time in the plot is occupied by her ethical 
conversion, while Felix’s is dominated by his time in the riot and in prison. The 
riot, indeed, mostly discourages readers from adopting Felix’s “radical” lifestyle. 
Felix instead proves the real validity of the fears a middle-class reader might 




riot irrevocably illustrates that even intelligence and charisma are not enough to 
alter the course of brute strength and alcohol. Instead of diffusing the riot, Felix 
commits manslaughter, a worse deed than many of the rioters might have 
committed if left entirely to their own devices. Eliot allows Esther to question his 
shortcomings: “I can’t help being discouraged for you by all these things that 
have happened. See how you may fail!” Felix’s answer, however, lacks a specific 
response to his situation: “The only failure a man ought to fear is failure in 
cleaving to the purpose he sees to be best” (45.434).  
Nonetheless, Felix does go on to issue a more positive portrayal of the 
situation Dorothea Brooke faces at the end of Middlemarch (to be discussed 
below). Instead of reaching for grand gestures, such as stemming a riot, perhaps, 
Felix prefers “the minimum of effect, if it’s the sort I care for” (45.435), and he 
cares for “very small things, such as will never be known beyond a few garrets 
and workshops” (45.435). Evan Horowitz scathingly points to this shift in view 
as a crisis of agency for Eliot, who sees “no direct way to transform intention into 
action.”27 Felix’s lesson from the riots, then, appears to be a modification of his 
goals. The smaller acts he praised as the novel began, setting up a night school, 
for instance, were swallowed up in the political turmoil of the novel’s central 
sections. Chastised by his failure to influence the political outcome of the 
election, either through speeches or by diverting the riot, Felix lowers his sights 
to smaller, more pragmatic goals. Thus I disagree with Horowitz’s claim that 
                                                




Eliot is paralyzed by her fear that any action can lead to social “chaos.”28 Instead, 
I would suggest that Eliot is interested in a more portable and less socially 
specific model of morality. Rather than focusing on precise details of charity or 
direct action taken by Esther and Felix, Eliot chooses to focus her novel on the 
moral and ethical value of deliberately living a life without greed, embodied for 
Esther and Felix as a large income.  
However, this moral choice, too, is troubled by the text’s ending. 
Examining Esther’s and Felix’s final scene together complicates the novel’s direct 
discourse of renunciation. Felix has just learned that Esther has given up her 
fortune, but doubts her resolve. After a list of more serious questions, he 
considers her hair: “‘And these curls?’ he said, with a sort of relenting, seating 
himself again and putting his hand on them” (51.474). Esther replies, “They cost 
nothing – they are natural” (51.474). This simple exchange provides a 
fundamental dichotomy between things natural and things purchased. Esther 
can keep her “natural” curls, but artificial ones would have to be abandoned in 
her more serious economic life with Felix. Other scenes between Esther and Felix 
demand a more complicated understanding of exactly what it means for Esther 
to keep her hair intact. She is first described to the reader from Felix’s viewpoint:  
He would not observe her, but he had a sense of an elastic walk, the tread 
of small feet, a long neck and a high crown of shining brown plaits with 
curls that floated backwards – things, in short, that suggested a fine lady 
to him, and determined him to notice her as little as possible. A fine lady 
                                                




was always a sort of spun-glass affair – not natural, and with no beauty 
for him as art. (5.67)  
Even Felix, determined not to notice her, marks the instant signal of nobility in 
Esther’s hair. Curls, imagined here as a literal “crown,” are a sign of being a “fine 
lady,” not worthy of Felix’s respect. Similar language of royalty appears in the 
most significant early encounter between the two lovers. Felix visits Esther in 
order to scold her for her lack of seriousness, and finds her “playing with a 
shower of brown curls, and a coronet of shining plaits at the summit of her head  
. . . a remarkable Cinderella” (10.120). It is not only Esther’s hair that is natural, 
and therefore without price, but, by extension, it is also her aristocratic 
characteristics, which are now proven to stand without the backing power of 
money. Unlike the genuine working class, she has “natural” nobility that can 
exist beyond the market.  
Esther’s “natural” aristocracy conflicts, despite the novel’s attempt to 
bridge the gap, with Felix’s radical, working-class politics. It is indeed difficult to 
imagine the refined Esther participating in the kind of life that Felix desires. 
Furthermore, Felix Holt’s stance on money is so consistent throughout the novel 
that it jars with the novel’s ending. In the concluding scene, Esther glowingly 
recites the endless spending power of the small amount of money she will retain 
from her fortune:  
There would be money to spare, and you [Felix] could do wonders, and be 
obliged to work too, only not if sickness came. And then I think of a little 




live; and a little income for my father, to save him from being dependent 
when he is no longer able to preach. (51.474) 
Regardless of her chosen renunciation, Esther still sees a morally acceptable way 
of being economically comfortable. She will retain enough money from her 
fortune to protect Felix from the more unpredictable side of the market, but not 
so much that he can live completely without working. Felix responds 
enthusiastically, “Why, I shall be able to set up a great library, and lend the 
books to be dog’s-eared and marked with breadcrumbs” (51.474). Esther adopts 
the kind of practical solution that might still appeal to Eliot’s audience. Her 
choice also, crucially, empowers her. Unlike many Victorian heroines, Esther’s 
decision to retain part of her fortune allows her to provide for her family and 
play an active role in Felix’s future charities.  
As much as readers may want to accept Esther’s solution, it does nothing 
to solve any of the novel’s deeper economic problems. From the political 
perspective, Esther’s choice leaves the morally corrupt local nobility firmly 
intact, and the majority of her wealth in the hands of those who will do little 
good with it. Mr. Lyon, when he first learns of her fortune, rejoices at it as “a 
mean of honouring and illustrating a purer form of Christianity” than that 
adopted by the local gentry (41.391). By rejecting her fortune, Esther shuts down 
the possibility of joining her money to her father’s religious calling. Furthermore, 
Esther here undermines Felix’s entire moral program. Even though he ostensibly 
accepts her money to fund charity work among the poor, it is hard to escape 




that Felix is forced to recognize that no charity work can be successful without 
the help of outside income, an idea completely opposed to his earlier desire to 
help the working class from within. His earlier stance is so privileged in the 
novel that marriage and economic comfort, for Felix, will always be a 
compromise.  
By proposing a series of legitimate monetary dilemmas in Felix Holt, Eliot 
attempts to grapple with how, exactly, any person can interact with the market in 
a purely moral fashion. The novel comes to no successful conclusion. Esther’s 
compromise, in the end, seems to represent only a compromise. Esther and Felix 
are doomed to live a life with neither luxury (Esther notably promises to give up 
her attar of roses, the pervasive symbol of her deviant economic tendencies), nor 
moral purity. The attempt to salvage Esther’s money by making it only sufficient 
to maintain the family, with any residue going to charity, is not enough to 
ameliorate the sense that the ending is, somehow, a failure. Esther’s moderation 
of Felix’s goals is, however, shown to be the only way that those goals can 
succeed, just as Esther’s plea at the trial is the only reason Felix isn’t transported. 
Felix’s powerful claims then that “I reverence the law, but not where it is a 
pretext for wrong” and “I hold it blasphemy to say that a man ought not to fight 
against authority” are enough to condemn him (46.442). Only Esther’s assertion 
that “his nature is very noble; he is tender-hearted; he could never have had any 
intention that was not brave or good” saves Felix (46.449). In much the same 
way, her moderation of his intense social views is what makes them more viable, 




sympathetic with Felix’s vocational ideals, the novel undermines and revises his 
rigid distinctions between his macho humanitarianism and the feminine triviality 
that he associates with Esther, aesthetics, and the marketplace.”29 The novel’s 
reassertion of middle-class values, by giving Esther and Felix a proper income, is 
perhaps why so many recent critics insist on the essentially conservative nature 
of Felix’s Holt’s “radical” politics. Esther’s and Felix’s promise to help the poor in 
small, local ways has so little room in the text that their actions, while given a 
beautiful rhetorical frame and a complex psychological rationale, cannot stand 
on their own. We can see why Eliot might choose to re-write her plot of 
renunciation in Middlemarch. 
 
III. Eliot’s tactics fundamentally shift between the two novels, even though her 
message stays the same at its core. While Felix Holt struggles to demonstrate 
strategies for shunning the market and the psychological shifts behind that 
desire, Middlemarch emphasizes both the ways that money itself corrupts and our 
need for human sympathy. The narrator’s intense emphasis on sympathy is 
rendered as an addition to the rhetoric of Felix Holt, which allows for sympathy 
but does not demand it so insistently from readers. In Middlemarch, Eliot 
famously dictates not only the plot but also desires to control the reader’s 
response to that plot. More succinctly, Eliot uses her narrative voice to teach us 
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how to view other humans with sympathy. For example, just as readers have 
learned to dislike Mr. Casaubon, Eliot interjects:  
But why always Dorothea? Was her point of view the only possible one 
with regard to this marriage? I protest against all our interest, all our effort 
at understanding, being given to those young skins that look blooming in 
spite of trouble . . . . For my part I am sorry for him. (29.278, 280) 
Eliot spends most of this chapter re-presenting the details of Dorothea’s marriage 
from Mr. Casaubon’s point of view instead of Dorothea’s. The intention is quite 
pointedly to make us realize that the marriage is a disappointment for both 
parties. Any sympathy we feel for the disillusioned Dorothea should extend to 
her husband, even though his age and dryness make him less of a natural object 
for that sympathy. Eliot returns to this perception-shifting tactic again and again 
through her novel, using free indirect discourse to align her narrative voice to the 
interiority of each of her characters and presenting their actions from their own 
perspective.30 Readers are forced to participate in Eliot’s sympathy. Ann 
Cvetkovich cogently notes that Eliot’s practice here is “central to a Victorian 
tradition that claims for literature or high culture a special role in laying the 
groundwork for political change because it has the capacity to develop and 
educate feelings.”31 More than in the more overtly political Felix Holt, Eliot’s 
narrative tactics in Middlemarch attempt directly to develop the qualities that she 
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finds the modern world to lack. For Eliot, “sympathy is the imaginative impulse 
that, transcending the egotism and renouncing the desires of self, promises to 
bridge the epistemological and ethical gap between self and world.”32 This bridge 
comes, as my analysis will show, to take the place of monetary or market 
relations, as Eliot attempts to move even beyond the sympathy implied in 
monetary charity to a completely non-monetary world.  
Middlemarch’s expanded scope allows Eliot to treat a broader range of 
economic perspectives than she does in Felix Holt, and most importantly to show 
the ill effects of money more clearly. By treating characters who are already 
wealthy, unlike the largely working-class cast of Felix Holt, Middlemarch adds 
significantly to the treatment of money as social corruptor. One addition is the 
novel’s discourse of gambling and debt, in which the moral sacrifice of 
participation in the market is shown most strongly. Gambling by its very 
definition depends upon involvement in the market for amusement, rather than 
economic necessity. It presents a way to profit from the wealth of others with no 
corresponding investment of labor. Because the same action can produce, or 
remove, fortune, gambling fundamentally undermines economic systems. While 
the narrative remains largely neutral toward Farebrother’s gambling as a way to 
stretch the meager income from his curacy, a stronger value judgment is framed 
against both Fred Vincy and Lydgate. Fred’s gambling, while hinted at more 
broadly, appears largely in his illegitimate horse dealing. Before the novel begins 
he has already made the questionable decision of borrowing money from Caleb 
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Garth, when he has little likelihood of repaying it. The possible moral cost here is 
very high–Caleb Garth is the text’s embodiment of male virtue, and Fred risks all 
of the Garth family’s future happiness in his futile endeavor. Fred, like a 
stereotype of irresponsible wealth, places his own short-term happiness at a 
premium and takes money from the poor to finance it. Furthermore, Fred’s 
economic ideas are incredibly imprecise: “Of what might be the capacity of his 
father’s pocket, Fred had only a vague notion: was not trade elastic? And would 
not the deficiencies of one year be made up for by the superfluities of another?” 
(23.230). Fred’s economic rhetoric here only serves to displace responsibility, 
causing him to degenerate into a blatant economic speculator. Like the Victorian 
public, half-versed in economics, Fred knows only enough about the nature of 
money to abuse his opportunities. Instead of returning part of his loan, he invests 
his entire gift from Featherstone in a horse, hoping to make a quick profit. The 
horse turns out to be, literally, a bad investment, and Fred is forced to face the 
grimly stated economic facts of the case: “he was simply aware that he had only 
fifty pounds, that there was no chance of getting any more at present, and that 
the bill for a hundred and sixty would be presented in five days” (24.241). Fred’s 
acknowledgement of these economic truths shows his essential capacity for 
reform. Under adverse circumstances, he can recognize, or at least learn, that the 
only recourse is honesty with the Garths. He sees that his turn to irresponsible 
speculation has only made his situation more dire. Later in the novel, readers are 
intended to recognize Fred’s abandonment of gambling at the Green Dragon as a 




Lydgate, in contrast, is permanently animalized by his descent into debt 
and his attempts to shore up the family’s finances by playing billiards. Lydgate, 
like Fred, begins the novel with no sense of what the market genuinely entails. 
As Kurt Heinzelman suggests in his reading, Lydgate chooses “to regard 
economics as neither a moral nor an epistemological ‘fact.’”33 His cycle of poor 
decisions extends much more deeply than Fred’s. He begins by investing money 
in a medical practice that he fails to maintain. He then goes into debt for material 
goods that are more lavish than his circumstances allow and fails to retrench his 
personal finances when the bills are due. As Lydgate descends, Eliot notes that 
his earlier, more enlightened self did not gamble. He “had looked on at a great 
deal of gambling in Paris, watching it as if it had been a disease. He was no more 
tempted by such winning than he was by drink” (66.668-69). Lydgate’s morality 
initially protects him against such corruptions. But, as his fortunes fall, Lydgate 
takes up gambling explicitly as a way to avoid his fiscal duties: “his thought now 
began to turn upon gambling – not with an appetite for its excitement, but with a 
sort of wistful inward gaze after that easy way of getting money, which implied 
no asking and brought no responsibility” (66.669). For Eliot, though, there is no 
way to gain money without responsibility. The consequence of Lydgate’s choice 
is the utter renunciation of his ability to take a moral stand. Eliot’s tone, as 
Lydgate begins to gamble, becomes heavily didactic:  
He was not only excited with his play, but visions were gleaming on him 
of going the next day to Brassing, where there was gambling on a grander 
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scale to be had, and where, by one powerful snatch at the devil’s bait, he 
might carry it off without the hook, and buy his rescue from daily 
solicitings. (66.670).  
Fred, observing from the sidelines, notes Lydgate’s unnatural behavior, which 
the narrative voice describes as an “excited narrow consciousness which reminds 
one of an animal with fierce eyes and retractile claws” (66.672). The shift is 
absolute, and Lydgate has moved utterly beyond his customary “air of self-
possessed strength” (66.672). From this point forward, Lydgate never regains the 
full self-determination he had in the opening chapters because the market, with 
gambling as its most pernicious form, corrupts. Lydgate’s reach for “the devil’s 
bait” results in only the hook: his increasing need to be prosperous, through 
whatever means, overturns his desire and ability to carry on with his medical 
reforms.  
Middlemarch also comments more directly than Felix Holt on the corruption 
inherent in modern industrial practice. Eliot uses Mr. Vincy’s silk works to 
remind her readers of sweatshop labor and the dreadful factory conditions more 
fully explored in novels like Mary Barton. As Dorothea’s family and Mrs. 
Cadwallader look down on Peter Featherstone’s funeral, Mr. Brooke comments 
that the Vincys are “a credit to the manufacturing interest” (34.327). Mrs. 
Cadwallader rebuts with a presentation of the family as vampires. Mr. Vincy is 
“one of those who suck the life out of the wretched handloom weavers in Tipton 
and Freshit. That is how his family look so fair and sleek” (34.327). The 




increasing dominance of factories forced their wages ever lower and lower, far 
below the level of poverty.34 By one key detail, Eliot gives her readers a full 
reminder of just what Mr. Vincy’s social aspirations rest upon. His shameful 
treatment of the handloom weavers, however, is not Vincy’s only failing. Early in 
the novel, Vincy criticizes one of Bulstrode’s investments: “It may be for the 
glory of God, but it is not for the glory of the Middlemarch trade, that Plymdale’s 
house uses those blue and green dyes that it gets from the Brassing manufactory; 
they rot the silk, that’s all I know about it” (13.130). The critical eye here is on the 
economic malpractice of using ill-gotten money to fund religious programs, but 
it also scathingly depicts the corruption inherent in the demand for industrial 
profits. Mr. Vincy is apparently unable to resist the market’s demand for the 
cheaper dyes. By the end of the novel, Bulstrode’s litany of offenses includes 
being “a sleeping partner in trade concerns, in which his ability was directed to 
economy in raw material, as in the case of the dyes which rotted Mr. Vincy’s 
silk” (61.618). Bulstrode’s failing here and Vincy’s are inseparable, as they 
conspire together to give the public a poorly made good for the same price as its 
better-made predecessor. Even worse, the reader knows that Mr. Vincy’s ill-
gotten money is paying for Fred’s lavish, unused education and Mrs. Vincy’s 
dinner parties and ribbons. The family’s wealth is “sucked” from those who need 
it, only to end in the most useless of luxuries. As a manufacturing family, earning 
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their money by repressing others and exploiting the market, the Vincys are the 
great social evil of Middlemarch.  
More critically, Eliot argues that even good intentions can be corrupted or 
thwarted by money. Dorothea’s inability to do anything with her fortune, despite 
her ideals, is a constant theme of the novel. She is rarely, if ever, able to spend 
her money in a way that is genuinely helpful. Eliot gently mocks her by noting 
her dismay that “everybody . . . was well off in Lowick: not a cottager in those 
double cottages at low rent but kept a pig” (9.77). Her hopes of being a Lady 
Bountiful are thwarted by the generally good conditions on Casaubon’s estate, 
just as they were earlier thwarted by her uncle’s lack of interest in improving his 
own. Dorothea desires to be charitable, but has no agency. After Casaubon is 
dead and she has a fortune at her disposal, Dorothea still finds herself unable to 
follow through with her charitable projects. She reluctantly learns that she does 
not have enough money to endow a school or to embark on any other large-scale 
reform. She confesses to Lydgate, “I am very uncomfortable with my money, 
because they tell me that I have too little for any great scheme of the sort I like 
best, and yet I have too much . . . . So you see that what I should most rejoice at 
would be to have something good to do with my money” (76.765). The tragedy 
of the novel is that she never does find that “something good to do.” Dorothea is 
an unsuccessful philanthropist because her ardor lies outside the realms of 
feasible charity, but Eliot also uses her to make the point that true sympathy with 




Lydgate is important to him, for example, her sympathetic exchange with 
Rosamond about Lydgate’s circumstances is ultimately more significant.   
Eliot’s treatment of Mr. Brooke drives this point home even more strongly. 
As he attempts to enter politics, Mr. Brooke’s shame over the conditions of his 
estate lead him to attempt a more paternalistic attitude toward his tenants. To 
avoid being shamed, Mr. Brooke needs to improve their standards of living, but 
he has no genuine sympathy for them and operates only from selfish motives. 
When he finally does intervene in the problems on his own estate, his tenants 
deeply resent his overt paternalism because they can detect his lack of true 
feelings and tact. After being addressed as a “good fellow,” Mr. Dagley, a poor 
cottager, replies “with a loud snarling irony” that he is “glad to hear I’m a good 
feller” (39.395). He goes on to resist Mr. Brooke’s authority to suggest 
punishment for his son, caught poaching: “You’ve got no call to come an’ talk 
about sticks o’ these primises, as you woon’t give a stick tow’rt mending. Go to 
Middlemarch to ax for your charrickter” (39.396). Desiring only the authority of 
paternalism, without performing the necessary actions to gain the loyalty of his 
tenants, Mr. Brooke makes a hasty retreat, even though he “had been inclined to 
regard himself as a general favorite” (39.397). Mr. Brooke’s failure as a landlord 
results in the utter breakdown of any possible communication with his poor 
tenants. In order to become less of an embarrassment, Mr. Brooke is forced to run 
his estate as a business and rehire Caleb Garth to manage it. Paternalism, 





Eliot also uses the more complex plot of Middlemarch to present the 
economic ramifications of three marriages, rather than just one. Lydgate 
demonstrates the worst of the novel’s possible economic outcomes. He chooses 
to marry a frivolous woman–the unreformed Esther, if you will–and she forces 
him away from his principles. Rosamond’s extravagance drives Lydgate to the 
most improvident of all possible actions—borrowing money from the corrupt 
Bulstrode.  Only by exchanging Bulstrode’s loan for one from Dorothea can 
Lydgate regain any moral center in the novel. Even Dorothea’s money is unable 
to redeem him fully. He must, in the end, spend his life devoted to Rosamond’s 
greedier pursuits. Lydgate is forced to abandon his charitable impulses for the 
sake of his wife’s worldlier ones, which drive him, as discussed earlier, away 
from his original ethics. The narrator sardonically remarks that he ceased 
studying fevers in order to write “a treatise on Gout, a disease which has a good 
deal of wealth on its side” (Finale.834). To borrow again from Heinzelman’s 
analysis, Lydgate’s initial inability to understand economics, as it relates to his 
marriage, “means that his imaginative understanding of other economies–such 
as the internal structure of the human body . . . will turn out to be  . . . secret, 
imaginary.”35 The lesser failure of his imagination, choosing the wrong wife, is 
intimately tied to the greater, losing his medical idealism. Lydgate, almost 
inevitably, ends his days pursuing mercenary ends and curing the rich of gout, 
the disease caused by their own excess. Rosamond forces him to abandon his 
charitable intentions for a life of shallow luxury. 
                                                




Fred and Mary prove closer to achieving a financial ideal. Fred has been 
given a gentleman’s training, but not one’s income. Mary uses her influence to 
keep him out of the church, where he would have made himself reprehensible. In 
one of her more impassioned speeches, she asks, “What right have such men to 
represent Christianity–as if it were an institution for getting up idiots genteelly?” 
(52.516). Fred turns, instead, to a more humble position with Caleb Garth, who 
can teach him a better relationship to the monetary world. The narrator plainly 
points out that “Fred never became rich,” even though he does gain enough 
money to “become owner of the stock and furniture at Stone Court” (Finale.834). 
Unlike Rosamond’s corrupting influence over Lydgate, Mary’s virtue saves him 
from Featherstone’s tainted fortune, which introduces only vice and corruption 
into the text. By learning to work for his living, Fred is able to return, ultimately, 
to his birthright. He gains the benefit of Featherstone’s estate, without the moral 
sacrifice. From the beginning of his shift in fortunes, his plans for Stone Court are 
presented in the most careful of moral terms. Mary asks, “Should you call it bad 
news to be told that you were to live at Stone Court, and manage the farm, and 
be remarkably prudent, and save money every year?” (86.830). Fred replies, “Oh, 
I could be a tremendously good fellow then, Mary.” A proper, saving lifestyle is 
just what Fred needs to stabilize his character, along with some of Caleb Garth’s 
notions of work. While Fred and Mary are presented as morally worthy, 
however, their attentions do not extend beyond their own home. Besides raising 





With so much contention surrounding issues of money in Middlemarch, 
Dorothea’s renunciation at the end of the novel can be seen in a less equivocal 
light. While she does keep enough money to sustain her family, Eliot passes over 
that fact quickly. Even with £700 per annum, as opposed to Esther’s £150, 
Dorothea must scale down her desires. She passionately exclaims that she will 
“live quite well on my own fortune – it is too much – seven hundred-a-year – I 
want so little – no new clothes – and I will learn what everything costs” (83.812). 
While Esther’s money becomes the source of Felix’s imagined charity, Dorothea’s 
money is not mentioned again. The break between money and true charity, 
hinted at only through the absence of specific details in Felix Holt, is made 
absolute in this novel. Dorothea explicitly makes a moral, rather than economic, 
improvement in Will Ladislaw’s life. The “Finale” chapter reports only that 
“many who knew her thought it a pity that so substantive and rare a creature 
should have been absorbed into the life of another” and that “the effect of her 
being on those around her was incalculably diffusive” (Finale.836, 838). 
Dorothea’s economic influence on Will is deliberately silenced in favor of her 
“diffusive” moral effect on the world. While we can read Eliot’s exclusive choice 
of morality as an essentially anti-feminist gesture, it also seems to be the only 
moral claim that she can possibly make. The novel has already proved that 
money is too complicated and corrupting for any unmediated relationship with 
wealth, and the only way to deal with the moral problems it brings is to place the 




Will Ladislaw’s rejection of Bulstrode’s money allows a more clear and 
concrete example. The money offered to Will, after all, is genuinely immoral. His 
grandparents earned their fortune, now in the hands of Bulstrode, as dealers in 
stolen goods, and Will’s mother fled the family (another positively portrayed 
monetary renunciation) when she realized the truth. Will’s natural “impulse . . . 
to reject the disclosed connection” to Bulstrode begins even before the monetary 
offer occurs (61.622), and the revulsion only strengthens as the scene continues. 
On the surface, Bulstrode’s proposal appears quite logical. He informs Will that 
he would like to “make amends for the deprivation which befell your mother” 
by giving him money “from a store which would have probably already been 
yours had your grandmother been certain of your mother’s existence” (61.622). 
Even though Will has a right to the money, however, he recognizes the moral 
impossibility of acceptance. He asks Bulstrode, cuttingly, “Was that business [in 
which the fortune was made]–or was it not–a thoroughly dishonourable one–
nay, one that, if its nature had been made public, might have ranked those 
concerned in it with thieves and convicts?” (61.623). Bulstrode objects to the 
questions, which provokes Will to give the clearest statement about money 
contained in the novel:  
It is eminently mine to ask such questions, when I have to decide whether 
I will have transactions with you and accept your money. My 
unblemished honour is important to me. It is important to me to have no 
stain on my birth and connections. And now I find there is a stain which I 




and so will I. You shall keep your ill-gotten money. If I had any fortune of 
my own, I would willingly pay it to any one who could disprove what 
you have told me. What I have to thank you for is that you kept the 
money till now, when I can refuse it. It ought to lie with a man’s self that 
he is a gentleman. (61.624) 
Will’s speech comes directly to the crux of all Eliot’s attempts to moralize about 
economic matters. Money is a potential, or even probable, “taint.” We should be 
careful from whom, and for what reasons, we accept it, because it has an infinite 
power to blemish our characters and control our future actions. The highest 
moral act, in the terms presented here, is to refuse money, even when you are 
poor, because it comes from an impure source. Economists would, of course, 
disagree: in economic terms money is always and only a unit of value. Eliot 
patently rejects such assertions of neutrality, implying that the economic system 
covers over a fundamental corruption. 
Once we recognize the contagion transmitted with ill-gotten, or indeed 
almost all, money in these two novels, the renunciations of Eliot’s heroines make 
perfect sense. In the moral frame of her novels, giving up money is both a high 
moral action and a preventative one. Esther sees that the Transome fortune 
carries only misery, and Dorothea recognizes that Casaubon’s money, like her 
marriage, cannot bring her happiness. For both women, starting over again, with 
just enough money for subsistence, is a way of rendering oneself morally pure. 
The contagion of money, however, leaves Eliot with a major, unresolved 




weight placed on being able to choose one’s own economic status, monetary 
charity comes to seem like more of a curse than a blessing to its recipient. For this 
reason, all of Dorothea’s charitable fervor turns into a diffuse moral influence. 
Eliot, finally, turns to a larger, more general, philosophy of charity than the one 
she adopted in Felix Holt. She ends Middlemarch with the proclamation that “the 
growing good of the world is partly dependent upon unhistoric acts” 
(Finale.838), rather than on grand gestures or great deeds. Somehow, Dorothea’s 
“incalculably diffusive” morality and Felix Holt’s vague desire to do “very small 












  I would like to end with a few notes on the timeline of this project. The 
chapters here are presented in chronological order, but I am not suggesting a 
historical progression. Rather, the authors in this study have responded to a 
pressing social problem in particular ways. Their responses can, as presented 
here, suggest an evolution—from Smollett to Eliot, we see a more and more 
complete separation between the genres of literature and economics—but that 
lovely logical advancement is only true for these authors and in the texts that I 
discuss here. It is, in short, at least partly a coincidence. Trollope’s Palliser novels 
alone, written from 1865-1876, destroy any suggestion that the difficult 
connection between literature and economics has been “solved” by George Eliot 
for anyone except herself. Nonetheless, some historical shifts are important for 
the purposes of this project. Only Dickens, for example, writes directly about the 
experience of life in a workhouse, because of the authors in this study only 
Dickens was actively concerned with poverty during the New Poor Law crisis. 
Similarly, only George Eliot witnessed the rise of mathematical economics. Even 
in the relatively compressed timeline of the nineteenth century literature I 
discussed, important shifts in the field occurred.   
 The second problem with assuming a chronological progression of the texts 
I have discussed is the obvious and extreme gap left by my non-discussion of 
Romanticism, the great literary event that occurred between Smollett and 
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Dickens. I omit the Romantics for two serious reasons. First, and most 
importantly, the Romantics have a quite different kind of relationship to 
economic theory than both their predecessors and their followers. On the one 
hand, authors like Percy Shelley passionately debated economics directly with its 
proponents, most notably in his case William Godwin, while Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge lashed out bitterly against Thomas Malthus. This kind of direct 
argument, while also fascinating, lies outside the more explicitly literary interests 
of this project. On the other hand, poets like Wordsworth have a nostalgia for the 
“old ways” of rural poverty that strictly limits engagement with modern 
economic crisis. Secondly, there is a serious problem of scale. Choosing one 
“representative” poet for a chapter on Romanticism would grossly distort any 
kind of historical argument. Wordsworth’s representation of poverty in 
“Michael” (1800) or “The Old Cumberland Beggar” (1800) is so radically 
different from, for example, William Blake’s in The Songs of Innocence and 
Experience (1789) that selecting one or the other would be historically false. At the 
same time, a broad comparison of Romantic attitudes toward economics is an 
entire work on its own, and, indeed, has been done before by scholars better 
suited than I.1 This project, ultimately, focuses on a particular economic crisis of 
representation in which the Romantics largely do not participate.  
 That said, I would like to touch briefly on a historical phenomenon of some 
note to the afterlife of this project: namely, the professionalization of charity and 
the rise of the welfare state. This topic is, of course, far too broad to include an 
                                                
1 See, for just one example, Marlene McLane’s Romanticism and the Human Sciences 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000). 
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extensive discussion in this epilogue, but I would like to offer some brief 
glimpses. The incredible drive of economics toward statistical science in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century removed the pressure from literature to 
oppose it. That is, as economics became more and more specialized and 
mathematical, it removed itself from topical competition with literature. Supply, 
demand, and productivity in the abstract are not generally the concerns of 
fiction. This separation allowed literature to respond to formerly economic 
problems with less anxiety about genre. Secondly, the British public became 
increasingly complaisant about professional charity. This is not to say that 
criticism didn’t exist. Workhouse scandals rocked England as late as the Pall Mall 
Gazette’s “A Night in a Workhouse” series in 1866, and the fantastic 1877 trial of 
Dr. Barnardo, leader of a children’s rescue mission in East London, put 
philanthropy back, negatively, in newspapers.2 Charity itself, though, became 
less of an issue. While the 1830s had seen intense debates about the right of the 
poor to aid, the 1870s and beyond saw debates focused almost exclusively on the 
best ways to perform that charity.  
 For an example of this shift in economic and charitable understanding, we 
need look no further than George Moore’s most successful novel, Esther Waters, 
published in 1894. Unlike the other authors in this project, Moore’s social 
pessimism, heavily influenced by the naturalist novels of Émile Zola, seems to 
know the exact place of charity. Esther lives in an economically tenuous world, 
                                                
2 For an excellent treatment of late-Victorian charity work, see Seth Koven, 




shifting from one low-paying job to another until finally marrying a professional 
bookmaker. William’s health ultimately prevents him from taking his bets legally 
at the racecourse, and the public house he operates with Esther is closed when he 
is convicted of taking bets over the bar. On William’s death, Esther is left as 
impoverished as she began. The novel’s discourse of gambling operates both as a 
direct account of the realities of horse racing and as a metaphor for the monetary 
instability of the poor. Gambling is condemned as a social corrupter. Readers see 
men and women lie and steal to obtain money for betting, while their families 
nearly starve. The Barfield family, for whom Esther first works as a servant, loses 
nearly their entire estate because of horse racing. But Moore also notes that the 
gambling has other, more approved, counterparts, and a desirable economic role. 
William bitterly notes that the rich can have their betting any way they like it, 
“Then the betting that’s done at Tattersall’s and the Albert Club, what is the 
difference? The Stock Exchange, too, where thousands is betted every day. . . . 
Why shouldn’t the poor man ‘ave his ‘alf-crown’s worth of excitement? The rich 
man can have his thousand pounds’ worth whenever he pleases.”3 To William, 
the stock exchange itself is just another form of gambling, limited exclusively to 
the wealthy. Capitalism at its very core is nothing more than an elaborate betting 
system. Meanwhile the poor have nothing to look forward to, besides the 
outcome of the races: “Their only pleasure is a bet. When they’ve one on they’ve 
something to look forward to; whether they win or lose they ‘as their money’s 
worth” (306). William thus wants to shift the moral terms of gambling. The 
                                                
3 George Moore, Esther Waters, ed. David Skilton (1894; Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995) 
305-306. Subsequent citations in text. 
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excitement of the races is a purchasable form of hope, the one thing that can’t be 
had in more traditional markets.  
 The novel, ultimately, can’t back this attempted economic shift. In fact, it 
ambivalently emphasizes that there is little hope of changing anything about 
money and its distribution. Moore caustically portrays an anti-gambling judge as 
a drunkard and gambler himself, who nonetheless spouts morality from his 
bench. He solemnly declares that gambling “springs forth from the desire to 
obtain wealth without work, in other words, without payment; work, whether in 
the past or the present, is the natural payment for wealth, and any wealth that is 
obtained without work is in a measure a fraud committed upon the community” 
(330). The judge, in terms borrowed directly from the older political economists, 
imagines money as a closed system—one works for wages, which are then saved 
and turned to wealth. Gambling is not “work,” and is thus not a viable source of 
wealth. The novel has prepared us to see this proposal as a bitter fraud. Esther 
works brutal jobs to keep her son alive, but never sees any profit or savings. 
William, meanwhile, works so hard to keep his gambling business afloat that he 
catches tuberculosis and dies. While we thus might expect the novel’s working-
class characters to dispute the judge’s truism, readers instead find his words 
mirrored by the dying William. On his deathbed he tells Esther, “No good comes 
of money that you don’t work for” (372). Esther responds that “I’m sure you 
worked enough for what you won” (372) but William can only repeat the judge’s 
dictum once more.  
 Moore ends his novel exactly where it begins, with Esther returning, in 
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identical language, to the Barfield manor as a servant. Her return to the now 
impoverished house signals the bleakness of Moore’s economic landscape. 
Esther, despite her goodness and her dedication to hard work, has resolutely 
failed to break free of her legacy of poverty. She has worked her entire life to 
save her son, whose poverty forces him to join the army and become “mere food 
for powder and shot” (394). In this atmosphere of grim realism, though, Moore 
can give a portrait of charity far different from the other authors in this study. 
Esther, unlike the other heroines I have discussed, is the recipient of charity, not 
the giver, and her bland acceptance of such help draws a radically different 
picture of the charitable world. Esther, turned out on the streets with an infant, 
sees the workhouse as a place of terror: “If once she entered the workhouse she 
would remain there. She and her child paupers for ever” (159). She enters the 
workhouse anyway, and suffers little harm from it. The novel sees her entrance 
there as so matter-of-fact that it merits no further commentary. Other charities 
are more positively portrayed. Esther finds the lying-in hospital, run by 
charitable subscription, to be unsympathetic to the differences between its cases, 
but the care she receives there is both kind and medically advanced. Her mother, 
who refuses to enter the hospital, dies in childbirth instead. William, too, is 
treated very well by the charity hospital for tuberculosis patients. Most 
importantly, though, these charitable institutions are treated as facts, and Moore 
shows almost no private charity. There is no moral debate about taking money 
from an individual, because large philanthropic bodies seamlessly provide what 
is necessary. Only once, before she enters the workhouse the first time, does 
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Esther ever consider asking for money from an individual, and even then she 
chooses not to. Esther Waters shows us that, by 1894, public charity is imagined as 
a fundamental part of the lives of the poor. Given the novel’s despair of social 
mobility, society must structure itself in such a way that the poor have these safe-
havens. Charity isn’t optional or unethical, or even worthy of debate; it is simply 
necessary.  
What I have hoped to illustrate in this project is, thus, a series of snapshots 
of uncertainty. Mid-Victorian literature, following in the emotionally turbulent 
legacy of the eighteenth century, wanted to both solve social problems and to 
protect its genre from others that discussed the same problems. The presence of a 
shifting morality on one hand and political economy on the other made this an 
incredible challenge. And these questions linger today. While the removal of 
economics to mathematical models helped literature to sidestep problems of 
genre, the ethical problems of charity have proven harder to solve. We live with 
this legacy in what is cheekily known as “liberal guilt”—how do we both believe 
deeply in social equality and live with financial privilege? How do we reconcile 
personal freedom with the need for large social institutions? What do we do 
when someone on the street asks for our spare change? Each of the authors I 
have discussed has answered these questions in his or her own way, but each 
one has floundered at the exact point of specificity. While literature wants to 
solve the problem of personal obligation, it can only suggest possibilities to its 
readers. And, indeed, a specific, didactic message would never resonate as 
strongly through time as Dorothea Brooke’s wail of frustration that “there is no 
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sorrow I have thought more about than that — to love what is great, and try to 
reach it, and yet to fail.”4 
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